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Abstract 
Techniques from engineering, economics and control theory are used in 
this thesis to investigate the effectiveness of dynamic pricing for demand 
control and capacity optimisation in cellular mobile networks. The scope is 
extended to include pricing strategies that can provide a certain target revenue 
for the network operator. Algorithms for the application of dynamic pricing in 
voice and data networks are suggested. Mathematical models are developed 
to predict the effect of dynamic pricing on the network operator's market share 
and the overall user demand, including the effect of variable tariffs on user 
mobility. The question of setting the optimal tariff for a given system load is 
addressed and three dynamic price setting methods suggested. The first, 
competition driven ad hoc pricing, is used to identify the most sensitive 
parameters in the model, namely the revenue generated and the level of call 
blocking in the network. Two further tariffs (linear revenue attainment and 
optimal revenue attainment) are then developed for controlling the system and 
ensuring optimal behaviour. The tariffs are tested using a seven-cell cellular 
model developed with OPNET TM . Simulation results show that the 
performance of the competition driven ad hoc and linear revenue attainment 
linear pricing strategies is varied and they lead to either a significant reduction 
in the revenue of the network operator or the welfare of users. The optimal 
revenue attainment price setting strategy, on the other hand, is shown to be an 
effective tool for generating the desired revenue, while decreasing the average 
price in the network and increasing the number of successful calls. In addition, 
it is suggested that the optimal dynamic pricing strategy could potentially 
increase a network operator's market share by up to 10% compared to 
traditional pricing policies, thus offering a viable pricing alternative. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction. 
A- 
UCI. 
Technological developments in electronics in the last 20 years have 
transformed the lives of ordinary people and redefined the way business is 
done. The world-wide web, e-commerce and dot. com companies have 
become household names, while at the forefront of this digital revolution, 
cellular network operators are providing wireless applications which allow 
access "anytime, anywhere". In fact, there are suggestions that in the very 
near future mobile and wireless terminals will completely replace fixed 
terminals'. The predicted growth in demand for future network services is 
phenomenal as can be seen in Figure 1 -1 - 
The UK mobile cellular telephony market, in particular, has expanded 
very rapidly in the past decade. At the end of the first quarter of 1999, mobile 
phone penetration was almost 30% - up by 5% from the end of the previous 
year 2. The revenue and call minutes generated by users have also increased 
in proportion to the increase in subscribers (see Figure 1-2 and Figure 1-3 
below) and, by 2003 cellular revenue is expected to grow by a further 200% 
[1], with data playing an increasingly large part [2]. 
1 Kenn), Hirschhorn, Group Director of Strategy, ImagMeering and Futurology with Orange, claims that 
by 2005 all communications will be performed using a small, voice activated device that can be worn as 
an ear-ring ["'I. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction A- UCI. 
The increase in demand for network services has led to substantial 
investment in the network infrastructure and one UK operator, for example, 
invests E10 million a week into their network [5]. 
However, the total network capacity available to network operators is 
limited, not only by the amount of capital they can afford to invest but also by 
the total bandwidth allocated to cellular telephony. Furthermore, technological 
limitations also hinder the expansion of cellular network capacity. Typically, a 
GSM network can supply bandwidth up to 2Mbit/s/kM2' while an optical 
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) fixed line network can deliver up to 
several hundred Mbit/s/kM2 and as demand grows its capacity can easily be 
increased many times with relatively low incremental costs [2]. This is the chief 
limiting factor limiting the expansion capacity of cellular networks. 
In addition, a defining characteristic of the UK cellular market is the 
aggressive rivalry between service providers [6]. This fierce competition has 
let to a significant reduction in call charges (see Figure 1-4). In fact, the 
relatively slow rate of increase in revenue in Figure 1-3 is due to the 
decreasing prices, partially obviating the effect of the rapid growth in mobile 
phone usage. 
Therefore, network operators today are faced by a very real and difficult 
problem caused by the overall rise in demand. On the one hand, further 
increases in user demand would require installation of additional infrastructure, 
a costly option, which can only be used to a limited extent. On the other hand, 
due to the very competitive nature of cellular markets, the prices of services 
are being pushed down, decreasing the profit margins of the operators and 
reducing their potential for future capital expenditure. 
-20- 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
rlr 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 
Year 
A- 
ucl. 
Figure 1-4 Comparison of average cost per minute for fixed and cellular telephony in 
Europe 3 
To combat the adverse effects of the decreasing profit margins, the 
principle aim of network operators is to optimise their return on invested capital 
by maximising the return per subscriber and use of available network capacity. 
This task is complicated by the fluctuation of user demand for 
telecommunication services according to time of day. The difference between 
peak and off-peak demand is very significant, with a magnitude of difference of 
up to 20 to 1 between the busy and quiet periods [7]. An additional dimension 
to the problem in cellular networks is the mobility of the users, who can move 
freely around the network, making the accurate prediction of expected demand 
harder. Once put into place, the available capacity in individual cells is fixed 
and although engineering solutions, such as dynamic channel assignment, 
alternate routing and dynamic cell sizing, have been suggested for moving 
capacity around the network, these are at the cost of increased signalling 
overheads and/or interference. In addition, these strategies will fail if all cells in 
the network are busy at the same time. 
I France, Gerniany. Italy. the Netherlands. Sweden and the UK. 
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An alternative approach to shift demand for optimising the utilisation of 
network resources is via the use of pricing. In order to smooth out fluctuations 
in demand, this thesis suggests that the pricing could be dynamic; the price for 
calls will change as demand fluctuates. It will rise with demand, deterring 
some new entrants from choosing to access the network, and vice versa. This 
is not a new idea and dynamic pricing has, for example, been implemented 
successfully in the electricity industry. 
This thesis will address all aspects of pricing faced by network operators 
starting with the economic objectives of pricing, through the pricing options 
and finally, several dynamic pricing strategies for setting of dynamic pricing 
and evaluating their optimality are suggested. 
This is a multidisciplinary subject, which combines techniques from 
operational research, marketing, economics, control theory and engineering 
into a comprehensive study of pricing for the mobile telephony market. This 
complex task is further complicated by the fact that accurate forecasting of 
demand for new telecommunication services is difficult. This is due to the 
exceptionally fast growth of the market, substitution effects that are difficult to 
model, such as the interchange in usage of fixed and mobile terminals (Kelly 
[8] and Boden [9]) and a lack of accurate information. Furthermore, any 
predictions made about a particular market cannot always be extended to 
another market. It should be borne in mind, therefore, that the conclusions 
drawn in this thesis are derived from data gathered in the UK. As a result they 
would be applicable to the UK market and should only be extended to other 
markets with caution. 
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1.2 Structure of the Thesis. 
A- 
ME 
Chapter 2 presents the problem of limited network capacity from an 
engineering point of view. It begins with an outline of the structural and 
operational characteristics of current GSM and GPRS systems as well as the 
future IMT-2000 systems. The factors affecting the capacity and spectral 
efficiency of the systems mentioned above are identified, followed by 
definitions of terms commonly used in traffic theory for the measurement of 
network capacity utilisation. The temporal distribution of cellular traffic is 
presented and followed by techniques suggested for better utilisation of the 
available network resources in 2 nd and 3 rd generation systems. These include 
dynamic channel assignment, alternate routing and dynamic cell sizing. The 
techniques will be described and their advantages will be weighed against 
their drawbacks. An alternative means for fitting demand more closely to the 
available network capacity through dynamic pricing is suggested and its 
advantages discussed. Finally, a significant economic implication of the 
application of dynamic pricing is identified and a link between dynamic pricing 
and control theory explored. 
Chapter 3 focuses on pricing from an economic point of view. The 
economic objectives of network operators will be identified, followed by an 
overview of the tariffs currently used by network operators for meeting these 
objectives. A mathematical model intended to predict the effect of dynamic 
pricing on the market share of network operators is presented. The choices 
faced by network operators when determining the tariff (charging units) for 
accounting of resource usage by customers are presented, before describing 
some practical implementations of dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing 
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algorithms are presented for voice and packet based data networks 4 be ore 
engineering issues arising from the implementation of dynamic pricing, such 
as the signalling overhead and the best position for the algorithm are discusscl. 
Finally, possible complications due to the interconnectivity of cellular networks 
with the fixed network are examined. 
Chapter 4 continues the discussion of the expected effect of dynamic 
charging from an economic point of view, in particular its effect on user 
behaviour. A comprehensive mathematical model for evaluating this effect is 
introduced. This takes into account the price elasticity of user demand as well 
as the existing pricing bias in the network and a substitution effect due to the 
fixed network. In addition, a user mobility model showing the effect of price on 
user mobility is also introduced. The discussion then focuses on the final stage 
in any pricing policy: the setting of monetary units to the charging units. A 
literature overview of suggested optimal price setting strategies from an 
economic and consumer welfare point of view will be given and the drawbacks 
of each approach highlighted and an alternative "provider-oriented" approach 
evaluated. 
Chapter 5 presents a simple, market-driven, ad-hoc dynamic pricing 
setting policy, which takes into account the minimum and maximum price the 
network providers want, or have to, charge and takes the current market price 
as the average price in the network. A seven-cell OPNET TM simulation model 
developed to test the effect of dynamic pricing is described. Simulation results 
with the ad hoc pricing policy indicate that the behaviour of the network is very 
sensitive to the shape of the proposed pricing function. 
' Although a dynamic pricing algorithm for packet-based networks is suggested, due to limited 
resources the optimal dynamic pricing strategies will be urnplemented only for voice based services. 
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Chapter 6 introduces a feedback control theory approach to the setting of 
dynamic pricing. The revenue generated by the network operator and the 
percentage of blocked calls are identified as the most sensitive variable in the 
system and, therefore, recognised as very suitable controlled variables. The 
mathematical framework of an alternative revenue attainment approach to 
dynamic pricing is, therefore, given, guaranteeing a predefined minimum 
revenue for the network provider and assuming dynamic price linearity. 
Simulation results showing the effectiveness of the revenue attainment model 
are presented and discussed. Finally, the requirement for the linearity of the 
pricing function is dropped and an optimal shape found, through modification 
of the revenue attainment model, using calculus of variations and control 
theory. A comprehensive model for the determination of optimal dynamic price 
setting strategies for any type of demand assumptions is presented and 
simulation results reported. 
In chapter 7 the expected effect of the ad hoc, the linear revenue 
attainment and optimal revenue attainment pricing strategies on network 
operators' market share is calculated, with the aim of identifying the optimal 
pricing for maximisation of the total user database. 
Chapter 8 summarises the conclusions of this work and outlines 
suggestions for further research and development. 
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This chapter will begin with a brief historic overview of the development 
of cellular networks, followed by an outline of the structural and operational 
characteristics of current GSM and GPRS systems as well as the future IMT- 
2000 systems. The factors affecting the capacity and spectral efficiency of the 
systems mentioned above will be identified, followed by definitions of terms 
used in traffic theory for the measurement of network utilisation. The temporal 
distribution of cellular traffic will be presented, followed by techniques 
suggested for better utilisation of the available network resources in 2 nd and 3 rd 
generation systems. Dynamic channel assignment, cell sizing and alternate 
routing will be described and their drawbacks acknowledged. An alternative 
means for fitting demand to the available network capacity through dynamic 
pricing will then be suggested, followed by a discussion of its advantages. 
Finally, a significant economic implication at the application of dynamic pricing 
will be identified and some control theory terminology introduced. 
2.1 Mobile Cellular Systems. 
1.1 An overview. 
The first commercial mobile telephone services were established in 1946, 
and these early systems used a single transmitter to cover an area of 40 - 50 
miles. However, this approach offered a very limited system capacity of very 
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few radio channels, which were quickly saturated. For example, in 1970 the 
Bell system in New York City could support just 12 simultaneous mobile 
conversations. The 13 th caller was blocked [10]. The key in the development of 
wireless mobile networks was the discovery, in 1947, by engineers in Bell 
Laboratories that a reduction in transmitter power reduces the signal coverage 
area, allowing re-use of the available radio frequencies and thus increasing 
the capacity of the system. This process is called cell splitting and the area 
covered by a single low power transmitter is called a ce// (see Figure 2-1 ). 
This technique is still being utilised by service operators and, for example, 
urban areas have more cells per square kilometre than rural ones. 
The minimum set of cells using all the available frequencies is called a 
cluster. In first and second generation mobile systems, frequencies cannot be 
re-used in adjacent cells because of problems with co-channel interference, 
but clusters can be repeated throughout the network following a pre-set 
frequency re-use pattern [11 ]. 
Figure 2-1 Cell splitting 
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Cell 
cluster 
Figure 2-2 Frequency re-use pattern 
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The division of the coverage area into many cells imposes an additional 
problem with users moving between cells. The network operators have to offer 
a seamless service, and therefore, as users move to new cells, channels have 
to be provided for mobile calls to be transferred from one cell to the next. This 
process is called "handover". As the users cross cell boundaries, their mobile 
stations have to "sign off" from the controller in the old cell and re-register with 
the controller managing the new cell (see Figure 2-3). 
Co ntro I 
r tran fer 
RSIS, 1 
fir \ 
Mobile IIIIý 
t rajec to ry BSS2 
Area o t'dua I 
control 
Figure 2-3 Handover procedure t, 
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The increase in total network capacity, due to smaller cells, turned 
cellular telephony into a feasible and useful alternative to fixed line telephony. 
The first generation of mobile systems was designed primarily for the 
transmission of speech signals, although they were also able to transmit data 
at relatively low bit rates [12]. They are usually referred to as analogue 
systems as the radio transmitter does not digitise the speech signals prior to 
transmission. These systems include the Nordic Mobile Telephone (NMT), the 
American Advanced Mobile Phone Service (AMPS) and the British Extended 
Total Access Communication System (ETACS) [12]. Analogue systems are 
being gradually phased out in favour of digital systems. 
Second-generation cellular radio systems are digital and offer higher 
speech quality, increased capacity and security, and some standards also 
offer international roaming, i. e. mobile stations can connect and use 
compatible networks abroad. Examples of second-generation systems are the 
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) and DCS-1800 in Europe, 
and Digital APMS (D-AMPS, IS-54) and PCS-1900 (IS-136, an upgraded 
specification of IS-54) in the USA. 
Enhancements of the GSM and IS-136 second-generation systems are 
currently being rolled out to enable current networks to support higher rate 
data services. The most important developments in this area are [13]: 
1. High Speed Circuit Switched Data (HSCSD); 
2. Enhanced Data Rates for GSM Evolution (EDGE); 
3. General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). 
1. High Speed Circuit Switched Data (HSCSD) is a GSM bearer service 
intended to use multiple time slots for increased data rate over the GSM air 
interface, offering data rates of up to 57.6 Kbit/s. HSCSD may be used for 
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a wide variety of tele-services and its advantage is that it requires no 
restructuring of the available GSIVI infrastructure. Its disadvantage is that it 
reduces the number of users the cells can support thus effectively reducing 
cell capacity. 
2. EDGE, on the other hand, will use new modulation and channel coding 
techniques to evolve data services over GSM networks by using as much 
of the existing physical layer as possible. The disadvantage of EDGE is 
that it requires new infrastructure installation in the Base Transceiver 
Stations (BTS) (see section 2.1.2.1 below) and in addition reduces the cell 
radius because of higher interference. EDGE can support data rates from 
22.8 Kb/s to 69.2 Kb/s depending on the channel-coding scheme [13]. 
3. GPRS uses a packet based approach and will be discussed in greater 
detail in section 2.1.2.2. The EDGE concept has also been considered for 
GPRS (EGPRS) and Circuit Switched Data (ECSD). 
Third generation of mobile telecommunications standards is now under 
development, such as the International Mobile Telecommunications by the 
year 2000 standard (IMT-2000). This standard is known in Europe as the 
Universal Mobile Telecommunication Systems (UMTS). The operational 
objective of the new systems is to provide seamless services across various 
radio and fixed cable environments and under different operational conditions. 
The specifications include the provision of broadband multimedia (voice, data, 
video) and a home environment which can be defined by the user, so that 
consumers experience the same services wherever they are [14]5. It is 
intended that migration from second to third generation systems will be 
Their development is well on its ý, vay and the European Parliament required its member states to put in 
place a han-nonised system for authorising UNITS systems by I't January 2000 'in order to allow the 
provision of UNITS services by I" January 2002. 
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progressive and will be perceived by existing customers as a service evolution 
which is beneficial, attractive and natural [15]. 
In the following sections, before identifying the parameters affecting the 
capacity of the three types of systems outlined above, the architecture of 
cellular networks will be examined in detail. This would enable us to fully 
appreciate the serious network management problems faced by cellular 
operators brought about by limited network capacity. Tools developed by 
teletraffic engineering theory to measure the effective utilisation of available 
system capacity and overall system performance will be described, followed 
by an overview of techniques for offering flexible capacity. 
2.1.2 Overview of GSM, GPRS and UM TS Network Architecture. 
The basic architecture of the three types of cellular networks studied in 
this section is very similar. In general, cellular networks consist of Mobile 
Stations (MS) carried by the user, which can move freely around the network 
and the fixed support network infrastructure. The MS uses radio frequencies to 
communicate with the fixed support network. The support network is layered 
and the degree of stratification depends on user density. In the following 
section, the principal components and their main functions for the GSM 
support network are explained in detail and the differences in the structures of 
the other two networks highlighted. 
2.1.2.1 GSM network architecture. 
The GSM fixed support network consists of a Base Station Sub-System 
(BSS), a Network and Switching Sub-System (NSS) and an Operation Sub- 
System (OSS) (see Figure 2-4). 
-31 - 
Chapter 2 Mobile Cellular Networks -A, ucl. 
Each cluster of cells in the network is controlled by a Base Station Sub- 
system, which consists of two parts: Base Transceiver Stations (BTS) and a 
Base Station Controller (BSC). The BTS are located in cells and communicate 
with the MS in the cell; they are responsible for the transmission, reception 
and management of the radio interface. The BSC, on the other hand, is 
responsible for the allocation and release of radio channels and handover 
management within the cell cluster. 
The main task of the Network Switching Sub-system (NSS) is to manage 
the databases needed for subscriber data and to direct the traffic around the 
network. It consists of Mobile Switching Centres (MSC) and two databases: 
the Home Locations Register (HLR) and the Visitors Location Register (VLR). 
Network 
MSC Switching MSC 
Sub-system 
_.. d, v- 
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BSC Sub-system 
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Figure 2-4 Structure of the GSM mobile system 
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Each MSC is responsible for the control of a few BSCs and the set-up 
and co-ordination of calls to and from GSM users. As the number of users 
increases, full intermeshing of the MSCs becomes very costly and complicated 
and so a second layer of Transit Switching Centres (TSC), has to be added to 
the hierarchy. These are now present in almost all mobile networks [16]. The 
HLR and VLR associated with the MSC contain details of the physical location 
of each MS in the area - those registered in the cell and those visiting the cell. 
For security reasons, an Authentication Centre (ALIC) and Equipment Identity 
Register (EIR) are introduced to check the status of the user attempting to use 
the network [17]. 
The main tasks of the Operation Sub-System involve network operation 
and maintenance, subscription management and MS management. Thus the 
OSS interacts with all levels of the network. The first task of the OSS is 
completed through the use of special Operations and Management Centres 
(OMC) which provide the mediation between the network personnel and all 
machine entities in the network (MSCs, BSCs, HLRs and VLRs). The second 
task of OSS involves subscriber data management and call charging. 
Subscriber data management involves keeping up to date all the information 
about the subscriber such as their current tariff rate and any other subscriber 
specific features. It is done through interaction with the relevant HLR and the 
Subscriber Identity Module (SIM), located at the MS. Call charging 
management involves the gathering of information regarding the call charges 
incurred by the user in different network locations and the centralising of the 
billing data. The final task of the OSS is to update the MS equipment register, 
which is particularly useful when searching for stolen or misbehaving MSs. 
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2.1.2.2 GPRS network architecture. 
As mentioned earlier, GPRS (General Packet Radio Service) represents 
an enhancement of GSM that enables it to support packet switched serviceS6. 
As a result, two additional nodes are added for handling packets and the 
existing BSSs are modified. The two additional nodes are: 
* Serving GPRS Support Node (SGSN) 
Gateway GPRS Support Node (GGSN) 
The architecture of a typical GPRS network can be seen in Figure 2-5 
[18]. 
msc VLR 
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Network 
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H 
PDN 
Base Station PDN Packet Data Network 
Sub-system 
PCU Packet Control Unit 
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Figure 2-5 GPRS network architecture 
SGSN sits on the same hierarchical level as the MSC in GSM networks 
and per-forms the following functions: 
Circuit switched networks, such as GSM, require a dedicated communication path to be established 
betw 
i 
een the initiator of the call and the recipient. There Is Inherent Inefficiency In this approach, which 
requires the allocation of resources for the entire lengg-th of the connection. In contrast, in packet- 
switched networks, no path is dedicated and the available resources are allocated as each packet arrives 
depending on demand [ 18]. 
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1) Packet routing to and from any GPRS-enabled MS in its service area; 
2) Session and mobility management; 
3) Authentication and ciphering; 
4) Packet counting for billing purposes. 
GGSN, on the other hand, performs the following functions: 
UCL 
Encapsulation of Packet Data Protocol (PDP) packets into GPRS packets; 
2) Routing (tunnelling) of Packet Data Units (PDUs) to the serving SGSN; 
3) Packet counting for billing purposes. 
The GPRS infrastructure utilises the same HLR and VLR databases as 
the GSM network and also shares the same radio interface resources. To 
enable the handling of GPRS packets, the GSM BSS requires new hardware 
and software and this is implemented through the addition of a Packet Control 
Unit (PCU). 
GPRS packet 
data to/from 
SGSN 
GSM calls 
to/from 
MSC 
BTS 
Figure 2-6 Functions of PCU 
The PCU is responsible for the allocation of GPRS channels between all 
GPRS enabled MS that wish to transmit at any given time. This process is 
known as Medium Access Control (MAC) and is performed in all packet-based 
networks. The PCU also manages the transfer of user data between the MS 
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and the SGSN. The PCU "listens" on the logical radio channels allocated to 
GPRS enabled MS and forwards the packets as they arrive. The PCU can be 
implemented in the BTS, BSC or SGSN, although most vendors have chosen 
to implement it in the BSC. 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) suggests 
in its GPRS technical specifications [191 that the allocation of GPRS resources 
is done dynamically, depending on demand. This "capacity on demand 11 
principle aims to ensure that the GPRS resources are optimally utilised. 
2.1.2.3 Structure of IMT-2000 (UMTS) network. 
The technical specification of the IMT-2000 system allows network 
operators a choice regarding the network architecture. It has been suggested, 
however, due to the massive investment of mobile operators in the UMTS 
licences (for example, in June 2000 the UK auction for bandwidth raised $34 
billion [20]), that the operators will, at least at the introductory stage, try and 
minimise investment in UMTS equipment. As a result, it is very likely that 
incumbent players in the UK market will choose to utilise as much of their 
available infrastructure as possible. The radio interface of an IMT-2000 
network is shared between the MS using Code Division Multiple Access 
(CDMA) technique, the principles and advantages of which will be discussed 
briefly in section 2.1.3.2. As both GSIVI and GPRS use Time Division Multiple 
Access JDMA) technique in their radio access (see 2.1.3.1), the 
infrastructure for interaction with MSs over the radio interface cannot be 
reused. However, the rest of the fixed support network can be shared between 
GSM, GPRS and UMTS users, as indicated in Figure 2-7. 
Radio access for the UMTS network is mediated by the Radio Network 
Sub-system (RNS). The RNS offers the allocation and release of resources to 
-36- 
Chapter 2 Mobile Cellular Networks Uic I 
establish connection between the MSs and the UMTS Terrestrial Radio 
Access Network (UTRAN). A RNS contains one Radio Network Controller 
(RNC), which is responsible for resources, and one or more node Bs, which 
are responsible for radio transmission/reception in one or more cells [21]. 
PDN Packet Data Network 
Figure 2-7 Proposed structure of UMTS 
2.1.3 System Efficiency and Capacity Optimisation of Cellular 
Networks. 
As mentioned above, cellular networks consist of two separate 
components: a mobile network and a fixed support network. The capacity of 
the fixed support network can be increased easily and without significant cost 
to the service operator, but the total capacity of the radio interface is limited by 
the radio frequencies allocated to cellular telephony [22]. In addition, although 
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the radio interface capacity can be increased through cell splitting (see Figure 
2-1), this is very expensive. Thus, the bottleneck in a cellular network is the air 
interface and the efficient utilisation of the available radio resources is, 
therefore, paramount. At the highest level of network management, operators 
need to ensure that the available radio spectrum is utilised optimally and 
provides the highest possible capacity and QoS for the network. The 
benchmark against which the efficient use of available radio spectrum is 
measured in cellular networks is the overall spectral efficiency fl. This 
parameter is obtained by considering both the modulation and multiple access 
method efficiency of a cellular network and is defined as: 
77 --": Ila7lm 
77(l - Multiple access spectral efficiency; 
ill,, - Modulation spectral efficiency. 
At the second level of network management, the network operators have 
to ensure that the available capacity of the network is utilised optimally in 
conditions of vastly fluctuating user demand (both spatially and temporally). In 
the following sections, the factors affecting the overall spectral efficiency and 
limitations to the capacity of the networks discussed above will be identified, 
offering a brief overview of the highest level of network management and 
planning. Then the teletraffic management problem of matching the available 
network capacity to user demand and optimising the utilisation of the network 
will be discussed. 
2.1.3.1 Capacity and overall spectral efficiency of FDMA and TDMA systems. 
Multiple access spectral efficiency is linked to the access technique 
employed by the cellular network to ensure that multiple users can access the 
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network resources. Three multiple access techniques are currently in use: 
FDMA, TDMA and CDMA. 
Analogue systems are accessed using a Frequency Division Multiple 
Access (FDMA) protocol. Each user is allocated a frequency channel (a 
fraction of the total bandwidth available (see Figure 2-8 (a)), which can be 
used exclusively for the entire duration of the call. For example, for AMPS by 
specification this is 30kHz per user, allowing a data rate per channel of 
10kbps, whereas for ETACS the channel bandwidth is 25kHz, allowing a data 
rate of 8kbps. See Appendix A for further details on AMPS and comparison 
with other cellular systems. 
Two multiple access techniques are used by second generation cellular 
networks: TDMA and CDMA. First, we shall look at the TDMA protocol as it 
can be compared directly with the FDMA technique explained above. CDMA 
will be explained later. 
GSM and DAMPS networks use the principle of Time Division Multiple 
Access (TDMA). Each user is allowed to use the whole bandwidth of a 
channel in the cell but only for a limited time slot. The slots of a number of 
users are organised into frames, which are transmitted over the air interface 
(see Figure 2-8 (b)). For example, in GSM the channel spacing is 200kHz 
(shared by 8 users) which allows a total data transmission rate for 8 users of 
104kbps [12]. For DAMPS, on the other hand, the carrier spacing specified by 
IS-54 is 30kHz, which allows a total transmission rate of 23.85kbps per three 
user signals 
7 [12]. 
The data transmission rate given excludes the s1g, in I I _nall' g overhead also transmitted 
by the mobile 
stations in the normal course of their operation. 
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The multiple access effectiveness of a FDMA system 17, is defined as: 
Ra = 
Frequency re-use factor. 
(2-2) 
Therefore, 17, can be increased by reducing the frequency re-use factor. 
However, reducing the frequency re-use factor will lead to increased co- 
channel interference and reduced QoS. 
By definition the total number of users supported by a FDMA or TDMA 
system is [23]: 
Bvt, /Bc 
K 
Bw - Total system bandwidth; 
Bc- Bandwidth allocated per channel. 
(2-3) 
Substituting ( 2-3 ) into ( 2-2 ) defines the access efficiency of a FDMA 
system rl, in terms of supported users as: 
Ila ::::::: 
BcNu 
Bý, (2-4) 
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This result suggests that by optimising the number of users in the 
network the efficiency of the access technique can be increased. 
On the other hand, the multiple access efficiency of a TDMA system TI 
is defined as: 
77a = Tf B,,, 
(2-5) 
,r- Duration of a time slot; 
Tf - Frame duration; 
mt - Number of time slots per frame; 
N111c- Number of users sharing the same time slot in the system but 
having access to different frequency sub-bands. 
It can be seen that an increase in the multiple access effectiveness of a 
TDMA system requires fine tuning of mutually exclusive factors such as 
decreasing the frame duration without affecting the duration of individual time 
slots and the bandwidth allocated per channel. 
The second component, which determines the overall spectral efficiency 
of a FDMA or a TDMA cellular network, is the modulation efficiency. This is 
defined as: 
lb, - 
N 
BwAc 
4,, - total coverage area. 
By substituting ( 2-3 ) into ( 2-6 ) 77,, becomes: 
B,,, Bc 
K 
B,,, Ac BcKAc 
(2-6) 
(2-7) 
Therefore, the modulation spectral efficiency of a FDMA or a TDMA 
system does not depend on the total bandwidth of the system. It depends only 
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on the bandwidth allocation per channel, the total coverage area and the 
frequency re-use factor8- 
2.1.3.2 Capacity and spectral efficiency of C DMA systems. 
An alternative to TDMA, specified fully by the EIAMA IS-95, is Code 
Division Multiple Access (CDMA). In CDMA, all users in a particular cell use 
the entire frequency band allocated to this cell, rather than just part of it, as a 
channel [24]. Furthermore, CDMA uses a frequency re-use factor of 1 [25]. To 
distinguish between individual signals in a cell, CDMA uses 'spread spectrum' 
technology in which individual radio signals are coded using unique pseudo- 
random code sequences. Each user is assigned a "key" which is used to 
it spread" the signal across the entire band allocated to the individual user (say 
1.25MHz as specified by IS-95). The receiver can only decode the signal sent 
by the mobile station with the same code as all other signals are dispersed as 
noise (see Figure 2-9) [26]9. 
' The capacity of the network can be increased further by using Enhanced TDMA (E-TDMA) Instead of 
the traditional TDMA. E-TDMA uses the natural pauses m' every conversation for transmission of 
additional data, thereby increasing efficiency. 
m 9 This technique ý, vas first employed by the military to hinder signal jam mig, and its advantage is that it 
offers a high level of security as intercepted calls are coded. 
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Figure 2-9 Code division multiple access technique (CDMA). 
CDMA is a soft capacity system, i. e. there is no hard limit to the total 
number of users that the system will support. However, it is possible to 
estimate the number of users supported by a cell using: 
NII = 
ill, i7hc,, G 
11 
B", 
(2-8) 
vjý Rx (Eh 10) 
Frequency re-use efficiency; 
i7l, - Bandwidth efficiency factor; 
c,, - Capacity degradation factor to account for imperfect Automatic 
Power Control (APC); 
Number of sectors in site antenna; 
Voice activity factor; 
R- Information bit rate plus overhead; 
E,, 11, - Bit energy-to-interference ratio. 
The overall spectral efficiency for a CDMA system (q ) is defined as: 
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NuR 
Bw 
UCT. 
(2-9) 
Thus, in CDMA an increase in the overall spectral efficiency can be 
achieved by increasing the number of users supported by the system and the 
information bit rate per user. The first factor is limited by the overall radio 
spectrum allocated to cellular telephony, while the second is limited by the 
technology specifications. 
In summary, the overall spectral efficiency in a FIDIVIA, TIDIVIA or CIDIVIA 
network is limited by the multi-cell nature of the networks but ensuring that the 
networks utilise the available spectrum optimally would allow network 
operators to support the maximum number of users. The fixed nature of the 
total available capacity imposes the question of the optimal utilisation of the 
available channels. This has to be done in conditions of fluctuating demand 
and user mobility. The next section will look at this problem and after 
introducing the necessary teletraffic engineering terms, will discuss the 
suggested techniques for optimal capacity utilisation for both 2 nd and 3 rd 
generation systems. 
2.1.4 System Capacity Utilisation Measures. 
The efficient utilisation of the available network capacity can be 
measured by either calculating the amount of traffic the network carries (using 
traffic flow or intensity) or by calculating the proportion of calls that were lost 
as a result of demand exceeding capacity (Grade of Service). 
2.1.4.1 Traffic intensity 
The traffic flow or traffic intensity in a cell is defined as the product of the 
number of calls during a specific time period and the average call duration 
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(also known as call holding time)'O. The period of time that is normally 
considered in traffic theory is an hour, so traffic intensity is the product of the 
call arrival rate ý (expressed in calls/hour) and the call holding time 'r 
(expressed in hours/call). It is written: 
Är Erlang. (2-10) 
Measured in units of Erlang, traffic intensity specifies the load on the 
network as a whole or the load on the individual channels in a particular cell. 
2.1-4.2 Grade of Service 
Demand for cellular network services can fluctuate as a function of both 
the time of day and the user spatial distribution. An excess of user demand 
over available system capacity at any given location results in lost calls. 
Teletraffic engineering aims to deploy available network capacity to minimise 
the lost calls on a cell by cell basis. There are two terms for classifying those 
lost calls, depending on the mode of the mobile station when the call was lost. 
A mobile station in a cellular network can be in two distinct modes: dedicated 
mode, when a user is engaged in making a call; and idle mode, when the user 
has switched on their handset and is waiting for calls [17]. If the capacity of the 
network is saturated while the MS is in idle mode, the user will not be able to 
initiate or receive calls. This situation is described as call blocking. If a user 
moves to a fully saturated cell when the MS is in dedicated mode, there will be 
10 Call holding time is defined as the tune for which a customer will use the service facilities. This is 
normally, expressed as a probability distribution function with a mean and a variance. Recent research 
and empirical data courtesy of BT swggest that the call holding distribution time for cellular networks is 
log-normal, ývvlth mean and variance depending, on the cell size, coverage area and the speed of the 
moving mobiles. 
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no free channel on which the call can continue. In this case the call will be 
droppedli. 
The total number of blocked and dropped calls is a major indicator of the 
performance of a cellular system and in teletraffic engineering it is defined as 
the Grade of Service (GoS) provided by the network. This is different from the 
concept of Quality of Service (QoS), which is a much broader concept and 
includes other parameters such as connection quality, voice clarity etc. The 
relationship between GoS and QoS is shown in Figure 2-10. 
Cellular systems are designed with a GoS of 1% or better during peak- 
busy hour 12 [12], i. e. only one call in 100 should be dropped, so on average 
the GoS will improve when the system is not busy. 
QOS 
F- II Voice quality: Network 
I 
accessibility 
continuity and clarity 
Channel. avadability Coverage area 
Call blockmg Call droppmg 
GoS 
Figure 2-10 Relationship between QoS and GoS. 
There are three formulae which enable teletraffic engineers to determine 
the number of channels necessary in a cell to provide given grade of service 
for a given traffic intensity: Erlang-B, Erlang-C and Poisson. The difference 
" Research suggests that, overall, the probability of call blocking is higher than the probability of call 
dropping [271. 
d of 60 in* utes dur' g the day when the traffic Busy hour or peak-bus), hour is defined as the perio in in 
intensity is at its greatest. This is averaged out over several weekdays and for cellular networks the peak 
usually occurs between 10 a. m. and 12 p. m. with a second peak between I p. m. and 3 p. m. The peak- 
btisy hour changes at weekends. 
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between them is in the underlying assumptions as to the treatment of blocked 
calls. The formulae and the assumptions are compared in Table 2-1. 
Formula Blocking probability Assumptions 
Erlang B PIA KIKI) 
,6= 
B(S, A)= 
(AS 
S 
Y 1- call arrival rate A Poisson) 
h ll h ld =O K ca ing time wit mean o 
I/y 
, traffic intensity A= 
X/p 
number of channels S 
blocked calls abandoned 
Poisson A KIK! -A PB P(S, A)= I. callarrivalrate 
A (Poisson) 
ll h ld h = KS ca o ing time wit mean 
I/p 
. traffic intensity 
A X/M 
number of channels S 
blocked calls held for the mean 
call holding time. then dropped 
ErlangC 
Probability of delay C(S, A)= Pr I'Cd > 0] with call arrival rate A (Poisson) 
call holding time with mean 
A)= 
(AS 
S! 
IS (S 
-A)] C(S 
I/P 
, S-I Aili! + 
t(AS 
S! 
ýS, 
I(S - A)J] 
E traffic intensity A= Xly 
=0 number of channels S 
Probability of delay greater than t blocked calls held until served 
Pr [rd > t] = C(S, A ý-I(I-A)Spt 
Average delay El"Ed 
I 
=C(S, A)I(I - A)Sy 
Table 2-1 Comparison between the three traffic intensity formulae 
For the cellular networks operating at present, the first (Erlang-B) formula 
is perhaps the most suitable one because blocked calls are abandoned. In all 
three formulae, it is assumed that: 
1. Calls occur at random intervals; 
2. Number of users per channel is very large; 
3. All users offer the same amount of traffic; 
4. The system is in statistical equilibrium; 
5. The traffic offered is known or accurately predictable. 
As the Erlang formulae were developed to describe the system blocking 
probability for fixed networks, their extension to mobile networks is not always 
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straightforward. For example, the velocities at which users travel will affect the 
performance of the cellular network and at first glance invalidate their 
applicability. If the velocity of the mobile nodes is increased while keeping all 
other factors in the system, e. g. cell size, constant, the blocking and dropping 
probability also decreases as shown in a study by Hong and Rappaport [27]. 
However, this result is consistent with the theory of the Erlang model because, 
due to the higher velocity, the overall call holding time in a cell will decrease, 
thus decreasing the overall system load. Although their underlying 
assumptions could be challenged, the Erlang formulas offer a useful tool for 
network management. 
2.1.5 Traffic Profile. 
Current user demand for cellular services exhibits some unfavourable 
properties: it is distributed very unevenly, both temporally and spatially, and 
poses problems to service operators attempting to optimise the use of 
available system capacity. There is a very significant difference in demand for 
cellular network resources during peak and off peak hours, as can be seen 
from Figure 2-11. A network geared to meet peak demand will be idle and 
have much spare capacity the rest of the time. In addition, traffic intensity 
varies spatially depending on the distribution of users in the network. The 
aggregation of a large number of users in a relatively small area (a football 
stadium or a movie premiere, for example) leads to the generation of 
particularly high traffic volume in that area. This phenomenon is known as a 
"hot spot" [281. 
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Figure 2-11 Temporal distribution of cellular traffic in a small cell 13 
2.1.6 Capacity Optimisation Techniques. 
-A- UCL 
Total network capacity, as pointed out earlier, is limited by the frequency 
bandwidth allocated for cellular communications and certain network 
parameters chosen by the network operator (multiple access method, cell size, 
frequency re-use factor). Once the sizes of the cells are decided and the 
channels allocated the capacity on the individual cells is fixed. However, the 
fluctuation in demand makes some flexibility in cell capacity desirable. Two 
ways have been suggested for adding a degree of flexibility in the number of 
available channels per cell by either moving capacity between cells (in TDMA) 
or changing the size of the cells (UMTS). 
2.1.6.1 Offering flexible capacity in first and second-generation systems. 
There are two approaches that have been suggested for circuit-switched 
networks [29]: 
9 Moving capacity between cells (dynamic channel assignment); 
I ý, Data courtesy of BT. 
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* Using the overlap between cells and allocating calls to cells according to 
the level of traffic in each cell (altemate routing). 
With the first approach, instead of permanently reserving channels for 
use within each coverage cell, the channels are kept in a centralised pool and 
are allocated to cells according to demand. The channels can be re-used in 
coverage cells separated by a re-use distance interval. 
Channels could be allocated using a variety of different algorithms: 
First available: assigns the first available channel found in the search for 
free channels; 
- Nearest neighbour: chooses a channel from the neighbouring cell. 
Hybrid algorithms, which use some fixed and some dynamically allocated 
channels, can also be used. The negative side of dynamic channel 
assignment is the increased computational load on the system. 
The second approach allocates calls to cells depending on their load, 
and various algorithms have been suggested: 
Last chance: a call blocked by the cell with the strongest signal is offered to 
the cell with the next strongest signal; 
Least busy cell: assigns overlap calls to the cell with the least number of 
calls. 
Alternate routing strategies offer increased flexibility at the cost of some 
increased co-channel interference. 
In conclusion, the available network capacity can be utilised more 
efficiently, and the number of blocked and dropped calls reduced by the 
application of dynamic channel allocation and alternate routing algorithms. 
However, this is done at the cost of an increased signalling overhead, 
although the increase is proportional to the complexity of the algorithm. 
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2.1.6.2 Offering flexible capacity in third generation systems. 
CDMA systems have "soft capacity" and as a result will not exhibit call 
blocking when full capacity is reached; instead, the offered quality of service 
will slowly degrade, possibly encouraging customers to shorten their 
conversations according to Elliot and Dailey [30]. However, this shift in quality 
can be very frustrating to users using data services, for example, where 
decreased QoS has a profound effect. Spilling et. al. [28] suggest that an 
increase in demand can be met through adaptive cell sizing, i. e. reducing the 
radii of busy cells while neighbouring BSs increase their coverage area. This 
approach can work very well when dealing with traffic "hot spots" in the 
network. However, its effect is limited if all cells in an area become congested 
at the same time. 
2.1.6.3 Other congestion control mechanisms in GSM. 
Access to the GSM network is through the Random Access Channel 
(RACH) and is based on the slotted ALOHA method where, if a call request is 
not answered after a timeout, the sender assumes that there was a collision 
and the call request is repeated after a random time period. Currently, when 
the system detects congestion at the access point of the network (the radio 
interface), it has three methods to allow it to control throughput [17]. 
The first method for traffic control involves the alteration of the 
parameters of the RACH which determine the allowed number of repeat call 
attempts per MS and the time interval between attempts. The second method 
involves a rejection of a call request with a message forbidding the MS to 
access the network again for some specified length of time. The third method 
is the most effective option and relies on the concept of an access class. it 
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controls congestion by barring whole classes of MSs to access the network 
(cell) at busy times (except for emergency calls). To achieve this, subscribers 
are split into 10 balanced sub-populations and the access class a user 
belongs to is stored in their SIM card and cannot be altered. Special 
categories of GSM users are defined as "Very Important GSM Subscribers" 
(Mouly and Pauted, 1992: 371) [17], including security services, public utilities 
and emergency services, which will have a lower probability of call blocking. 
An ordinary user has no control over their blocking probability. 
2.2 Alternative Approach to Capacity Optimisation - Dynamic 
Pricing. 
The traditional engineering approach to capacity optimisation attempts to 
map user demand to the resources in the network by shifting and adjusting the 
number of traffic channels in a given region. However, wide fluctuations of 
user demand in time and space, coupled with the difficulties and cost 
associated with providing a flexible channel allocation scheme, lead to network 
congestion and a reduction in the GoS supported. This thesis suggests and 
examines in detail an alternative approach to optimising the use of the 
available network resources; instead of mapping the network resources to 
demand, user demand would be pushed towards the desired level that can be 
met by the available network resources. The ultimate lever that a network 
operator can use to affect user demand is the price of the calls and in order to 
even out demand, the price of calls has to change dynamically in time. It will 
decrease when demand is low to encourage more usage, and increase when 
demand is high to discourage new users and to possibly to encourage existing 
users to shorten their calls. Plotted in Figure 2-12 is the number of calls 
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generated in a cell as a function of time 14 and a two-tariff (with peak and off 
peak) price charged by an UK network operator [31]. It can be seen that the 
price of calls is high even when demand is very low at the start of the day and 
low at the end of the evening when demand is still high. 
The aim of a dynamically priced network would be to eliminate this 
anomaly and to distribute the traffic carried over the network more evenly, both 
temporally and spatially, resulting in a more efficient utilisation of network 
resources. It is intended as a "soft line" approach to capacity utilisation. For 
example, in current cellular networks only one call in a hundred should be lost 
at the busiest time of day. 
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Figure 2-12 Price fluctuations in a non-dynamically priced network 
In reality, however, this criterion would be difficult to meet due for 
technical reasons. If, for example, a network operator notices that a small cell 
in central London, with say 29 channels, has a blocking probability of 5% 
during the busy peak hour over a month, they might want to increase the 
number of channels in the cell. Using the Erlang B formulae from Table 2-1 to 
14 Data courtes), of BT 
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find the number of channels that will decrease the blocking probability to 1 %, it 
can be seen that the number of channels needs to be increased to 32 [32]. In 
this particular example, only three additional channels would reduce the 
percentage of blocked calls to 1 %. However, to achieve this by the "hard" 
approach of cell splitting, the network provider will have to incur significant 
capital costs in purchasing additional infrastructure and running costs for re- 
configuring the network. 
2.2.1 Advantages of Dynamic Pricing Tariffs. 
An advantage of dynamic pricing is that it will act as a natural control 
mechanism for calls with different priorities. As users have a choice as to 
whether to proceed with a call or not, the importance of the call will influence 
their choice. Thus, with dynamic pricing, a natural prioritisation of the calls will 
occur, ensuring that generally only low priority calls are lost. This will be an 
improvement on the current system, which has no means for regulating the 
importance of calls and so loses them indiscriminately. Furthermore, since 
users of the cellular network can be mobile and a user in a car, for example, 
would move out of a busy cell relatively quickly and could soon make the 
intended call at a lower price rather than postponing or not making it at all. 
It is clear that dynamic pricing relies on the assumption that users will 
suppress their demand for the service when the network is busy and increase 
their usage at quieter times. Therefore, it is inevitable that a certain proportion 
of calls attempted during the busy hour and suppressed due to the very high 
price will never be made again. In effect, these calls are lost and represent lost 
revenue for the service provider. However, the proportion of calls lost due to 
suppression during busy periods has to be compared to the proportion of calls 
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lost due to call blocking and call dropping as a result of system overload. From 
the point of view of the wealthier consumers the increase in price can be 
perceived as a special (premium) price to be paid for a better QoS. On the 
other hand, users who have to suppress or delay their calls as a result of the 
high price could perceive it a reduction in the QoS and therefore this issue has 
to be handled carefully by the network operator. In addition, the reduction in 
price when the network is underused would stimulate additional demand, 
which could compensate for the reduction in revenue due to calls lost due to 
the high price. 
2.2.2 Dynamic Pricing Link with Contro / Theory and Economics. 
The idea behind a dynamically priced network is that it will give feedback 
to its users based on the current state of the system, in order to steer the 
system into a desired state. The feedback sent to users will be in the form of 
different price for the calls for at that particular time in a particular cell. This 
approach shifts the problem from being a purely network engineering problem 
into the domain of control theory. Thus in order to analyse the problem and to 
find the optimal price function that will ensure that the system is taken to the 
desired state it is necessary to understand the basic principles of control 
theory. 
In addition, changing the price of the calls will directly affect the revenue 
generated by the network operator. This is a very significant effect from a 
network operator's point of view and, therefore, also has to be examined. 
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2.3 Control Theory Background 
-A- -UCL 
Control theory deals with the analysis of dynamic systems and methods 
for developing controls to ensure that they remain in a desired state. In very 
general term the control problem can be defined as (see Figure 2-13): 
"Given a system S, with measured signals y, determine a feasible 
control input u, so that a controlled variable z as closely as possible follows a 
reference signal (or set point) r, despite influence of disturbances 
measurement errors n and variations in the system" (Glad and Ljung (2000): 
pp 8) [331. 
This problem is usually solved by letting the control input it be generated 
from y and r by a controller (or regulator) R. 
n 
Figure 2-13 Schemata of a controlled system 
Control systems can exhibit a number of properties and are usually 
classified depending on six of those. A system S is: 
1. Causal if for every time point tj, the output y(t, ) only depends on the 
control u(t), -,, <t<t, and non-causal otherwise; 
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2. Static if for every time point t, , the output y(tj) only depends on the 
controlled input u(t) for t= tj and dynamic otherwise; 
3. Time discrete if the output y and the controlled input u are defined only 
for discrete time points 15 and continuous otherwise; 
4. SISO (single input, single output) if for every time point t, the output and 
the controlled input are scalars and multivariable otherwise; 
5. Time invariant if the mapping y= S(u) is independent in absolute time and 
time varying otherwise; 
6. Linear if S is a linear mapping, i. e., 
S(alul +aU2)=ajS(u, )+a2S(u2 ) 
and non-linear otherwise. 
The classification of a dynamically priced cellular system by those factors 
would depend on the assumptions made about the overall behaviour of the 
network users and the dynamic pricing function. 
2.4 Chapter Summary. 
After a historic overview of the development of cellular networks, this 
chapter looked at the structural and operational characteristics of current GSM 
systems as well as the future GPRS and IMT-2000 systems. The factors 
affecting the capacity and spectral efficiency of the systems mentioned above 
were identified, followed by definitions of terms commonly used in traffic theory 
for the measurement of network capacity utilisation. The temporal distribution 
of cellular traffic was presented, followed by techniques suggested for better 
utilisation of the available network resources in 2 nd and 3 rd generation 
Ii Discrete control systenis are described using difference equations. while continuous systems are 
described using differential equations. 
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systems, such as dynamic channel assignment, alternate routing and dynamic 
cell sizing, were identified and their drawbacks acknowledged. An alternative 
means for fitting demand to the available network capacity through dynamic 
pricing was then suggested, followed by a discussion of its advantages. 
Finally, a significant economic implication at the application of dynamic pricing 
in terms of its effect on network provider's revenue and the terminology of 
control theory briefly discussed. 
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Chapter 3 
In the previous chapter, the problems encountered by limited network 
capacity and fluctuations in demand was identified. Dynamic pricing was 
suggested as a means for regulating demand and improving the optimisation 
of the available network resources. This chapter will focus on pricing from an 
economic point of view. The economic objectives of network operators will be 
identified, followed by a list of the tariffs currently used by network operators 
for meeting these objectives. A mathematical model developed to predict the 
effect of dynamic pricing on the network operators market share will then be 
presented. The choices faced by network operators in deciding on charging 
units for accounting purposes in static pricing strategies will be presented, 
before describing some practical implementations of dynamic pricing. Dynamic 
pricing algorithms will then be presented for voice and packet based networks 
before an in-depth discussion of issues arising from the implementation of 
dynamic pricing, such as the signalling overhead in the networks and the best 
position for the algorithm. Finally, possible complications due to the cellular 
networks' interconnectivity with the fixed network will be examined. 
3.1 Economic Aspects of Network Management 
Once the network infrastructure is in place, a network operator's 
objective from an economic point of view becomes maximisation of the return 
on invested capital. This is achieved through increasing both the size of the 
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subscriber database (market share) and the revenue per subscriber (RPS). 
The following sections will identify the factors affecting market share and then 
give an overview of the strategies employed by network operators for 
optimising the revenue per subscriber. 
3.1.1 Factors Affecting Service Provider's Market Share. 
The market share of each network operator will depend on historic 
factors specific to each country such as the number of competitors in the 
market and the underlying structure of the supply chain, factors that can be 
controlled by the network operators themselves and intervention of the 
regulator. For example, historically the UK market is very deregulated and 
competitive with four network operators and a number of service providers, 
which has encouraged competitive pricing policies 16 
A survey of mobile phone users in the UK, conducted as part of this 
research, indicated that the most significant factors affecting service providers 
market share are the price of acquiring a phone and the price of the calls. 
These were closely followed in importance by the network operator's coverage 
area 
17 
. The price of the calls was the deciding factor in the choice of 34.4% of 
respondents and therefore, it is reasonable to assume that, keeping all other 
factors equal, users would choose the service provider offering the lowest call 
charges. In practice this assumption will not be strictly correct, however, as 
users have different preferences and, for example, business users who are 
given mobile phones as part of their job are more concerned with the QoS and 
coverage provided by the network. 
16 See Appendix B for detailed information about the supply chain m the UK market and effect 
competition on price for the calls. 
17 See Appendix C for methodology and other firtdings. 
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Based on these findings the dynamic relationship between price of calls 
and the market share of a service provider has been plotted in Figure 3-1. As 
well as market share, in the short run, the price for services will affect the user 
behaviour and the demand for network resources. This will influence the 
revenue per subscriber recuperated by the network operator and in the long 
run will affect their profit and the amount of investment into new network 
infrastructure. In its turn, capital expenditure would again affect the price the 
network operator charges. The relationship between the price for services and 
the expected market share of the network operator is very complex and the 
importance of pricing strategies for the operators' successful market 
penetration and share retention cannot be underestimated. Customer churn 
would be a particular problem in mobile markets where the penalties for 
changing network providers are relatively low. 
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Figure 3-1 Factors affecting network operator's market share 
For example, T-Mobile 18 attempted to enter the market in September 
1993 by marketing itself as the operator which provided the highest quality of 
service on its network, initially limited coverage and simple and easy to 
18 Ncývv name for One 2 One since April 2002. 
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understand tariffs. In fact, to encourage demand, T-Mobile offered their 
customers all off-peak calls for free [11 ]. As a result, demand in off-peak hours 
increased dramatically and caused problems with system overload. This 
affected T-Mobile's reputation for offering good quality of service. Furthermore, 
under competitive pressure from other service providers, T-Mobile had to 
change and complicate their tariff structure in an attempt to attract more 
business users. Clearly, pricing is an important factor in determining the 
success of network operators in the competitive cellular telephone market. 
3.1.1.1 Market segmentation. 
As pointed out above, the gaining and retention of market share (or 
customer base) is the main goal of any service operator and the most effective 
means for acquiring new customers is through market segmentation. Market 
segmentation refers to the artificial subdivision of the market into different 
consumer groups, which allows the service provider to develop different 
marketing strategies to reach those groups. There are various bases for 
segmentation and the main criteria for effective segmentation have been 
identified by Kotler [34]. In general, each identified segment should be 
characterised by a set of common customer requirements, have measurable 
characteristics, common competitors and be of reasonable size (Ward [35]). 
Traditionally, telecommunication markets have been divided into business and 
private users. This particular segmentation is partly on the basis of the 
different price sensitivity of these two consumer groups. Alternative 
segmentation criteria could be: 
* Geographic factors: depending of country size, city size and population 
density or separate units such as nations, states, regions, countries etc. 
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9 Psychographic (or socio-economic) segmentation: this grouping is based 
on social class, life style or personality. For example, the lifestyle of a 
customer can influence their demand for telecommunication services. 
9 Behaviouristic segmentation: this segmentation divides customers into 
groups depending on purchasing behaviour, loyalty, usage rate and 
benefits sought. 
9 Demographic: consists of dividing the market into groups based on 
vana es such as age, gender, family size, family life cycle income, 
occupation and education. Demographic criteria are among the most 
popular bases for segmenting user groups. For example, the need for 
communication services and usage often follows closely demographic 
variables such as age or occupation. In addition, these factors are easier to 
quantify than the psychographic or behaviouristic factors identified above. 
e Size and profitability segmentation: a common phenomenon in many 
industries, including telecommunications, is that a small proportion of firm's 
customers account for a large proportion of their profit (also known as the 
Pareto effect) [35]. This is a useful basis for the segmentation of business 
customers, for example. 
* Service segmentation: the users can be segmented on the basis of the 
services they require, for example, e-mail, web access, video conferencing 
ec 
19 
In addition to the single criteria segmentation identified above, it is 
possible for the service operators to use a combined or tiered segmentation 
19 Users can also use service segmentation by differentiating between different service operators on the 
basis of the services provided. The UK Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) has suggested that 
mobile cellular phones provide three types of service - access. incoming calls and outgoing calls. Most 
network operators do not consider access to the network, defined as "the capability to make and receive 
calls" (Cruickshank, 1998: 24) [54] as a serN ice. In fact, only one UK operator offers a QoS guarantee, 
o 1N ing the users a free minute eN erv time their call is dropped. 
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approach in which the users are divided depending on one criteria - for 
example, size or profit, and then subdivided again, for example, depending on 
their service requirements. 
3.1-1.2 Tariffs for market share retention and 
generation. 
3.1-1.2.1 Voice calls tariffs 
revenue per subscriber 
Examples of pricing packages used by current network operators to 
increase their market share and the RPS include: bundled tariffs, single rate 
tariffs, home or friends and family discounts, off-peak tariffs and any 
combination of the above. With the increase in data transmission services, 
data only tariffs are also being introduced by mobile operators [36]. A separate 
pre-paid option was also introduced and the subscriber base using this option 
has grown significantly. On average, cellular European companies have 8 tariff 
packages (a maximum number of 22) while Asian companies have on average 
13 pricing packages [37]. 
These pricing packages and their advantages to users and network 
operators are examined below. 
Bundled tariffs include a certain amount of free off-peak talk time in the 
subscription fee. They are widely used as a means of generating a predictable 
amount of traffic per user. Over two-thirds of Western European operators use 
bundled tariffs and the number is increasing rapidly. The tariffs are well liked 
by users who can predict their bill fairly well. From the service operator's point 
of view, such tariffs are desirable because they are paid in advance and 
unused minutes are a significant source of profit. All four UK network 
operators offer bundled tariffs [38]. 
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With single rate tariffs, subscribers pay a single flat rate for all types of 
call (to fixed networks or mobile telephones) even when roaming (not 
connected to their own mobile network). These tariffs are aimed at a small 
sector of highly mobile business users and are deployed mainly by USA 
operators. With their universal charge, these tariffs overcome call inhibition 
due to price uncertainty about roaming minutes. 
Tariffs utilising the home zone concept offer highly discounted calls to a 
predetermined area (mobiles in the same cell, for example, or fixed network 
telephones in the same local area as the mobile at the time). The home zone 
tariffs are "origination-based" (based on the location of the user at the time the 
call is made) and actively encourage the generation of calls to the home zone. 
4 
This allows mobile operators to compete effectively with the local loop area of 
fixed networks. Home zoning tariffs in the UK are offered by Cellnet and 
One2One. 
In contrast, tariffs utilising the friends and family concept offer 
discounted calls to nominated telephone numbers and are "destination-based" 
(depending on the destination to which the call is made). As well as 
encouraging loyalty, these tariffs are very attractive to mass market users and 
stimulate calling activity. In the UK, only Cellnet offers this type of tariff. 
Off-peak tariffs were introduced because, as explained earlier, networks 
are configured to meet peak-hour demand; and operators, in order to increase 
their revenue, want to stimulate off-peak usage. As a result, most tariffs offer 
discounted calls during the off-peak period. These tariffs are attractive to 
consumers because they address their fears of the high cost of using mobile 
telephones. From the network operator's point of view, they are desirable 
because they attract new traffic. Such traffic could be incremental (calls which 
otherwise would not have been made on the mobile) or time-shifted (calls 
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which were timed to coincide with the lower tariff rate, and otherwise would 
have been made during peak hours). 
The increase in the use of data services over mobile terminals, in 
particular in the younger generation (in some cases up to 90% of their 
communication is based on SMS messages (Short Messaging Service), for 
example [39]), has encouraged network operators to introduce special rates 
for data. There are even packages offering "data only" services and barring 
the user from making voice calls. These tariffs are relevant to specific groups 
of users who use portable computers or personal digital assistants. At present, 
they have little effect on overall traffic, but they will play a significant role when 
GPRS is introduced, as GPRS will offer higher data rates and a constant 
connection to the Internet. In Section 3.1.1.2.2 below, the tariffs currently used 
for pricing WAP and GPRS will be discussed in detail. 
A new pre-pay option, also known as pay as you go, was introduced 
recently. The users buy vouchers for the value they want and can charge their 
mobile phone bill. They are not offered any free minutes or reduced off-peak 
rates but are encouraged to use their phone by getting a discounted price for 
all phone use after, say, the first two minutes a day. Currently, pre-paid cellular 
mobile subscribers comprise 23% of all subscribers world-wide and GSM pre- 
paid subscribers are expected to rise to 53% by 2003 [401. All four UK network 
operators offer this package. The option is very attractive to users who worry 
about running up high bills and the pre-pay option is also popular in other 
industries. Research into the holiday industry, for example, has shown that 
people prefer to pre-pay for their holidays, and then enjoy them without 
worrying about cost [41]. Another advantage of pre-paid tariffs is that they can 
be used by users without credit rating (teenagers or people without bank 
accounts). The disadvantage of pre-paid tariffs from consumers' point of view 
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is that they are normally higher than standard tariffs [42]. From network 
operator's point of view, the advantages of pre-paid tariffs are that they reduce 
the cost of customer acquisition and the risk of bad debts. The disadvantage is 
that they could reduce airtime usage (due to higher prices) and customer 
churn (due to ease of changing network providers). 
To summarise, the competitive nature of the mobile cellular markets 
world-wide encourages flexible pricing tariffs, which attempt to capture and 
retain subscribers through satisfying the different needs of diverse user 
groups. 
3.1.1.2.2 WAP, i-mode and GPRS tariffs. 
It has been suggested that, with the introduction of data services, the 
pricing strategies of service operators will change significantly because, with 
packet-switched networks operators can charge for the amount of information 
transmitted rather than the time spent on line. In reality, however, service 
providers have been rather cautious about introducing different charging 
strategies. In the UK, Cellnet offer their business WAP customers price per 
minute Internet access at 10 pence or 9 pence per minute depending on the 
calling plan [43]. 
The Japanese i-mode service operator NTT Do Co Mo charges 
according to the volume of data transmitted, not the time spent on-line [44], at 
a rate of YO. 3 ($0.0024) per packet of 128 bytes [45]. In addition, a monthly 
subscription flat rate fee is paid by customers who wish to access certain i- 
mode Internet sites. 
The Australian service operator Mobilkorn launched, as it claims, the first 
commercial national GPRS network at the beginning of August 2000. The 
service costs 0.99 Australian dollars per minute at peak times and 0.49 
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Australian dollars per minute at off-peak times for business users, and 1.99 
Australian dollars and 0.99 Australian dollars per minute respectively for all 
other users [46]. 
These examples indicate that service operators are very tentative about 
introducing new charging strategies to customers, even if the new strategy is 
clearly to the user's advantage, as is the case with data services which can 
charge for the amount of data transmitted rather than length of the connection. 
3.1.1.3 Effect of pricing on network operator's market share 
Tools used in game theory can be employed for predicting the 
implications of a pricing tariff on the market share of a network operator. It has 
been used to compare the effect of both fixed and dynamic pricing strategies. 
Fishburn et al. [47] compared the market shares of two companies, one of 
which charged a fixed fee, and the other one charged per-use fee and 
concluded that per-use pricing does not have a definite advantage over fixed 
fee pricing. Although they argue that in the long-run fixed fee pricing would be 
a winner, they also point out, that in conditions of competition, price wars are 
very likely, which will drive the prices of both firms down, diminishing the 
advantages of fixed price pricing. MacKie-Mason and Varian [48] estimated 
the cost of dynamic pricing for the fixed line Internet and showed that, in a 
competitive market environment, optimal dynamic pricing is economically more 
efficient, compared with a physical capacity expansion to satisfy the same 
levels of demand. 
To estimate the effect of pricing on the market share of a cellular network 
operator, a mathematical model developed by Mason [49], will be adapted to 
compare the expected welfare of users of cellular networks with and without 
dynamic pricing. The original model measures the consumer utility gained 
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from using a particular firm in a competitive market place. It will look at two 
horizontally differentiated firms, which means that some consumers will prefer 
one of the firms and others the other, even if both firms offer identical products 
at identical prices. This differentiation is realistic because if, for example, a 
company introduces dynamic pricing, some of its existing customers can be 
reluctant to change their service provider. The degree of consumer loyalty will 
be determined by the magnitude of the parameter m ý! 0. 
In addition to existing users, some new users will be attracted from the 
competitor. Effective tools for acquiring new users are advertising, sales 
promotions and discounts and the amount of these the network provider can 
afford will be proportional to the revenue of the network operator. In the market 
share estimation model this will be represented by the term wR, with wE=- (0, I) 
a random number representing the degree of success of the network 
operators marketing campaign and Ri representing the normalised total 
revenue of operator i- 
The total welfare of the users will depend on the quality of service that 
the users experience and the overall network usage of the respective network 
operator. The quality of service users experience will be calculated as the 
users'Value for Money (VFM) term defined as: 
VFM= 
I- PB 
pi 
Weighted average price 
20 of firm 
PB, - Probability of call blocking of firm i. 
2" The 
, 
weighted average price will be calculated by taking the probability of any one price value 
occurring, multiplying it by the price value itself and addi g all we ghted pric in IIe values together. 
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As the probability of call blocking decreases, the VFM component 
increases (for constant average prices). The total amount of product 
consumed by the users in this case is the total number of calls completed in 
the network and these will be normalised and represented as Ni * 
Assuming that the users are uniformly distributed along the interval (0, I) 
and the two firms are located at the end of the line at 0 and 1 respectively [49], 
the total user utility from firm i for a consumer located at 0:! ý x:! ý I will be: 
User welfare 
U(x, i) = m[ix + (I - iXI - x)]+ Ni +I- 
PBi 
+ wRi (3-2) 
pi 
Location utility component; 
Ni - Normalised total number of calls serviced by firm i; 
PBi 
-Probability of call blocking with firm i; 
Average weighted price of firm i; 
Random promotion effect factor; 
Rj- Normalised total revenue of firm i. 
This expression will enable us to calculate the utility each user can gain 
from joining one of the firms and, therefore, will allow us to evaluate the effect 
of pricing on network operators market share 21 . The calculations will be done 
at the end of Chapter 6, after three dynamic pricing strategies are suggested 
and evaluated. 
11 it 'xill be assumed that users wIll Incur no addItIonal costs when changlng network operators. 
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3.2 Pricing and Charging: Definitions, Requirements and 
Background 
In the previous section the economic objectives of network operators 
were identified and the means available for increasing the consumer database 
and maximising the revenue per subscriber were described. In this section, the 
challenges faced by network operators in setting pricing tariffs will be 
discussed. The process of price setting consists of three stages: at stage one, 
the network operators have to choose the charging unit for quantifying and 
accounting for network usage. The second stage consists of a choice of type 
of pricing strategy, for example static or dynamic, linear or non-linear. The final 
stage involves the setting of appropriate pricing units to the chosen pricing 
strategy, for achieving the network operator's objectives. 
3.2.1 Definitions. 
Following the terminology of Kaussar et. al [50] the term pricing will refer 
to the process of setting a price on a service, on a product or on content, while 
the term charging will refer to the function that translates the technical values 
of used resources into monetary units. The term accounting, on the other 
hand, refers to the process of metering the use of resources by individual 
users. 
Linear tariffs in telecommunications are used to describe pricing in which 
the user pays the same amount for all units purchased, i. e. a user will not 
receive a discount for buying more of the same service, although a company 
could provide many different services at different prices. 
Non-linear tariffs can charge a user different prices for different quantities 
of the same service. These tariffs include two-part tariffs such as the time of 
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day tariff in which users are charged different prices for peak and off-peak 
calls [51]. 
3.2.2 Requirements on Pricing Tariffs. 
The discussion so far has looked at the economic objectives of network 
operators and showed the role of pricing in determining both operators market 
share and the RPS. The complex relationship between pricing and other 
economic parameters in the network mean that setting of the pricing tariffs 
needs to be done with considerable care. A 'good' pricing strategy has to meet 
the following requirements from the network manager's point of view (Stiller 
[52], or Ferrari and Delgrossi [53]): 
(a) Encourage optimal network efficiency to gain maximum welfare and 
QoS. The pricing strategy has to encourage users to request network 
services and ensure network resource optimisation without blocking too 
many users due to over-demand; 
(b) Achieve high probability of cost recovery. The pricing strategy should 
ensure that the network operators recover their investment costs. This 
requirement guards against the possibility that if prices are set too low 
the network operator may not be able to produce enough revenue to 
off-set costs and obtain a fair profit margin, even when the network is 
well loaded and efficiently run; 
(c) Competitiveness of prices. The charges offered should be competitive 
with those of networks offering similar services; 
(d) Low implementation and usage costs of the charging policy, i. e. the 
tools that need to be acquired for accounting and billing of customers 
and the overheads generated by such tools should be low. 
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From the point of view of the customers, the main properties of a 'good' 
pricing policy are: 
(e) Comprehensibility: pricing policies should be easy to understand; 
(f) Controllability: users should be able to control the total charges for 
communication by varying the length or QoS requirements of the 
connection; 
(g) Predictability and stability: users prefer charges that they can predict, 
i. e., they prefer to know what the total charge for a transaction will be 
beforehand and they also prefer prices not to change too often in time; 
(h) Fairness: the pricing strategy should be perceived by users to be fair 
and reasonable. 
3.2.3 Additional Factors Affecting Operators Pricing Policies. 
As shown above, cellular network operators have to operate in a 
competitive market environment and as a result their pricing policies are 
further affected by government regulatory policies and other market forces. 
The main external factors affecting pricing policies in the UK are: 
(a) Industry regulator OFTEL (Office of Telecommunications). The influence of 
OFTEL on the prices for mobile phones can be significant. For example, by 
changing the basis on which interconnectivity call charges were calculated 
in 1997 [54], OFTEL affected call prices from the fixed network to mobile 
ones 
22 
. 
22 Interconnectivity charges refer to charges levied by cellular operators to fixed line operators for calls 
initiated in the fixed network and terminating on the cellular network. These charges are then passed on 
to the consumers. In the past, these were derived on a fully allocated historic cost basis (this type of 
accounting takes into account the cost of assets at the time that they were purchased). However, 
followin(g a modification in the licences of the mobile operators, the charges of calls to mobile phones 
currently have to be based on long run mcremental costs. This type of accounting, called forward 
accounting. takes into account the cost of the assets at a current time, together with the cost increment to 
deal , vith mobile calls. 
This has led to a reduction in the prices as mass production and new 
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(b) Necessity for future network investment. The price of mobile calls will be 
affected by the cost of 3 rd generation licences and the need for installation 
of new infrastructure for the 3 rd generation networks. It is expected that the 
significant investment that has to be made by the service operators will 
ultimately (especially with the rules imposed by OFTEL prohibiting cross- 
subsidisation of services) be reflected in the prices of handsets and calIS23 . 
As these examples indicate service operators may not always be able to 
implement the most efficient pricing policies for their network. 
3.2.4 Charging Units in Telecommunic a tion Networks. 
The charging units used by the network operators to determine the 
charge a user has to pay can be based on different parameters of network 
utilisation. They include: 
1. Pricing based on the usage of a unit of a particular network resource such 
as bandwidth, buffer space or amount of interference introduced by the 
user, for example (connectionless networks), or call duration (connection- 
oriented networks). This type of pricing can also be done on the basis of 
larger units such as per flow for data networks or per call (voice networks). 
It is known as usage based pricing; 
2. Pricing based on access with users paying only a network access fee 
which includes all calls (flat rate pricing); 
technologies have reduced the overall cuff ent cost of base stations and other equipment. As 
interconnecting charges make up the largest proportion (16.7%) of the accounted operating costs of 
network operators [37]. the reduction of interconnect charges has a significant effect on call charges. in 
a similar manner the charges charged by the fixed line operators for terminating mobile originating calls 
will be reduced. Therefore, OFTEL plays an important role m determining the future prices of calls to 
and from mobile phones. 
2-' Confirmed by Pat Gallagher. director of British Telecom Plc., who stated in August 2000: "We have 
to make up for the high cost somewhere. In the end we are not a welfare state" [20]. 
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I Pricing based on the level of congestion in the network (congestion 
pricing); 
4. Pricing based on the time of day (time of day pricing); 
5. Pricing based on destination of call (location oriented pricing for 
connection-oriented networks) or distance or number of hops to be 
travelled by packets (connectionless networks); 
6. Pricing based on the Quality of Service or Type of Service requirements of 
users (Quality of Service pricing); 
In determining the charging units on which the pricing will be based, the 
network operator may decide to use more than one of the options listed above. 
So, for example, a network operator may choose to charge every customer a 
flat access fee, and in addition to that, make individual users pay for their 
usage of network resources. 
After deciding on the units that will underline the pricing strategy, network 
operators have to decide on the type of price or tariff that will be used. The 
pricing can be static or dynamic. 
3.2.5 Static Pricing Strategies. 
Static pricing strategies are characterised by the fact that the price for 
unit of resource remains constant even if the network performance does not 
meet the requirements of the network users or the industry regulator. Static 
pricing strategies for voice communication are currently used by network 
operators world-wide as outlined in section 3.1.1.2.1 above. With the 
development of data based services, however, the challenge has been to find 
the "best )) pricing strategy for a packet based network. The static pricing 
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strategies suggested in the literature for data and voice calls can be classified 
into five main types [55]. 
3.2.5.1 Flat rate pricing. 
In this type of pricing discussed by Cocci et al [56], a price is set and 
applied on per byte of information transmitted basis. In essence, this is a 
usage-based scheme and users pay a sum to the network provider that 
depends on the number of bytes sent. This is a rather simplistic pricing model, 
as it does not account for flows in the network with different QoS 
requirements. If this model is applied to a GPRS network, for example, users 
with more relaxed delay requirements will pay the same as users with more 
stringent delay requirements and this will be perceived as unfair (see 3.2.2 (h) 
above). 
3.2.5.2 Priority (differentiated) pricing. 
Cocci et al. [56] extended their initial flat rate pricing model to include 
priority (i. e. service classes) for different services that will be carried over the 
network. Different service classes make different demands on network 
resources. For example, real-time services require stringent jitter and delay 
guarantees, while non-real time services are "best-effort". It is suggested that it 
is fairer to charge higher fees for the bytes with higher priority, which are then 
assumed to receive better QoS. Priority pricing schemes have great potential 
as they ensure that the users pay proportionally to the network resources they 
require. Bohn et aL [57] further developed the class-based approach by 
suggesting static pricing schemes in which different classes in the network are 
guaranteed a minimum performance level. 
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3.2-5.3 Bandwidth based pricing. 
In this type of pricing users pay for the amount of bandwidth they use and 
are charged more for higher bandwidth requirements. Clark [58] developed a 
model in which the users are expected to specify their requirements such as 
expected connection speed (bandwidth) and QoS, thus helping the network 
operator with the planning of the resource allocation. 
3.2.5.4 Reservation based pricing. 
Songhurst and Kelly [59] offered a charging scheme which takes into 
account not only the type of service and the amount of traffic the user has 
transmitted but also the length of the connection. The time element of the 
pricing scheme is introduced to represent the reservation component, i. e. the 
amount of time network resources are reserved for a particular network user 
rather than being available to other users. 
3.2.5.5 Paris Metro Pricing. 
This pricing scheme was suggested by Odlyzko [60] and is modelled on 
the Paris Metro pricing. In the past, Paris Metro operated in a simple fashion 
with 1st and 2 nd class carriages that were identical in the number and quality of 
seats they offered. The only difference was the price of the tickets. People 
using 1st class paid more than people using 2 nd class. As a result, 1st class 
carriages were less congested as only people who cared about getting a seat 
were prepared to pay more. This principle can be applied to 
telecommunication networks by offering users the same service at different 
prices. The main difference between this approach and the priority pricing 
schemes mentioned above is that, in this case, the users can choose which 
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particular price to pay, whereas with priority pricing the network operator 
decides how the services should map onto the offered service classes. 
3.2.5.6 Interference based pricing. 
A possible unit for calculating the prices in a CDMA network could be the 
minimum interference that can be introduced by a user. As the requirements of 
different users can differ, the differentiation in the charges can be achieved 
through taking into account the bit rate requirements of the individual users 
and calculating the total interference or load they contribute to the network 
[61]. The load of user i is determined by: 
Eb Ri 
No 
iw 
ri =- 
Ri - Bit rate requirement of user i; 
Total system bandwidth; 
Eb Energy per bit to Noise ratio of user i. 
No 
(3-3) 
This type of pricing will be perceived as fair by the users because it will 
ensure that they pay only for the resources they use. Different weighting of the 
nominal price can be introduced to represent the different QoS requirements 
for the different classes of service. 
3.2.6 Dynamic Pricing Strategies. 
Dynamic pricing strategies use price to manipulate user behaviour in 
order to optimise network utilisation, or any other parameter defined by the 
network operator. Compared to static pricing strategies, with a dynamically 
priced network the service operators have to decide not only on the charging 
-78- 
Chapter 3 Economic and Technical Implications from Dynamic Pricing UCL 
units for accounting purposes, but also which parameter in their system to use 
as a control variable. Potential control variables for determining the changes in 
the price, depending on the type of network, could be: 
1- System load (in terms of number of calls, or traffic intensity, packet load or 
total interference); 
2. Percentage of blocked calls; 
3. Packet delay; 
4. Frame delay. 
3.2-6.1 Practical application of dynamic pricing. 
Dynamic pricing is not a novel idea and although it has not been applied 
to cellular telephony, dynamic (also referred to as real-time) pricing strategies 
have been utilised in the electricity industry. Study of their effect will enable us 
to make predictions about the expected effect of dynamic pricing in cellular 
networks. An alternative application of dynamic pricing over longer time-scale 
in the airline industry will also be reviewed and the conclusions summarised. 
3.2.6.1.1 Electricity. 
Real time (dynamic) pricing for electricity has been applied in practice for 
both industrial and residential customers in America and Europe and at least 
13 US utilities and several European electricity suppliers have demonstrated 
that hourly pricing is feasible (Zarnikau et. al. [62]). 
American commercial users were able to shift their usage pattern in 
response to real time rates and in particular during peak hours, although the 
response to real time pricing, was not uniform, with just two companies 
providing the bulk of the measured response [63]. Similarly, in the UK, the 
experience of Midland Electricity, reported by Dawn [64] showed that industrial 
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consumers use the information from real time pricing to monitor their electricity 
costs more closely and to alter their working patterns. However, although 84% 
of Midland Electricity's industrial consumers used the information to monitor 
their consumption, only 53% used the information to manage their 
consumption [65]. 
Using real-time pricing on residential customers Electricit6 de France 
observed that the majority of participants paid less for their electricity as a 
result, although many did not look at the prices often enough to change their 
demand. The small sample of customers and the bias introduced by the 
optional nature of the tariff, however, do not allow generalisation of the results 
[661. 
The practical implementation of dynamic pricing in electricity indicates 
that dynamic pricing is a feasible alternative to traditional pricing strategies; 
however the response of users to the dynamic prices is complex and variable 
with the majority of commercial users using dynamic pricing to monitor rather 
than manage consumption. Residential customers, on the other hand, could 
expect to pay less for their electricity when using dynamic pricing. 
3.2.6.1.2 Airline industry. 
The objective of airline carriers is to maximise the revenue generated 
from each plane, since once the plane leaves the ground all its free capacity is 
lost. Revenue maximisation subject to capacity and/or time constraints is also 
known as yield management. This is, in fact, very similar to the situation with 
cellular telephony or any other industry with limited capacity, as the resources 
are there and if not utilised, revenue is lost. 
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In order to maximise revenue, the flight operators change the price of the 
tickets dynamically depending on demand and the time left to departure. The 
operator offers available seats at the highest price they believe will be 
accepted by the customers at any given time. However, the dynamics of 
finding the revenue maximising seat allocation is complicated by the possibility 
of multi-leg journeys, over-bookings, discount allocation, passenger spillage, 
passenger upgrades from the discount class fare and demand 
interdependence (Belobaba [67], Brumelle et al [68] and Smith et al [69]). The 
application of DINAMO, a dynamic revenue optimisation program developed 
for American Airlines, shows that dynamic optimisation can significantly 
improve the revenue generated from the system [69]. American Airlines 
estimate their benefit from the dynamic pricing system at over $500 million per 
year. 
Although the time scale of the optimisation problem in airline industry is 
different to the time scale of the optimisation problem in cellular networks, the 
problem of yield management still arises and can potentially be addressed by 
the application of dynamically priced tariffs. 
3.3 Technical Implications from Dynamic Pricing Implementation. 
3.3.1 Dynamic Pricing Algorithms. 
3.3.1.1 Dynamic pricing algorithm for voice based networks. 
A suitable control variable for implementation of dynamic pricing in voice 
based networks like GSM, is the degree of utilisation of the available capacity. 
If demand exceeds capacity this will lead to blocked calls and dissatisfied 
-81 - 
-k Chapter 3 Economic and Technical Implications from Dynamic Pricing UCL 
users. If, on the other hand, the available capacity is under-utilised this will 
result in inefficient use of the available resources and potential loss for the 
network operator. The utilisation of available resources accurately represents 
the state of the network, in terms of the available capacity and the QoS that 
the user receives from the network. 
Figure 3-2 shows a flow chart of a suggested dynamic pricing algorithm 
developed for a GSM network. The algorithm is based on a regular update in 
prices as a function of the network load. 
The update in price will affect deterministic demand D(t), which is a 
function of the time of day and can be predicted fairly accurately, based on 
historic data. Another demand component is the random demand S(t), caused 
by, for example, emergencies (Koschat et. aL [70]) but this type of demand will 
not be affected by changes in price. 
The load or state of the network will change as calls start and terminate 
and a snapshot of the state of the network will be taken at pre-set time 
intervals to enable price updates. The price update interval does not have to 
be constant, although this will be the case considered in this thesis. 
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Figure 3-2 GSM (voice calls) dynamic pricing algorithm 
3.3.1.1.1 Voice and data dynamic pricing algorithm. 
-k ur-I 
GPRS networks are packet-based but they share the same resource pool 
with GSM networks and, therefore, a dynamic pricing algorithm has to take 
this into account. In Figure 3-3 a dynamic pricing algorithm for a GPRS- 
enabled network for both voice and data calls has been presented. 
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The left-hand side is identical to the GSM algorithm presented in Figure 
3-2 but the right-hand side has been adapted to the requirements of packet 
based traffic. 
Figure 3-3 GPRS (voice and data calls) dynamic pricing algorithm 
At first glance there is a significant difference between the control 
variables that can be used in GSM and GPRS. While in GSM based networks 
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the percentage of blocked calls is the main criterion which has to be kept 
under control, GPRS-enabled networks have to meet the QoS requirements 
for reliability, delay, peak throughput, mean throughput and precedence as 
recommended by ETSI [71]. These are all good candidates for use as control 
variables to influence the changes in the dynamic prices. However, simplicity 
and tractability are also important requirements for price setting and, therefore, 
from network operators point of view it is desirable that only one parameter is 
used. 
Studies have shown ([72] and [73]) that frame delay in GPRS-enabled 
network is directly proportional to the load in the network. In fact, the frame 
delay is unbounded for load >5 kb/s (see Figure 3-4). 
This result suggests that the load in the network can again act as a very 
accurate indicator of the state of the GPRS network and it is the control 
variable that has been chosen for the generation of dynamic prices. 
8 
> 
LL 
2345 
Input load per slot (kb/s) 
Figure 3-4 Expected frame delay 
As users can request a variable amount of bandwidth, dynamic pricing 
for GPRS would be advertised on 'per time slot' basis, so if users want to 
increase their throughput, they can purchase additional slots. Furthermore, as 
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real and non real-time applications have different service requirements, the 
network may not be able to meet the strict delay requirements for real-time 
traffic without "penalising" the non real-time traffic (Oliver and Songhurst [74]). 
To reflect this, prices will be allowed to vary not only in time but also 
across the different service classes with different nominal (or per time-slot) 
prices being calculated for real-time and non real-time traffiC)24 . The term 
nominal price will be used to describe the charge per unit of resource at any 
given time. 
The sharing of resources in GPRS between circuit switched and packet 
based services poses a very specific problem for dynamic pricing 
implementation. Industry regulations do not specify the exact nature of the 
division of resources and one possible implementation is to permanently 
subdivide the total capacity into two individual pools of resources. However, 
most users will have both GSM and GPRS enabled phones and will, therefore, 
be in a position to compare the prices of the respective pools. A large 
discrepancy in price between the two services can lead to users' choosing the 
cheaper option and as a result saturating the capacity and driving the price up. 
Meanwhile, capacity in the expensive alternative will be freed and the price will 
drop. This will now become the desirable alternative and users will shift to this 
type of service. The rapid and sudden shift in demand will lead to unstable 
system and lower QoS to users. As suggested in Figure 3-3, a solution to this 
problem can be the introduction of flexible divide between the two pools of 
resources. Thus the busier type of traffic is allocated more capacity thus 
24 For example, real time traffic will require a maximum mean transfer delay of less than 0.5 s per 128 
octet Service Data Unit (SDU), while a SDU Mi the best effort category have unspecified delay. A SDU 
is defined in the reference model for OSI, as the amount of miformation whose identity is preserved 
when transferred between peer (N+ 1) -layer entities and which is not interpreted by the supporting (N)- 
layer entities [7 1 ]. 
-86- 
Chapter 3 Economic and Technical Implications from Dynamic Pricing UCIL 
keeping the free capacity in each pool proportionally the same. In this case, 
the nominal prices will be similar (if not the same) and the users will not have 
an incentive to shift their demand rapidly. For example, one nominal price will 
apply to all voice and real-time data connections and one reduced nominal 
price will be quoted for the non-real time data services. However, a drawback 
to this solution is that as an increase in intensity of one type of traffic, will lead 
to a reduction in the overall capacity of the network and thus indirectly 
increase the nominal price in the other type of traffic. This can be seen as 
cross service subsidy by the industry regulator and therefore this point has to 
be clarified. 
The algorithm shown in Figure 3-3 can be applied directly to CDMA 
networks by taking the total interference in the network at any given time, 
instead of load as the control variable. This algorithm will allow for the co- 
existence of different types of access methods on one network, which is an 
additional advantage from the point of view of network operators, who may not 
want to discontinue existing services until the new ones have become 
established. 
3.3.2 Dynamic Pricing Implementation. 
3.3.2.1 Charging and billing overhead. 
The limited availability of radio interface resources presents a problem for 
any algorithm requiring additional signalling or communication between the 
IVISs and the fixed support network (BSTs, BSCs or the MSC). It could 
potentially use up valuable radio interface and reduce the throughput of the 
system. 
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The implementation of dynamic pricing algorithms relies on the 
dissemination of the new prices to the MSs- In GSIVI networks, the pricing 
information can be disseminated to the IVISs in the relevant cell using the 
Broadcast Control Channel (BCCH )25. Only IVISs in a particular cell listen to 
this channel and it has a free slot on the Downlink, which can be used to 
transmit the current call price to the MSs. As this implementation does not 
involve the use of additional resources, it will have no effect on the signalling 
overhead volume, i. e. the dynamic pricing would be transparent. 
The effect of the implementation of dynamic pricing in GPRS network will 
differ only in the additional necessity to broadcast the updated prices to both 
GSIVI and GPRS-enabled mobile stations. In this case the broadcast to GPRS- 
enabled MSs can be done on the Packet Broadcast Control Channel 
(PBCCH). 
The effect on signalling volumes between the fixed parts of the network 
from the implementation of dynamic pricing will be more significant. Presently, 
in GSM networks, the billing information is transmitted around the network by 
means of toll tickets [17]. Toll tickets are individual records created for each 
call that contain all the information necessary for calculating the call charges. 
They are created by the MSCNLR and an average toll ticket contains 
information about the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), the type 
of call (Mobile Originating, Mobile Terminating or Forwarded) and the call 
status (successful or not and if not, the reason for failure). The toll ticket also 
contains detailed data allowing the operator to accurately calculate the call 
charge (call starting and finishing time, number dialled, service type etc. ). In a 
I- The Broadcast Control Channels (BCCH) is used in cellular networks for the continual broadcasts. on 
the downlink (base station to mobile stations) of information including base station identity, frequency 
allocations, and frequency hoPPmg sequences. 
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dynamically priced network, in addition to all this information, it will be 
necessary to keep track of the price in the cell at the beginning of the call, and 
any subsequent price changes during the calls, which will make the toll ticket 
larger. However, the bandwidth available to the fixed support part of the 
network is not limited and can easily be increased, so the additional overhead 
generated by dynamic pricing is not significant. There will also be an increase 
in the processing overhead, although with the current speed of processors, 
this will not be significant. 
These arguments apply equally well for a GPRS based network. 
Charging information is collected at both the SGSN or the GGSN and contains 
information regarding the volumes of data transmitted, the duration of usage of 
the packet data protocol addresses, the duration of PDP context, duration of 
usage of external data networks and location information. In particular the 
SGSN will collect information for each MS related to radio network usage, 
while the GGSN collects information relating to the external data network 
usage. This information will be transmitted from the relevant SGSN or GGSN 
to the network operators chosen Billing System (BSys) using the Charging 
Gateway Functionality (CGF) [751. The Charging Gateway concept enables 
the operator to have just one logical interface between the CGF and the BSys. 
The information collected by the SGSN and the GGSN is collected in the form 
of Call Detail Record Charging ID (CDR). A CDR is generated every time a 
PDP context is activated and a unique Charging ID is assigned to all records 
generated for one PDP context. The addition of dynamic charging will cause 
an increase in the number of records generated for each PDP context. 
However, as in the case of the GSM networks the increase in traffic can be 
handled without significant decrease in the processing speed. 
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An additional problem with dynamically priced networks is the practicality 
of conveying the billing information to users in a meaningful way. Users 
require information to enable them to cross check their bills at the end of the 
month. Since the degrees of freedom in the network increase if prices and 
QoS requirements are allowed to vary, this information will increase 
significantly. A customer facing a comprehensive 30-page bill at the end of the 
month may not be able to interpret it accurately and this can lead to disputes 
and delays in bill payment. Therefore, network operators need to address this 
issue carefully. One solution could be to generate bills more frequently. The 
scale and expense of this task might be minimised by sending bills to the 
users via e-mail or text messages, for example, but this is unlikely to be 
without financial implications. 
Another alternative could be the implementation of intelligent agents on 
users' terminals that collect and process information about the type of calls 
and the price of the calls users make and display it to users on request. The 
latter approach has the advantage of reducing the amount of signalling in the 
network and the processing overhead in the billing system. In addition, they 
may be very helpful to users by, for example, informing them when the price 
falls below a given threshold set by the user. This function could potentially 
lead to users swamping the network when prices suddenly become very low, 
following the pattern of the yo-yo effect described in section 3.3.1.1.1 above. 
However, in this case users will probably set different thresholds and dilute the 
effect. Further investigation would be necessary to determine the extent of this 
problem. 
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3.3-2.2 Positioning of the dynamic pricing algorithm. 
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Finally, the network operators have to decide on the best position for 
implementation of the dynamic pricing algorithm and the most suitable place in 
both GSM and GPRS networks will be the Base Station Controller (BSC). 
There are three main reasons for this choice. Firstly, the BSC is the common 
gateway to the radio interface for both the circuit-switched and packed-based 
services and, therefore, has full access to all data necessary for the evaluation 
of network performance such as system load, number of blocked calls, packet 
delay and revenue. In fact, some of this data is already collected by the 
network operators but is not used [17]. Secondly, there is enough processing 
power in the BSC to perform the calculations of the updated prices in finite 
time. And finally, the positioning of the algorithm in the BSC will minimise the 
increase in the overhead in control traffic in the network. 
3.3.3 Implications of Cellular Network's Interconnectivity with the Fixed 
Network. 
One reason why the application of dynamic pricing to cellular telephony 
could not be very straightforward is the wireless networks' interconnectivity 
with fixed networks. Calls terminating in a cellular network may have 
originated in the cellular network itself, in a cellular network run by a 
competitor, or a fixed network. Similarly, calls originating in the cellular 
network can terminate in any of the three types of network. In applying 
dynamic pricing, several issues arise. They include the issue of whether 
dynamic pricing should be applied to incoming or outgoing calls in a cell, or 
both. The capacity in a cell is limited and can be taken up by outgoing calls 
(the calls initiated in the cell) or incoming calls (the calls terminating in the 
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cell). If dynamic pricing is applied to only one type of call, the effect of dynamic 
pricing will be lost on the rest of the calls. Three possible implementation 
scenarios are: 
Case 1: Dynamic pricing is applied only to outgoing calls. In this case, a 
proportion of all calls in the network will be unaffected by dynamic pricing. The 
overall effectiveness of dynamic pricing will be reduced and the degree of 
reduction will depend on the ratio of originating calls to the total number of 
calls. 
T Total number of calls N otal n( 
I 
Incoming Outgoing 
calls X calls N-X 
Figure 3-5 Division of incoming and outgoing calls in a cell 
Case 11: Dynamic pricing is applied only to incoming calls. This is a very 
similar situation to the one above but in this case the effectiveness of dynamic 
pricing will depend on the proportion of terminating calls to the total number of 
calls. However, two interesting issues arise. Firstly, in this case users can only 
see the price for the call they intend to make after they have dialled the party 
they want to call. This will inevitably generate some signalling overhead and if, 
after seeing the price, the user decides that they do not want to continue with 
the call, network resources will be used without any revenue being generated. 
Secondly, a percentage of the calls terminating in the cellular network 
originate in the fixed network, and communicating the current price to fixed line 
users can be difficult without a display on the terminal equipment. It has been 
suggested that 20%-30% of mobile terminating calls are made from the fixed 
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network [76]. If these calls are also excluded from dynamic pricing and 
assuming a 50-50 split between incoming and outgoing calls in a cell, the 
effectiveness of dynamic pricing will be only 35%. 
In both cases above the system is left open to abuse. If a party calls 
another party and the price they have to pay is quite high because they are in 
a busy cell or are calling a busy cell, they can always ask the called party to 
call them back. In this case, the proportion of incoming/outgoing calls will be 
increased and the effectiveness of dynamic pricing reduced. A solution to this 
problem would be to ensure that both parties see the same price. The 
implication of this strategy will be discussed below, for the case of mobile to 
mobile calls. 
Case III: Dynamic pricing is applied to both incoming and outgoing calls. 
In this case, both incoming and outgoing calls will be subjected to dynamic 
pricing, but the system can still be abused if calls are made between two 
mobile phones and the price in one of the cells is lower that the other. 
Suppose that a party initiates a call at price P, in Cell 1 to a party in Cell 3 with 
price P,,. If P, > P,, the calling party can ask the called party to ring them back, 
which will affect the proportion of outgoing to incoming calls. 
Again a possible solution to this problem would be to ensure that both 
users see the same price. Implementation of this in practice will require the 
calling party to announce in advance their intention to call Cell 3, and to be 
given a price for the call after dialling the number. 
-93 - 
Chapter 3 Economic and Technical Implications from Dynamic Pricing UCT. 
Figure 3-6 Price distributions in cells 
The price advertised to the caller will be the higher of the two prices. This 
should be applied to all mobile-to-mobile calls to ensure that no discrepancy is 
created. It has to be noted that, if this strategy is adopted, a proportion of calls 
could be lost due to the fact that a higher than necessary price was advertised. 
This is very similar to the situation explained above in Case 11. 
The number of calls lost in this way can be estimated by using the tree in 
Figure 3-7. Assuming that 30% of all calls originate or terminate in the fixed 
network, and that the probability of going down any branch of the tree at each 
step is equally likely, around 12% of calls will be dropped on applying the 
higher of the two cell prices. This does not represent a significant proportion of 
the total number of calls carried over the network and the generated signalling 
overhead is also insignificant. In the above calculations, it was assumed that 
the users only ever see one price, the more expensive one. If users are able to 
see both prices at the same time, their own and the called party price, it will 
affect their choice. As a result, the probability along the tree branches will be 
different and affect the final result. 
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Figure 3-7 Probability of lost calls due to applying the higher price 
Therefore, in order to be most effective, dynamic pricing has to be 
applied to both incoming and outgoing calls, and in the case of mobile-to- 
mobile calls the price of the more expensive cell has to apply. This will require 
the users to dial the party they want to call and then to look at the price and 
decide if they want to continue with the call. This may prove an inconvenience 
if a user is making a voice call, for example, but it is not going to be a serious 
problem if the user is making a data transmission call. 
3.4 Chapter Summary. 
This chapter focused on pricing from an economic point of view. The 
economic objectives of network operators were identified, followed by a list of 
the tariffs currently used by network operators for meeting these objectives. A 
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mathematical model developed to predict the effect of dynamic pricing on the 
network operators market share was then presented. The choices faced by 
network operators in deciding on charging units for accounting purposes in 
static pricing strategies was presented, before some practical implementations 
of dynamic pricing were described. Dynamic pricing algorithms were 
presented for voice and packet based networks before an in-depth discussion 
of issues arising from the implementation of dynamic pricing, such as the 
signalling overhead in the networks and the best position for the algorithm. 
Finally, possible complications due to the cellular networks' interconnectivity 
with the fixed network were examined. 
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The previous chapter looked at the economic objectives of network 
operators and discussed the implications of introduction of dynamic pricing 
from an engineering point of view. This chapter will begin with a discussion of 
the expected effect of dynamic pricing on the user behaviour. A 
comprehensive mathematical model for evaluating this effect will be 
introduced taking into account the price elasticity of user demand, as well as 
the existing pricing bias in the network and a substitution effect from the fixed 
network. In addition, a user mobility model showing the effect of price on user 
mobility will also be introduced. Then the discussion will focus on the final 
stage in any pricing policy: the setting of monetary units to the charging units. 
A literature overview of suggested optimal price setting strategies from an 
economic and consumer welfare point of view will be given and the drawbacks 
of the approaches highlighted. 
4.1 Effect of Dynamic Pricing on User Behaviour. 
The expected effect of dynamic pricing on the behaviour of the users in a 
cellular network will be threefold. Firstly, the changing prices will affect the 
number of calls the users make. Secondly, the prices will have an effect on the 
length of the calls the users make. So, a very expensive price could result in 
calls not being made at all, or calls being shortened. The third effect is specific 
to cellular networks and is directly related to the fact that users are mobile. 
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Faced with an expensive airtime, the users have a choice whether to proceed 
with the call or to delay it until they move to a less busy cell. Thus dynamic 
pricing will also affect the spatial distribution of users. 
In the next section, the assumptions made about the behaviour of users 
will be listed and justified and a basic mathematical model to depict the effect 
of dynamic pricing introduced. The model will be developed further to consider 
some additional aspects of the system, such as the existing pricing policy in 
the network and user mobility as a function of price. 
4.1.1 Assumptions. 
Four assumptions will be made regarding the behaviour of users and the 
cellular system: 
1. Users behave rationally, i. e. they consider the relative costs and benefits of 
any decision they make with their limited resources in hand. Therefore, as 
the price of a service increases they will purchase less of that particular 
service. This assumption is standard in classical economics theory (Cook 
and Farquhason [77]). It is also supported by results from a pilot user 
survey conducted as part of this project over the Internet (see Appendix C 
for survey methodology and other findings) and findings by Cosgrove and 
Linhart [78]. They studied the effect of pricing on demand for fixed 
telecommunication services and observed a positive correlation between 
increase in the price of calls and reduction in the total number of calls 
made by customers. This was true even for flat rate customers for whom 
reduction in call frequency had no effect on the bill. These findings confirm 
that the assumption that most users behave rationally is reasonable. 
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2. Price of calls is the most significant factor that affects user demand. This 
follows from assumption (1) and is confirmed by findings from the survey, 
which show that, the price of calls is the most significant factor in users I 
choice of service provider (see Appendix C). 
3. We will consider a closed system: no mobiles will enter or leave the 
system. However, mobility within the system as result of pricing will be 
taken into account and this will be discussed in section 4.1.4. 
4. We will only consider mobile originating calls to the fixed system and 
ignore all calls from the fixed network to mobile terminals and mobile-to- 
mobile calls. This will simplify the analysis of the system and the 
implementation of the dynamic pricing algorithm. 
4.1.2 General User Demand Model. 
The demand function of a product or a service shows the relationship 
between the price of that product or service and the quantity demanded by 
users at a given price. From assumptions 1 and 2 outlined in the previous 
section, it follows that the reaction of users to price will be rational, i. e. users 
will reduce their demand as price increases. Therefore, the demand functions 
that we will consider will be monotonically decreasing. 
An important aspect of user demand is demand price elasticity. Demand 
elasticity is defined as the expected % change in quantity demanded divided 
by the % change in price (Varian [79]). 
ED dQ PQ 
dPQ Q 
Quantity of product or service demanded; 
pc) - Price of the product or service. 
(4-1) 
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By definition, if for a particular product 
JEDJýý 'then its demand is inelastic, 
if JEDI >I its demand is elastic and if 
JEDI 
=I then the demand for the product is 
unit elastic. Demand elasticity depends on socio-economic factors such as 
income and age. In addition, the type of user business or private will also 
affect the magnitude of the demand elasticity. It is well established that 
business users have lower price elasticity than private users. In turn, private 
users can further be subdivided according to their disposable income into 
wealthy or poor, for example, which will again affect their respective elasticity 
of demand. 
4.1.2.1 Types of demand as a function of price. 
In economic theory, for the purposes of analysis simplification, demand 
functions are expressed as either linear ( 4-2 ) or exponential ( 4-3 ). 
Dx =A+ Bofýv (4-2) 
Demand time constant; 
BO - Slope of the demand function or demand elasticity; 
Px - Price of the product. 
B 
AP, 0 (4-3) 
In practice, however, the shape of the demand function is likely to 
depend on the type of service. There is little published evidence on the shape 
of the demand function in cellular telecommunication networks and in theory 
any function that satisfies the assumptions outlined above could be accepted 
as the demand function. For example, the reciprocal function defined by 
equation ( 4-4 ) is potentially a candidate. 
- 100- 
Chapter 4 User Behaviour Model 
A 
ý -PQI 
Demand for calls; 
Demand time constant; 
p- Elasticity coefficient factor; 
Price of calls. 
A., 
UCIL 
(4-4) 
A better choice, however, is a modified exponential function ( 4-5 ) 
suggested by Koschat et al. [80] because it was originally used for modelling 
demand in the fixed telecommunications network: 
Qtk kkk (4-5) -pt p qt ei 
Qf 
k- Demand for customers type k during hour t; 
q, k- Random demand during hour t; 
k_ 
pt Price of a call during hour t for a type k customer. 
This type of demand function will be modified to take into account 
behavioural features specific to the cellular network (the substitution and 
mobility effects are discussed in section 4.1.2.2.2 and 4.1.4 respectively) and 
so the simplified starting function for demand will be 26: 
Ae Q -ýPýp 
Q- Number of calls demanded; 
Demand time constant; 
p- Elasticity coefficient factor; 
Price of calls. 
(4-6) 
-() To ensure that the demand function is monotone decreasing (assumption 1) we shall only consider 
> 0. 
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This type of function has also been chosen because of potential ease of 
manipulation and properties that allow easy addition of the substitution and 
mobility effects. 
The elasticity of this type of demand is (using equation ( 4-1 ) ): 
Ed I --,,: 
OPQ (4-7) 
So the elasticity of demand changes proportionally to both P and price 
as we move along the demand curve. Therefore, p can be interpreted as a 
calibration parameter, which determines the significance of the effect of price 
on user elasticity: a small p indicates relatively minor significance, while a 
large p means that the price will have a relatively large effect on elasticity. 
Thus p acts in a similar way to pure demand elasticity and can, therefore, be 
interpreted as a quasi-elasticity of demand. 
The dependence of demand elasticity on parameter P poses the 
question of determining the appropriate elasticity for the demand. As the price 
in a dynamically priced network is not constant, it will not be possible to test 
the demand for any fixed value of the demand elasticity. However, by 
choosing the values of 0 while bearing in mind the interval of feasible 
dynamic prices, it will be possible to simulate a network with demand elastic or 
demand inelastic traffic. Although no information is available regarding the 
actual elasticity of demand for communication services, in this thesis it will be 
assumed that the demand is at most unit elastiC27 i. e. 
JEDI 
: -< I. 
Further 
investigation of user behaviour is necessary for more accurate information on 
the elasticity of demand. The problem is compounded by the possibility of 
multiple services with potentially different demand patterns and elasticity. To 
Private communication with a network provider. 
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simplify the analysis, the demand model will be developed only for voice calls 
and the assumption will be made that the demand user elasticity P is uniform. 
4.1.2.2 Other factors affecting demand. 
The demand functions discussed so far give a relationship between the 
price and the expected number of calls made at that price. Plotting the 
expected number of calls at one provider's current peak (25 pence per minute) 
and off-peak (5 pence per minute) pricing rates, using the exponential demand 
function ( 4-6 ) and A= 100, the expected level of demand can be seen in 
Figure 4-1. 
100 
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Time of day (hours) 
Figure 4-1 Demand as a function of price 
Comparing this to the actual number of calls generated in a cell in real 
time in Figure 4-2 it can be seen that the demand pattern is very different. 
Therefore, price is not the only factor that affects the demand for calls. In order 
to make accurate predictions about the effect of dynamic pricing on expected 
user demand the model has to be modified further to match the actual data. 
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In the following sections three additional effects will be discussed and the 
mathematical model modified to give the desired behaviour. 
4.1.2.2.1 The time of day effect 
The first effect that we have not taken into account is the time of day 
effect. In Figure 4-2 it can clearly be seen that although the price per minute is 
higher during peak hours the demand is also higher. This is due to the fact that 
more business users use the phone and they have lower elasticity of demand 
than private users. In addition, people are more mobile and can have less 
access to fixed line telephones. At the end of the business day the demand 
drops significantly although the price is also significantly lower, because the 
proportion of private users (with higher demand elasticity) accessing the 
network increases. 
In the context of this thesis, the time of day effect will be defined as the 
expected number of users that will attempt to access the network at any given 
time of the day. It will manifest itself as significantly higher proportion of people 
attempting to access the network during peak hours (irrespective of the higher 
1'ý Data courtesy, of BT. 
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price) and could be implemented using a polynomial function, for example. 
However, in this case, the change in the expected number of calls as a 
function of the time of day will be taken as equivalent to the number of calls 
shown in Figure 4-2. 
4.1.2.2.2 Substitution effect 
Although the time of day effect can account for the drop in demand 
during off-peak hours, this contradicts the empirical evidence from UK's T- 
Mobile, who experienced a significant increase in off-peak number of calls 
when making their calls free [11]. This suggests that there is another powerful 
effect that has not been taken into account so far. One possible explanation 
for this rapid increase in demand can be the fact that most mobile users have 
fixed line telephones at home that offer cheaper calls. As soon as the price of 
mobile calls becomes lower than the fixed line telephone, as was the case with 
free T-Mobile calls, the demand can increase dramaticall Y29. 
The impact of the substitution effect on the demand function can be 
corrected by the addition of an extra term ( 4-8 ) to represent this sharp 
increase in demand at low prices. 
Qcorrected :::::::: 
0+ 
EPjý 
) 
(4-8) 
correction coefficient; 
The substitution effect would be active only when the price in the network 
falls below a threshold cut-off price Psub - 
In the case of the cellular networks 
this would be the price of the price of the fixed line calls. Therefore, the 
2() Fixed lines still carry a significant proportion of call mmiutes and in 1998 fixed line networks in the 
UK carried 142,897 million call minutes. compared to 9.542 million carried by cellular networks: a 
difference of 1.398' o [3]. 
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corrected demand function becomes ( 4-9 ), plotted in Figure 4-3 for A= 100, 
E= 10 and Pe [0.0 1,0.5]. 
A(I ý-PPQ '-, Q G lp"h, 1 (4-9) Q= (A(lý-'P'+EPj) 
PQEJPmin, Psuh) 
Substitution effect cut-off price. 
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Figure 4-3 Corrected exponential demand function for various price elasticity 0 
4.1.2.2.3 Existing pricing bias. 
Finally, the actual data to which we compare the output of the model is 
"biased" due to pricing information already present in the system. To offset this 
bias, the difference between the new dynamic price and the "inherent" or 
existing price will be taken, as a more accurate measure of peoples' 
willingness to pay. As a result, when the price is equal to either the peak or off- 
peak price already present in the call data, the expected number of calls from 
the model will be equal to the number of calls in the raw data. If the dynamic 
price is lower than the existing price, a higher proportion of people will attempt 
to access the network and vice-versa. This behaviour is particularly easy to 
implement with the exponential function of equation ( 4-6 ). 
beta =2 
beta =1 
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(, ý- 0 
(Plnamic 
-Pbias 
) 
A( PE sub, Pmax (4-10) (Pd'ynamic -Pbias 
+ 
(Pdynamic Yo pE Ipmi., Psub 
Pdynamic 
- The dynamic price at time t 
Pbias 
-Inherent peak or off peak price. 
To surnmarise, a modified exponential demand function will be used to 
represent the compound demand curve for cellular services. Taking into 
account the time of day and substitution effects and allowing for a pricing bias 
in our raw data the simplified demand function changes from ( 4-6 ) to ( 4-10 ). 
4.1.3 Effect of Price on Call Length. 
The second potential effect of dynamic pricing could be the reduction or 
increase in call length. This effect has not been considered by other 
researchers, but results from the user survey conducted as part of this project 
indicate that a significant proportion of people consciously reduce the duration 
of their calls during peak hours when the price is higher. Surprisingly, as noted 
earlier this is true even for people who do not pay for their calls (see Appendix 
C). Therefore, we can expect that a customer, confronted by a high price and 
choosing to proceed with making the call, will reduce the duration of their call 
in an attempt to reduce its cost. Although this particular aspect of user 
behaviour can have a very significant effect on the impact of dynamic pricing, 
its accurate modelling would require access to very sensitive data on current 
user behaviour. Attempts to access this data proved unsuccessful and, 
therefore, it was decided that the effect of call length would not be studied 
further, as the mathematical model would have been purely speculative. 
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4.1.4 Effect of Price on User Mobility. 
The main difference between fixed and wireless networks is that in 
cellular networks users can, to a certain extent, choose the location in which to 
initiate a call. Therefore, in order to predict the effect of dynamic pricing 
accurately this spatial freedom has to be taken into account. 
Following assumption (3), only mobility within the system and, in 
particular, only mobility due to changes in price will be considered. As users 
act rationally it is reasonable to assume that they will tend to move to areas or 
cells with lower prices and avoid expensive areas. This is equivalent to a 
situation in which users look at the price of the calls in their area (cell) and, on 
finding it too expensive, decide to delay the call until they find a cheaper area 
or move to an alternative location. Although this scenario does not seem very 
realistic at this point in time, the potential advances in location based services 
even in the very near future will enable users to know exactly where they are 
in the network. This assertion will be discussed further in section 4.1.4.5 
below. 
Various mathematical models have been suggested in the literature for 
describing user mobility in a cellular system. The advantages and 
disadvantages of three such modes, the gravity, the fluid and the Markov will 
be compared, and the most suitable model developed to represent mobility in 
a dynamically priced network. 
4.1.4.1 Gravity model of trip distribution. 
The gravity model developed in transportation studies can be used to 
predict the most probable distribution of number of trips between two regions 
depending on the distance between the regions [7], [81]. It is defined as: 
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T. = A-B .0 Dj. f 
(dij) 
Ai lBjDjf(dij) 
Bj = 
[ý 
Ai Oi f (dij )l 
Total number of trips to a zone; 
dij- Distance between zones i and 
Oi 
- Total number of trips originating in i; 
Dj - Total number of trip destinations in 
-A- WE 
(4-11) 
(4-12) 
(4-13) 
The additional constraints Ai and Bj , also referred to as balancing 
factors, are added to ensure that, if the number of origins or destinations in a 
particular zone are doubled, the number of trips between these zones will not 
quadruple. 
This model represents aggregate traffic and is particularly accurate for 
modelling traffic volumes between two towns or cities [7]. An advantage of this 
model is that it can be used to describe the most probable distribution of trips 
between two zones as a function some impedance factor, such as the cost of 
the trips. However, it requires the calculation of many parameters, which 
makes simultaneous modelling of many locations very difficult. 
4.1.4.2 Fluid mobility model. 
The fluid models view traffic flow as the flow of fluid, and use the 
following definition: 
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Number of site crossings per minute (circular region); 
Population density; 
Average speed of the nodes; 
Region diameter. 
-A- ucl. 
(4-14) 
This model also describes aggregate traffic and is very suitable for 
describing the traffic volume between two cities or countries, for example. Its 
limitation stems from the fact that "... since average population density and 
average velocity are used, this model is more accurate for regions containing 
a large population. " (Lam et. al., 1997: 82) [7]. 
4.1.4.3 Markov Model. 
The Markov (also known as random walk model) is the third type of 
model used to generate patterns for user movements. In contrast to the gravity 
and the fluid models, it describes individual movement behaviour. In this 
model, the subscriber behaviour is described through a matrix or site topology 
model, which states the probability of the user moving to an adjacent area or 
cell. This is very similar to having a pedestrian who decides which way to turn 
(left or right) while walking in a town. Examples of probabilities for a subscriber 
moving to any of the adjacent cells are shown in Table 4-1. 
Future utu 
cell Cell I Cell 2 Cell 3 
Present 
cell 
Cell 1 0.5 0.1 0.4 
Cell 2 0.4 0.2 0.4 
Cell 3 0.1 0.3 0.2 7 
Table 4-1 Probability movement table for a subscriber 
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If a user is in cell 1, for example, there is a 50% probability that they will 
remain in cell 1, a 10% probability of their moving to cell 2 and a 40% 
probability of their moving to cell 3. 
Although this model describes movement of individual users in a location 
area [7], it does so in a random manner and is not very suitable for describing 
trips. 
From the three models discussed above, it can be seen that the gravity 
model is the most suitable for the description of user mobility as a function of 
price. The model will be modified to represent the expected user behaviour 
and simplified, using assumption (4) on page 99, for easier manipulation. 
4.1.4.4 Simulation mobility model. 
The suitability of the gravity model to determine the most probable 
distribution of the number of trips between two regions depending on the 
attractiveness of the destinations has been discussed by Wilson [81]. The 
gravity model will be adapted to predict the number of calls generated 
between two cel IS30 - The analogous call gravity model is defined as: 
T= K0i Dj 12 (4-15) 
lila dij 
ic -A constant; 
T, j - The total number of calls 
between cells 1* and j; 
12- 
Impedance factor; 
d ij 
Oi 
- Total number of users in cell i; 
3' The constraint that there will be no mobile to mobile calls will be imposed after the model has been 
developed. 
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Dj - Total number of users in cell 
Similar to the original gravity model, this formula has one major 
deficiency: If the number of users between originating and destination cells 
doubles, the number of expected calls between those cells will quadruple. 
Therefore, to correct this deficiency, additional constraints have to be 
imposed: 
Tij = Dj (4-16) 
ITU =Oi (4-17) 
i 
To satisfy these constraints, the corrective constants (balancing factors) 
Ai and Bj are again introduced. 
In this case, the impedance function also has to be changed (see below 
for explanation of changes) and 
_ 
becomes: )1djJ2 
1=e 
_a(pd,.. ic-plias) 
ij 
a- Location mobility elasticity of users; 
Pbias 
-Inherent peak or off peak price; 
Pdi, 
namic - Dynamic price in cell i 
(4-18) 
The degree of customer reaction to the changes in price in the region will 
be represented by the parameter a. This parameter represents the location 
price sensitivity of the users. It can take both negative and positive values and 
can be used for calibration of the model as suggested by Evans [82]. 
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A correctly calibrated gravity model would give correct predictions for the 
movement of the mobile users (Bouchard and Pyers [83]). If we define the 
mean cost of a call in the network as the averaged price all users in the 
network pay at any given time, the increase in a has the effect of reducing the 
mean cost of calls. This is equivalent to a larger proportion of users moving to 
cheaper cells to make calls. Therefore, a can be seen as the users' 
propensity or willingness to move. 
The price factor Pi,, is introduced, as before, to offset the pricing bias 
present in the current network. The user mobility model thus becomes: 
-a 
(Pdynamic 
- Pbias 
=AB OD e (4-19) 
Ai -I (Pdj,? zamic -Pbias (4-20) BjDje-a 
(4-21 A0 e-a(pd"" - 
P" 
Although this model describes fully the most probable distribution of 
mobile users, depending on the expected number of users in each cell, when 
the effect of mobility due to price is taken into account [81], a problem with this 
model is that in order to find A, and Bj we need to solve equations ( 4-20 ) 
and ( 4-21 ). This can only be done by using an iterative minimisation 
algorithm. One possible implementation of such an algorithm, using Matlab, 
can be seen in Appendix D. 
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However, the model can be simplified by using assumption 4 in section 
4.1.1, which stated that we shall only consider mobile originating calls to the 
fixed system and ignore all calls from the fixed network to mobile terminals 
and mobile-to-mobile calls. Then the fixed network can be represented, as a 
cell in which the number of expected users is infinitely large. Therefore, the 
total number of calls between any cell in the cellular network and the mega- 
cell comprising the fixed network will be limited only by the expected number 
of users in the cellular network cell. As a result, constraint ( 4-20 ) can be 
dropped without any loss of generality. Thus, by imposing: 
VAj =1 (4-22) 
the model becomes: 
Vil :=B, Oi D, e 
-a 
(Pdynamic 
- Pbias 
) 
(4-23) 
Bi -I 
Oie-' 
(Pdynarnic 
-ýPbtasT (4-24) 
With 
D, =10i 
I, 
(4-25) 
These equations are much simpler to solve, without the need for iterative 
calculations. Therefore, this model will be used to represent the mobility 
behaviour of the users and, through the variation of the mobility elasticity a, 
various scenarios can be tested. 
4.1.4.5 Mobility model constraints. 
The original gravity model was developed to represent the most likely 
distribution of trips in an area and was modified to represent the expected 
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number of calls. This was done on the basis that there are certain similarities 
between calls and journeys and, therefore, the mobility of users will be 
affected in a similar way. 
Telephone calls and train journeys can be considered similar in the 
following respects: 
1- They are both services and, therefore, not tangible; 
2. The supply of the services depends on certain equipment being 
available to the subscriber, e. g. a mobile handset, a ticket or a car; 
3. Current charges for the services are dependent on both time of day and 
destination; 
4. They are supplied in real time and affected by real time and random 
events, such as equipment breakdown, for example; 
5. Making a journey requires certain preparation and, so does moving 
around the network to find a cheaper cell. 
6. The provision of constant Quality of Service is difficult and relies on 
anticipation and back-up equipment. 
There are, however, a number of differences: 
1. A successful call will depend on the caller and the calling party being 
available at the same time, otherwise the connection may not happen 
or the call length will be reduced (for e. g. leaving a message); 
2. The length of a journey is fixed and paid for in advance. Once the 
customer has selected the destination, it is difficult to change it, while 
the duration of a call can be varied depending on the price that is 
charged; a short and very brief call can be sufficient if the line is 
expensive. 
The similarities identified above, especially (5), suggest that users of 
transportation services and users of cellular networks could behave in a 
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similar manner. The differences do not affect the mobility of users and so are 
unlikely to affect the appropriateness of the model. However, there is a 
particular aspect of the model that could affect its suitability. The model 
assumes that the user "knows" the price of all possible trips before embarking 
on the selected one. It is difficult to justify the availability of this "perfect 
information" for the entire cellular network before a user chooses whether to 
make a call or not. However, with the advance of location based services it will 
be possible for users to know where they are and to request information about 
the prices of the cells around them. This trend is indicated by the latest 
development in WAP phone services, which allow users dynamic access to 
on-line information on the Internet. For example, a user can specify a location 
or a facility in a location they are interested in and a map of the area showing 
the facility can appear on their screen. At the moment users have to explicitly 
specify the area they want to call. In the future, with the integration of cellular 
networks and GPS (Global Positioning System), the location of the mobile 
user will be calculated automatically, so the user will just have to enter the kind 
of facility they are interested in. By analogy, the user will be able to request 
information about prices not only in his/her own but also in all neighbouring 
cells, as well as instructions how to find the location of the desired cheaper 
cell. Such future enhancement of the WAP based services is very feasible and 
there exists an incentive for the service provider to provide this type of 
information, as it will enable mobile users to take better decisionS31. 
it is likely that users will also move to cells with different prices unintentionally. In the course of their 
normal activities. To decrease the discrepancy between the call starting price and the price within the 
current cell. call charges should be updated periodically, after a pre-set fixed charge period. 
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4.1.5 Complete User Behaviour Mode 1. 
The complete user behaviour model takes into account both the price 
sensitivity of demand and the price sensitivity of the mobility of users. 
Therefore, the formula, which will be tested in a simulation for various 
parameter values will be: 
A(t)BI0iDle -(a+ß)(pdynamic -Pbias PC [P, sith, Prr 
(A(tý-ß (Pdynamic-Pbias) 
+ E(Pdynaniic 
tß 
x- 
PC [Pmin, Ps 
BI0iDle-c' 
(Pdý, 
ii(iriiic -Pbias 
))1 
Oie-' 
(Pdynamic 
-Pbias 
4.2 Price Setting Methodologies. 
(4-26) 
(4-27) 
After deciding on the charging units and the type of pricing strategy to be 
used in a cellular communication network, the main issue facing the network 
operators is the choice of monetary value per charging unit. According to 
classic economics theory this choice will depend on both the objective of the 
network operator and the elasticity of demand. 
4.2.1 Classic Optimal Price Setting Me th odology. 
Economic theory postulates that the optimal pricing methodology that 
should be used by all firms, independent of the type of market they are in is 
marginal cost pricing (Varian [79]). Marginal cost prices are calculated by 
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equating the marginal demand for the service to the marginal cost of providing 
the service. On the one hand, this ensures that users pay the actual cost for 
providing the service and this will maximise consumer welfare [84], [85]. On 
the other hand, marginal cost prices ensure that the supplier produces at 
minimum cost. Marginal cost prices are Pareto efficient i. e. they are the 
optimal prices for both users and suppliers and there are no other prices that 
will increase the welfare of both users and the suppliers. As pointed out by 
Anania and Solomon [86] this fact explains the zeal with which industry 
regulators promote marginal cost pricing. 
Marginal cost pricing is attained naturally in a market with perfect 
competition. By definition this is market in which the amount of goods 
produced by individual suppliers is negligible, compared to the total amount of 
goods in the market and, therefore, individual suppliers have no control over 
the price of the goods. They have to act as price-takers and accept the market 
price determined by the equilibrium of supply and demand. 
However, the telecommunications market is not a market with perfect 
competition. The proliferation of pricing tariffs employed by network operators 
for voice and data services (see section 3.1.1.2) suggest that the market is in 
effect competitive monopolistic or ologopolistic, with individual network 
operators having some control over the prices they set. Ignoring this condition 
and setting prices at marginal cost level will put a network operator at a 
disadvantage. In addition, in telecommunications networks, the marginal costs 
are zero, except when the network is congested [58]. Therefore, by using 
marginal cost pricing, the network operator can expect to recover costs only 
when the network is congested. As a result, a pricing scheme based on pure 
marginal cost pricing may not be sufficient for recovering the set up cost of 
communication network operators (Karsten et. al. [87], or Wang et. al. [88]). 
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4.2.2 Optimal Pricing Methodologies for Communication Networks. 
The rapid growth in Internet traffic due to its use by private individuals 
and companies has led to a rapid increase in the demand for network 
bandwidth. As a result, congestion and delays have become a characteristic 
feature of the Internet and the users perceive them as negative externalities 
[79]. Therefore, the control and reduction of congestion has been identified as 
a paramount issue and is the subject of intense academic research, in 
particular into the potential use of dynamic pricing for this purpose. In the 
following sections we will look at suggested dynamic pricing strategies for 
attaining optimal prices in fixed line communication networks and identify 
some of their drawbacks. 
4.2.2.1 Auction (smart market) pricing. 
MacKie-Mason and Varian [89] developed an approach called the "smart 
market 99 in which the users bid for the available network bandwidth by stating 
how much they are prepared to pay for the transmission of their packets. The 
network collects all the bids in a given time interval and arranges them in 
descending order by price. The price for the time interval is taken to be the bid 
for the last packet that will utilise the available capacity. The admitted packets 
that will utilise the network fully are then delivered, while the leftover packets 
are either returned to the users or re-routed to a slower network. Therefore, 
customers do not pay what they bid but the market clearance price, which is 
always the lowest of the prices of all admitted packets. The final accepted bid 
price, which is taken as the actual price for the bandwidth, is achieved using 
the classical demand-supply equilibrium. It represents the marginal willingness 
of consumers to pay and it is shown by MacKie-Mason and Varian [90] that 
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the congestion revenue equals the optimal investment in capacity expansion. 
A particular problem with this approach is that the highest bid packets are 
delivered first and this can lead to a backlog of lower bid packets. In addition, 
although it can be applied as an effective means of congestion control, its 
application to cellular telephony is limited. The overhead that will be generated 
over the radio interface as a result of informing users that their packets were 
not accepted, for example, will be significant and will reduce the throughput of 
the network. In addition, there is uncertainty as to whether the packets offered 
by the bidder will be accepted in the following time interval and the total delay 
the user will encounter as a result cannot be predicted. 
4.2.2.2 Shadow pricing. 
This approach is based on retrospective pricing on the basis of the 
congestion and inconvenience caused by the user to other users in the 
network and was suggested by Gibbens and Kelly [84]. A "shadow 11 price is 
defined, in an optimisation problem, as the marginal improvement on the 
optimised function when a single additional unit in one of the constraints is 
added (Rayes and Min [91]). In communication networks, the shadow price of 
sending a packet is the congestion cost to other packets, i. e. the cost to other 
users whose packets are dropped as a result of the processing of this packet. 
It is impossible for the network to calculate this cost at the time the packet is 
being sent, but it can be estimated by marking the packets. One possible 
marking strategy, for example, is for the routers to mark all packets that arrive 
after the buffer is full and continue marking until it is empty again. The charge 
that a user has to pay is proportional to the number of packets that have been 
marked during transmission. This mechanism can be used to control 
congestion: when congestion arises, prices go up and, therefore, users are 
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inclined to reduce their sending rate. A drawback of this pricing scheme is that 
its application relies on the congested router marking all packets that it has 
forwarded and which have caused congestion. Therefore, it has to identify the 
start and finish of the flow that has caused congestion. However, the self- 
similari tY32 of Internet traffic ([92], [93]) makes it very difficult for routers to 
identify the start and finish of the flow that caused the congestion and this 
makes marking the correct packets challenging. 
4.2.2.3 Dynamic bandwidth allocation. 
John and Liam Murphy [85] suggest an alternative pricing method, by 
linking marginal prices to the available network capacity, for optimising the 
benefit to users and controlling congestion. In their approach, users are 
assumed to act in their own best interest and each user is associated with a 
personal benefit function which shows the value users place on the amount of 
bandwidth purchased. A user is assumed to place most benefit on the first few 
units of bandwidth received and the benefit function levels off as more 
bandwidth is received. In the economics literature, this behaviour is known as 
diminishing marginal utility. The benefit function is used in conjunction with the 
price set by the network to determine the user demand for bandwidth at any 
time interval. The network operator, on the other hand, has to choose the 
bandwidth allocation to maximise user benefit while at the same time 
satisfying the capacity constraints of the system, such as buffer space or 
channel availability, for example. As a result, optimal prices can be derived 
which ensure that users will self-select their optimal bandwidth demands. An 
Self-similarity is defined as the scale invariance property of the traffic i. e. the profile of the traffic 
rema ns similar independently of the time scale (seconds, mi I mutes or hours, for example) on which it is 
observed. 
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alternative approach taking into account both the different bandwidth and QoS 
user requirements as well as the load in the network at any given time was 
studied by Gupta et. a/. [94]. They compared the performance of a fixed 
network (Internet) with two priority classes under the conditions of free access, 
flat rate and optimal dynamic pricing strategies. Their results showed that the 
optimal dynamic pricing strategy performs as well as the free access (no 
pricing) strategy with small network load. Both strategies offered higher net33 
and custome r34 benefit for users than the flat rate tariff at small network load. 
As the load in the network increased the optimal dynamic pricing strategy 
performed significantly better than either the flat rate or the free access 
strategies. The results held even after allowances were made for imperfect 
information and deliberate user demand misrepresentation in the network. 
These results suggest that dynamic pricing can significantly improve the net 
and customer benefit users derive from a fixed multi-service network. 
4.2.2.4 Provider-based pricing approach. 
The three pricing approaches outlined above assume that users are 
aware of the utility brought to them by purchasing a certain amount of 
bandwidth and will act in their best interest to maximise their benefit. But 
findings from INDEX (a project studying consumer behaviour), indicate that 
this assumption is not always true [95]. Taking on the role of an ISP (Internet 
Service Provider), the researchers tested various flat rate, usage and time 
based tariffs and observed the usage profile of their customers. They 
observed that users do not always choose the strategy that will maximise their 
By definition net benefits = total value - total delay cost. 
,4 By definition customer benefit = net benefit - total price. 
- 1ý)-) - 
Chapter 4 User Behaviour Model 
A- 
-UCI. 
benefit. Therefore, a pricing strategy attempting to allocate resources in order 
to maximise the utility of users will not necessarily do so. 
Furthermore, the goal of pricing from the provider-oriented point of view 
is not consumer utility maximisation (see (a), (b), (c) and (d) in section 3.2.2). 
As outlined in Chapter 3 the pricing objectives of a network operator can be 
affected by external business considerations and market factors. Therefore, a 
much more realistic approach to pricing from the service provider's point of 
view is to consider the consumer's willingness to pay and attempt to maximise 
the objectives of the network operator. The factors the network operators can 
attempt to maximise include: 
1. Profit - the difference between the revenue and the short and long term 
costs; 
2. Revenue - generated by calls and other services provided by the network; 
3. Utilisation of the available network capacity. 
These objectives are critical for the successful operation of network 
operator in the market place and therefore prices satisfying these will be 
optimal from network operator's point of view. 
4.2.2.4.1 Profit maximisation model. 
A very real objective for network operators is profit maximisation. Given 
expected revenue R(ý(t)), operational and amortisation costs K(t), network 
capacity C and expected aggregate demand ý(t), a simple constrained profit 
maximisation problem for a single communication service over a fixed time 
period t E=- [0, T] is defined as (see [96], [97]): 
T 
Maximise f e-" (R(ý (t)) - K(t)ýt (4-28) 
0 
- 1233 - 
Chapter 4 User Behaviour Model TICL 
subject to ý(t)!! ý C (4-29) 
r- Com pound interest rate; 
R(ý(t)) - Total revenue generated in time interval; 
ý(t) - Aggregate demand; 
Total network capacity; 
K(t) - Operational and amortisation costs. 
The generated profit is discounted by the compound interest rate to take 
into account the fact that future profits are worth less then current profit, as 
current profit can be invested and bring additional revenue. 
Solutions to this model will define the optimal prices that the network 
operator has to charge in order to maximise their profit. However, this 
particular model is most suitable for modelling of profit maximisation in the 
long term, say months or years and not suitable for the telecommunication 
industry. This is a very specific problem to the telecommunication industry 
because in the medium and the short term the operational and amortisation 
costs for network operators are constant, as the main investment of the 
network operator is in setting up the network infrastructure. Therefore, in the 
short term, the profit maximisation problem simplifies to a revenue 
maximisation problem for the network providers. Equation ( 4-28 ), on the 
other hand, can be used by network operators to determine the minimum 
amount of revenue they have to generate per year, in order to recuperate their 
investment costs, for example. 
4.2.2.4.2 Revenue maximisation model. 
The revenue maximisation approach is very similar to the yield 
management pricing approach adopted by airlines as discussed in section 
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3.2-6.1.2 above, but can be done on a shorter time scale. The constrained 
revenue maximisation problem, for a single connection oriented 
telecommunication service is: 
TT 
-rtý(t)p(týdt Maximise f e-"RWt*t fe (4-30) 
00 
subject to ý(t): ý C (4-29) 
r- Compound interest rate; 
R(ý(t)) - Total revenue generated in time interval; 
ý(t) - Aggregate demand; 
P(t)- Price at time t; 
Total capacity of the network; 
,r- Line/call holding time. 
Karsten et. al. [87] use a variation of this model to find the revenue 
maximising prices for an integrated multi-service digital fixed network and use 
it to derive a very comprehensive pricing model. However, the pricing function 
they suggest is extremely complex and difficult to derive and its practical 
application in networks is, therefore, limited. 
In addition, the revenue maximisation problem as defined in ( 4-30 ) 
suffers from one major deficiency, namely that, it assumes that network 
operators can set the prices they charge freely and without any interference. 
This is only the situation in unregulated monopolistic markets, where the 
monopolist is the price setter. In the situation of monopolistic demand equation 
( 4-30 ) can be solved fairly easily for many types of demand and a result from 
classic economics theory shows that the revenue maximisation price is the 
one, which makes the elasticity of demand unity [77]. For the exponential 
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demand function ( 4-10 ), the price maximising the revenue for the network 
operator would be 
35: 
PW (4-31 ) 
The revenues for expected number of users A= 78 and different mobility 
elasticity 0 are plotted in Figure 4-4 and it can be seen that the revenue 
maximising prices are as suggested by the model. The optimal prices for 
Pc [0.5,4.0), for example, will be P(t)c [2.0,0.25) units, for example, and these 
prices will also satisfy the constraint ( 4-29 ) and thus, according to ( 4-30 ), in 
theory, be acceptable prices for the network operator. However, these prices 
will not be acceptable in practice as the cellular market is very competitive and 
the network operators cannot set prices independently. In fact, as pointed out 
in section 1.1, Figure 1-4, the trend is for reduction in prices, and shows that 
the cellular network operators have to act to a degree as price takers, in order 
to be successful. Therefore, the revenue maximisation model suggested by 
equation ( 4-30 ) cannot be used readily for derivation of optimal dynamic 
prices for network operators. 
beta = 1.0 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
0 
Price (units) 
Figure 4-4 Revenue maximisation pricing Lý 
Ig-moring user mobility and substitution effects for simplicity. 
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This thesis will suggest and evaluate the efficiency of three alternative 
methodologies for derivation of optimal values for dynamically priced tariffs in 
a competitive market environment. This will be done in the framework of a 
scenario in which a hypothetical operator has an existing network, which is up 
and running. The existing pricing in the network will be the traditional two tariff 
pricing strategy with peak and off-peak prices. New dynamic pricing tariffs will 
be introduced and their effect will be evaluated against the performance of the 
"existing" pricing strategy. In calculating the values of the dynamically priced 
tariff the network operator will have available at its disposal information 
regarding the current performance of the network as well as "educated" 
guesses regarding the behaviour of users and competitors. The tariffs' 
optimality will be considered from both network providers and users point of 
view. This is a complex problem that cannot be solved analytically; therefore, a 
simulation will be used to evaluate the effect of the different tariffs. 
4.3 Chapter Summary 
This chapter began with a discussion of the expected effect of dynamic 
pricing on user behaviour. A comprehensive mathematical model for 
evaluating this effect was introduced which took account of the price elasticity 
of user demand as well as the existing pricing bias in the network. Substitution 
and time of day effects due to the fixed network were also modelled. In 
addition, a user mobility model showing the effect of price on user mobility was 
developed by adapting a transportation model discussed by Wilson [81]. The 
final stage in any pricing policy: the setting of monetary units for charging 
network resource usage by customers was discussed. A literature overview of 
suggested optimal price setting strategies from an economic and consumer 
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welfare point of view was given and the drawbacks of these approaches 
highlighted. 
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This chapter will present and evaluate the effectiveness of a provider- 
oriented market driven ad hoc dynamic price setting policy, taking into account 
the minimum and maximum price the network providers want to charge and 
the average price their competitors in the cellular market charge for calls. A 
seven-cell OPNET TM simulation model, developed to test the effect of dynamic 
pricing on cellular networks are presented. Results from the OPNET TM 
simulation using ad hoc competition driven dynamic pricing are shown and the 
resulting changes in network behaviour analysed. These indicate that the 
behaviour of the network is very sensitive to the shape of the proposed pricing 
function. 
5.1 Competition Driven Ad Hoc Pricing ModeL 
Implementation of the dynamic pricing algorithm outlined in section 
3.3.1.1 requires the derivation of a dynamic pricing function for mapping the 
prices to the load in the network. This requires the network operators to make 
decisions regarding the maximum and minimum price they will charge and the 
granularity of the intermediate prices. In a competition driven market the 
network operator has to set these prices bearing in mind the pricing of other 
competitors. The accurate determination of the minimum price is critical for 
avoidance of overload in the network, and its value can be determined on the 
basis of historic information about the network capacity and user demand 
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elasticity. The maximum price also has to be considered carefully, for 
example, taking into account any limit set or recommended by the industry 
regulator. 
Finally, the network operator has to set the granularity of the intermediate 
dynamic prices. It is in network provider's interest to determine these 
intermediate prices bearing in mind the prices set by other operators, to avoid 
consumer churn. For example, the network operator may want to ensure that 
the average price in the network is the same, or even below, the fixed price of 
its competitors. This can be seen as a measure for securing user interest and 
the network operator's market share. For example, if 70% of prices are below 
the average market price, the well being of an average user will be higher than 
if just 30% of the prices are below the average market price. 
If we call the minimum and the maximum prices a network operator 
chooses P,., and Pm, x I the objective is to determine the prices to be charged 
as the load in the network changes from 0 to Q,,, a, percent. In order to 
safeguard user interest and to protect themselves from the industry watchdog, 
a provider may wish to impose an additional constraint to ensure that the 
intermediate prices they charge are the minimum possible 36 . In mathematical 
terms this is equivalent to finding the curve P(q), which minimises the area 
bounded by itself, given a particular divergence of the price curve from the 
straight line connecting the maximum and minimum price m. The divergence 
,,, ii will depend on the average market price and the positioning of the network 
operator with respect to it. It can also be defined as a consumer utility or 
This assumption is not necessarily in network provider's best interest. The acceptable prices for the 
industry regulator could be higher. 
- 130- 
Chapter 5 Competition Driven Ad Hoc Pricing Model UCL 
welfare index because increasing m will lead to users seeing lower 
intermediate dynamic prices, thus potentially increasing their welfare. 
The optimisation problem faced by the network operator is: 
Qmax 
Minimise f (Pý,.. + P(q)ýq, (5-1 
Qmin 
subject to 
11 -+P(qýTdq 
=M 
(5-2) 
and the boundary conditions: 
p(Q", ) = P", (5-3) 
P(Qmax ) --": Pmax (5-4) 
Pm, 
n- Minimum price; 
Pmax 
-Maximum price; 
Load in the network; 
P(q) - Intermediate prices in the network; 
Consumer welfare index; 
Qn-fin 
- Minimum load to start dynamic pricing; 
Qmax - Maximum load in the network. 
Taking Qmj, =0 and using calculus of variations, the curve minimising 
the area bound by itself can be found using Lagrange's multiplier (Butkov 
[98]). Thus we have to solve: 
max 
H(P, P q) f Pmm + P(q)+, ýJl + P(qý iq 
0 
(5-5) 
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As ( 5-5 ) does not explicitly depend on q, a special formula for finding 
the functional can be used (Irving and Mullineux [99]) and the Euler equation 
which will be solved becomes: 
P. +P(q)+Il 
rl+P(qý 
-A 
/2 
P(q) 
-onst =K -- s- ý-I+ 
P (q 
ý (5-6) 
The general solution to this optimisation problem is (see Appendix E for 
detailed solution): 
P(q) = K-P _ 
VA2 
-(h-q 
)2 
min (5-7) 
To solve the problem for boundary conditions ( 5-4 ) and ( 5-5 ) and 
determine an exact solution the following system of equations has to be 
solved: 
P(o)-=p =K-p min min -h2 
P(Qmax p=K- Pm, _ 
VA2 
- (h -Q max 
)2 (5-8) 
max 
Qmax 2 f 
ll+Pl(q; 
dq=M 
0 
Simplifying and rearranging this (see Appendix E) leads to a system of 
two non-linear equations. These can be solved numerically (see Appendix D 
for a suggested Matlab program). 
Pm,, - P. 
h2 ý(h 
- Qjm: 
ýý 
Cos-, 
(h - Qmax Cos-, 
h 
(5-9) 
Then K can be found and the exact pricing function meeting the initial 
conditions determined. 
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The calculated price functions derived from equation ( 5-9 ) with 
Pmj, = 0.01 units, Pma, = 0.4 units, M=0.01 and M=1.0, corresponding to 
market average prices of 0.22 and 0.13 units respectively is shown in Figure 
5-1. Using information on current market prices (see Appendix B) the weighted 
average price of the market is 0.13 units. Therefore, these pricing functions 
will offer one average dynamic price, which is similar to the existing price and 
one, which is higher. As m --> o the pricing function becomes more linear, and 
as M ---ý Qmax + Pmax - Pmin , 
its upper limit, the function becomes less linear. 
This pricing scheme does not take into account the possibility of call 
blocking i. e. demand exceeding the available capacity. In this case an 
exceptional price of 0.5 units will be charged. In general some degree of call 
blocking is tolerated, and in this case the exceptional price will be charged 
when the blocking in the system is above 2%. 
The effectiveness of this pricing approach will be tested by simulation for 
the two values of M used to generate Figure 5-1. 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
M=0.01 
M= 1.0 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Number of busy channels 
Figure 5-1 Competition driven ad-hoc pricing function. 
To prevent user confusion by too many prices, the number of possible 
prices will be decreased by changing the prices only when there is a 10% 
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change in the available system capacity. So, for example, if the load in the 
system is between 10% and 20% the price will not change, however, as soon 
as the load in the network increases to 21%, the price will change. The 
simulation model developed to test the different pricing strategies is discussed 
in the following section. 
5.2 Simulation Development 
In order to study the change in cellular network behaviour under different 
dynamic pricing strategies, a simulation model of a seven-cell cluster was 
developed using the OPNET TM simulation tool [100]. OPNET TM was chosen 
because of its event driven nature and a comprehensive library of ready-made 
network and protocol models. Although the ready-made cellular network model 
implements the functionality of analogue mobile cellular systems as described 
in the EIA/TIA-533 specification standard, also known as the Advanced Mobile 
Phone Service (AMPS) [101], rather than a digital one, the template model 
was a good starting point for the addition of dynamic pricing. However, in order 
to assess properly its suitability as a model to represent a digital network it is 
important to answer two questions. First, is the FDMA modulation used in the 
network significantly different from the TDMA modulation in digital networks 
[12]? However, as can be seen from section 2.1.3.1, the capacity and 
operational characteristics of FDMA and TDMA networks are not significantly 
different. In addition, the mode of signal transmission (physical layer)37 does 
not have a direct impact on the implementation of dynamic pricing which 
affects the system layer 38 of the system, and therefore, for the purposes of this 
37 Layer I in the seven-layer OSI model. 
38 t-aver _3 in the seven-layer 
OSI model. 
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particular research it was not deemed necessary to change the basic 
framework of the model [102]. 
The second significant difference between AMPS and GSM is in the 
structure of the fixed support networks, as the AMPS networks do not have 
dedicated BSCs in which to implement the dynamic pricing algorithm [26]. 
However, since the simulated network consists of only seven cells and one 
cluster, the functionality of the MTSO in AMPS will be equivalent to the 
functionality of the BSC in a GSM network. Thus, the structure of the original 
model could be used without any changes. 
Extensive changes, however, were made to allow the introduction of 
pricing information into the model. The generation rate of calls had to be 
modulated to model the fluctuations in number of calls generated depending 
on the time of day and the price of the calls in the individual cells. The 
algorithm for updates in price and generation rate implemented in the 
simulation is identical to the algorithms described in section 3.3.1.1. 
5.2.1 Simulation Model Features. 
The main features of the model are listed below: 
1. Arbitrary number of mobile units per cell. The total number of mobiles in the 
network is 80; 
2. Arbitrary trajectories for each mobile station. Although available, this 
particular feature was not used in the simulation, as it was unavailable due 
to unresolved problems in OPNET 
TM [100]; 
3. Voice call set up and call termination modelled explicitly; 
4. Call generation distribution for voice and real time calls is Poisson- 
modulated (see 5.2.2 below for further discussion); 
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6. Price updates occur at user defined intervals. The price update interval 
used in the simulations is 300 seconds. 
The default values of other simulation parameters defined in the user 
behaviour model equations ( 4-26 ) and ( 4-27 ), have been summarised in 
Table 5-1 below. 
Parameter Default Value 
E 1/10 
Pbias 0.05 units - off-peak hours 
0.25 units - peak hours 
A Historic data from Figure 2-11 
Table 5-1 Other simulation parameters 
In addition to those, at the beginning of a simulation, the user supplies 
parameters such as the initial call price, total network capacity, and 
parameters against which the performance of the network is measured, such 
as, for example, optimal blocking probability. 
5.2.2 Mathematical Models for Traffic Generation. 
One of the most important aspects of network simulation is the 
appropriate choice of traffic generation model. Depending on the type of 
events arriving in the system two types of traffic have been identified: simple 
and compound. 
Simple traffic consists of the single occurrences of discrete events such 
as, for example, the arrival of telephone calls or ATM cells. It can be described 
as a point process, consisting of a series of arrival instances T,, TI ... T'I 
measured from time t, (Frost and Melamed [103]). So a simple traffic pattern 
can be defined by two parameters, the number of arrivals in the system N and 
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the inter-arrival times An = Tý_, -T,, i. e., the time interval separating the last 
arrival from the previous one. The arrival of voice calls in a GSM cellular 
network can be modelled by a simple traffic model. 
The second type of traffic, on the other hand, consists of batch arrivals 
and is termed compound traffic. Since at any time unit T,, there could be more 
than one unit arriving, in order to describe the traffic fully, one needs to specify 
a non-zero sequence, 1B, where B, is the (random) number of units in a 
batch. This type of traffic is generated in the network when users browse the 
Internet, for example, and can be used to model packet based traffic. 
5.2.2.1 Modelling of voice and data traffic. 
With either type of traffic, the most important aspect of modelling is the 
determination of the call inter-arrival times. These can be modelled using a 
number of distribution models depending on the nature of the traffic and an 
extensive overview is given by Frost and Melamed in [103]. From the traffic 
models discussed, the most suitable model for representing the arrival of voice 
calls in the network is the Markov-modulated traffic model. This type of traffic 
model is relatively simple mathematically and this explains its popularity. 
A Markov-modulated traffic model consists of a simple Markov process 
that, in addition to evolving in time following a Poisson process, is modulated 
by an additional process. In the simple Markov traffic model, the inter-arrival 
times Anare independent and identically distributed. The rationale behind the 
Markov-modulated type of models is the introduction of an explicit notion of 
different states in the description of the traffic stream. The additional Markov 
process is evolving in time and its current state controls (modulates) the 
probability law of the traffic mechanism. 
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The most commonly used Markov-modulated process is the Markov- 
modulated Poisson process, in which the modulation mechanism stipulates 
that in state k (out of total M) the arrivals occur as a Poisson process with 
rate k- The generation rate changes with the state of the system. For 
example, an on-off source can be described by Markov-modulated process: 
when the system is in state "on" calls are generated at ratekONand when the 
system is in the "off' state no calls are generated. 
This type of model will be used to represent call generation in the 
OPNET TM simulation of the GSM system. Voice call arrival times will be 
calculated using a Poisson process with rate At, which will depend on the time 
of day and will evolve as simulation time increases. Call inter-arrival times are 
presumed to be independent due to lack of information on the correlation 
factor. The probability of K arrivals in an interval of length t is calculated 
using: 
K 
PK Pt 
K! e-At 
(5-10) 
/ý - Voice calls arrival rate at time t; 
Expected number of arrivals. 
5.2.3 Simulation Network Architecture. 
The network model, as mentioned above, constitutes a seven-cell 
cluster, which is a common combination in real cellular networks (see Figure 
5-2). Within each cell, there are a number of mobile stations and a Base 
Station (BS) in AMPS or Base Transceiver Station (BTS) in GSM terminology. 
The seven base stations are linked to a Mobile Telephone Switching Office 
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(MTSO) in AMPS or the equivalent Base Station Controller (BSC) in GSM. 
The functions of each of the individual elements are outlined below. 
5.2-3.1 Mobile telephone switching office (M TSO)/Base station controller (BSC). 
In the model, the MTSO/BSC is responsible for call set up and handoff 
channel allocation as well as for monitoring lost or dropped calls. This module 
is also responsible for implementation of the dynamic pricing algorithm. It 
calculates the price for each indivdual cell based on the information it has on 
the number of available free channels in the cell and the call blocking 
probability in the cell. 
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5.2.3.2 Base stations/Base transceiver stations (BTS). 
These are responsible for broadcasting the updated prices to the mobile 
stations. 
5.2.3.3 Mobile stations. 
In the model, the mobile stations represent the behaviour of the users. 
Each can be described by its call generation rate, which determines the 
frequency of calls a user makes at any given time. The value of the generation 
rate for each mobile station is defined dynamically by the time of day and the 
price of the calls in the cell, using the demand function described by equations 
( 4-26 ) and ( 4-27 ) above. The generation rate is updated every time the 
mobile receives a new price from the MTSO/BSC. 
The performance of the simulation model was validated by using a fixed 
flat rate pricing strategy and varying the user inclination to move, denoted by 
in the mathematical model, and the quasi elasticity of user demand, 
denoted by 0 in the user behaviour model. The results are presented in 
Appendix F. 
5.3 Simulation Results with Competition Driven Ad Hoc Pricing. 
The objective of the simulation is to evaluate the effect of the competition 
market driven pricing function defined in section 5.1 on the performance of the 
network. This effect will be evaluated in terms of the expected impact on the 
interests of both the network operator and the customers. Although the 
network price is allowed to vary, it is bounded within the interval PE=- [0 .01,0.5 
]. 
In order to study the behaviour of the network in the regions of both inelastic 
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and elastic demand, the price elasticity parameter39 P will be set at Pc 
As the elasticity of demand Ed for the exponential demand function is (see 
section 4.1.2.1) 
I Ed I:::::::: PP 
Price of the service/product; 
(5-11) 
this choice of p ensured that Ed c: [0,1.5] and, therefore, inelastic, unit elastic 
and elastic demand behaviour were tested. 
The impact on the interests of the network operator was measured in 
terms of generated revenue and the efficient utilisation of the available 
network capacity. In addition, network operators have to ensure that call 
blocking in the system is kept under control; therefore this statistic was also 
recorded. The welfare of users, on the other hand, is affected by the total 
number of successful calls made in the network and the price of the calls. 
Therefore the effect of dynamic pricing on the number of successful calls and 
the weighted average price in the network was also monitored for each pricing 
scenario. 
All simulations were run over a 24-hour period and other variables in the 
system will be fixed as stated in Table 5-1. 
39 Defined in the mathematical model dex eloped in chapter 4 as the sensitivity of users to price changes 
and termed quasi-elasticity of demand. 
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5.3.1 Simulation Results with Competition Driven Pricing without User 
Mobility. 
5.3.1 .1 Network operator's perspective. 
The effect of different dynamic pricing functions on the interests of the 
network operator was monitored via the revenue generated by the network, 
the percentage of blocked calls and the distribution of load in the network as a 
function of time. 
Shown in Figure 5-3 is the effect of the linear and non-linear dynamic 
pricing functions on the total revenue generated in the network. There is a 
significant difference in the effect of the two pricing functions for all values of 
price elasticity 0. There is a 20% increase in the revenue generated for the 
network operator with linear dynamic pricing (demand elasticity P>0.0), 
compared to the revenue generated without dynamic pricing (P = 0.0). The 
increase remains almost constant for all values of 0 for which the user 
demand is inelastic (p < 2.0). 
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Figure 5-3 Total revenue generated in the network as a function of t, 
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The total revenue generated with the non-linear dynamic pricing function 
and inelastic demand (0.0 <p<2.0) is, on the other hand, less than the 
revenue generated without dynamic pricing (P = 0.0 ). The difference is most 
significant for 0=0.5 with a 25% reduction, which gradually reduces as P 
increases, to a 6% reduction for p=2.0. 
However, as the demand for services becomes elastic (p > 2.0) the 
revenue generated with both pricing functions is higher than the revenue 
generated without dynamic pricing. In fact, the non-linear pricing function 
performs better than the linear pricing function for P>2.5, generating 13% 
more revenue. This increase is due to the overall increase in the number of 
calls during off-peak hours, which will increase the average price in the 
network and therefore, lead to the generation of additional revenue. 
This result highlights the issues that network operators face when 
attempting to set dynamic prices. Apparently small differences in the pricing 
function can lead to significantly different results from a network operator's 
point of view. 
This is confirmed by the results for the percentage of blocked calls to 
total number of successful calls in the network in Figure 5-4. 
m 14 
m u 12 
'a 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
linear 
nonlinear 
0 1 2 
Beta 
Fi, c, ure5, -4 Percentage of blocked calls in the network tm- 
3 
- 143 - 
Chapter 5 Competition Driven Ad Hoc Pricing Model -A, UCL 
It shows that the linear pricing function offers a significant (up to 25% for 
0=2.0) reduction in the percentage of blocked calls for inelastic demand i. e. 
P!! ý 2.0. However, as demand becomes elastic (P > 2.0) call blocking abruptly 
increases (by 9%, compared to blocking without dynamic pricing). 
The non-linear pricing function does not offer any improvement in call 
blocking as the percentage of blocked calls in the network increases as soon 
as dynamic pricing is introduced (VP > 0.0). As with the linear pricing function 
the largest increase in percentage of blocked calls occurs when demand 
becomes elastic (P > 2.0). This is due to the increased preference of users for 
off-peak prices, which results in shift of peak hour demand to off-peak hours. 
Combined with the substitution effect with the fixed network these lead to a 
significant increase in off-peak demand (see Figure 5-7 below) and a dramatic 
increase in the percentage of blocked calls (the distribution of the percentage 
of blocked calls on hourly basis is shown in Figure F-4, Appendix F). 
The final parameter of importance to the network operator is the profile of 
the load in the network over time. This load is defined as traffic intensity in 
equation ( 2-10 ). Traffic intensity also changes as a function of both the price 
elasticity of demand 0 and the type of pricing function 40 . 
For inelastic demand (P! ýI. O) the effect on the traffic is not very 
significant i. e. the temporal distribution of the network load remains similar to 
the network load profile without dynamic pricing. This is true for both the linear 
and non-linear dynamic pricing functions (see Figure 5-5). 
40 The data presented is 
i 
averaged over hourly intervals to remove random fluctuations. A sample of the 
profile of traffic load without this smoothing, can be seen in Appendix F (F' Ii gure F- 10). 
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As price elasticity p increases, however, the effect of the pricing function 
on the profile of the load becomes significant, particularly during off-peak 
hours. As can be expected, more calls are generated with dynamic pricing 
using either pricing function (see Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7). The non-linear 
demand function offers a significant increase in the number of calls generated 
throughout the day, whereas the linear pricing function is more efficient at 
reducing the intensity of the traffic during peak hours. 
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Figure 5-7 Traffic distribution for P=3.0 
5.3-1.2 User perspective. 
I 
-k ucl. 
The two pricing strategies also affect the welfare of the users, which is 
determined by the total number of successfully completed calls and the prices 
in the network. 
Significantly more calls are serviced with the non-linear pricing function 
compared to the linear pricing function, for all values of p>o. In fact, 
forp c. [0.5,1.5] the welfare of the users actually decreases with the linear 
demand function, compared to the scenario without dynamic pricing (see 
Figure 5-8). 
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Figure 5-8 Total number of successful calls as a function of 0 
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This is due to the fact that the additional traffic in off-peak hours is less 
than the traffic reduction during peak-hours (see Figure 5-5), leading to an 
overall reduction in the amount of traffic. However, for both the linear and non- 
linear price functions the number of successful calls significantly increases for 
Pc [1.5,3.0] by 18% and 41 % respectively, compared to the situation without 
dynamic pricing (P = 0.0). This is due to the increase in user sensitivity to 
price, which leads to more calls being generated during off-peak hours than 
the calls suppressed during peak hours (see Figure 5-6 and Figure 5-7). 
The distribution of most probable prices that users would see with the 
two pricing functions is also different, although a direct comparison is not 
feasible due to the different intermediate values. However, it can be noted that 
the probability of users seeing the lowest price (0.01 units) when the non- 
linear pricing function is operational is significantly higher than its frequency 
with the linear price function, for all ý (see Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10). 
0.4 * beta = 1.0 
0.35 m beta = 2.0 
0.3 beta = 3.0 
0.25 
0 0.2 L- CL 0.15 
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a- 
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
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Figure 5-9 Probability distribution of price for a linear pricing function 
Therefore, in a system with a non-linear dynamic pricing function users 
are significantly more likely to be offered cheaper calls, compared to users in a 
system with a linear price function. Surprisingly, the frequency of the 
appearance of the maximum price (0-5 units) is very similar with both the 
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linear and non-linear pricing functions for inelastic and unit elastic demand 
(p 2.0). 
As P increases the probability distribution of the prices for the linear 
shifts towards the higher values of the prices, as an increase in user sensitivity 
leads to an increase in network load during off-peak hours. As demand 
becomes elastic (P > 2.0) there is a very significant increase in the probability 
of the maximum price (0.5 units), due to the significant increase in call 
blocking (Figure 5-4). 
0.56 
0.48 
0.4 
0.32 0 
rL 0.24 
0.16 
a- 0.08 
0 
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Figure 5-10 Probability distribution of price for a non-linear pricing function 
The price distribution with the non-linear dynamic pricing function 
indicates that the users are most likely to see one of just two most probable 
prices (the minimum and maximum price), whereas intermediate prices are 
much less likely to appear4l. This toggle effect arises because the non-linear 
pricing function does not offer sufficient control over call blocking and leads to 
an increase in the percentage of blocked calls. An increase of demand 
4' This situation is similar to the two price tariffs that users are accustomed to today In the UK, for 
example, and so this pricino would not appear particularly foreign to users. 
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elasticity p shifts the probability distribution of towards higher most probable 
prices, but this effect is only significant for 0 
The effect of demand elasticity 0 on the weighted average priceS42 is 
plotted in Figure 5-11. 
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Figure 5-11 Weighted average network prices as a function of P 
Overall, the non-linear pricing function offers a significantly lower average 
price than the linear pricing function for inelastic and unit elastic demand 
(0: 5 2.0) and would, therefore, be preferred by users. As demand becomes 
elastic (P > 2.0) the non-linear pricing function leads to higher average price 
than the linear function and, therefore, would become less desirable than the 
linear pricing function. 
These results show that dynamic pricing can have a significant effect on 
the load in the system, the generated revenue and the percentage of blocked 
calls. Furthermore, the shape of the pricing function will affect the benefit 
users can derive from the system. 
The weighted average price is calculated by taking the probability of a price value occurring, 
multiplying it by the price value itself and adding all weighted price values together. 
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5.3.2 Dynamic Pricing and User Mobility. 
An additional dimension to the problem specific to cellular networks is the 
mobility of users in reaction to the changing price, with users moving to 
cheaper cells and avoiding more expensive ones. This is modelled by altering 
the mobility elasticity parameter, defined as a in the mathematical model, 
which represents the willingness of users to move to cheaper cells before 
initiating a call. The results and graphs showing the reaction of the system with 
the linear and non-linear pricing functions at the introduction of user mobility 
are shown in detail in section F-2, Appendix F. Below is a summary of the 
main results. 
The introduction of user mobility would lead to a decrease in the total 
revenue generated with both linear (Figure F-6) and non-linear (Figure F-7) 
pricing function as the elasticity of mobility a increases, due to the shift of a 
larger proportion of users to cheaper cells. 
In addition, the percentage of blocked calls in the network can potentially 
increase (for a>1.5 and a linear pricing function (Figure F-8) and for a>0.5 
with the non-linear pricing function (Figure F-9)). This is due to the increase in 
the proportion of users moving to cheaper cells as the mobility elasticity 
increases. The higher proportion of users would saturate the available cell 
capacity and lead to an increase in the percentage of blocked calls. 
Overall, the introduction of user mobility leads to a more even distribution 
of the network load as a function of time. However, fewer calls were being 
made with both linear and non-linear pricing functions. This is due to the 
reduction of calls in peak hours, as a increases, which is not compensated for 
by an increase in calls during off-peak hours. The only exception is the 
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increase in the number of successful calls by 0.1% with a linear pricing 
function, a=0.5 and inelastic demand (p = 1.0) (Figure F-14). 
User mobility has no effect on the average price in the network, which 
remains constant when a linear pricing function is used (Figure F-16). 
However, with the non-linear pricing function and inelastic demand (P = 
the price steadily increases as a increases, raising by up to 8.9% for mobility 
elasticity a=2.0 (Figure F-17). For unit elastic demand (P=2.0), the 
introduction of user mobility leads to an initial drop in the average price in the 
network by 3% (mobility elasticity a:! ý 1.0). 
The results reported so far show that the response of the system to 
dynamic pricing is very complex and varied. The introduction of user mobility 
as a function of the changing cell prices adds an additional dimension to the 
problem, making accurate predictions about the effect of dynamic pricing even 
more difficult. 
It should be noted, however, that in the simulations above, it was 
assumed that the parameters for mobility and price elasticity, a and 0, are 
independent of each other and, therefore, their values were chosen 
independently. This, though, is not necessarily the case, and it is very likely 
that that the two coefficients are correlated. Although determining the exact 
relationship between the two coefficients is not within the scope of this project, 
the results suggest that the accurate estimation of these parameters is 
essential for reliable forecasting of the expected effect of dynamic pricing and, 
therefore, this area is recommended for future research 
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5.4 Chapter Summary. 
This chapter suggested a market competition driven ad hoc dynamic 
price setting policy, taking into account minimum and maximum prices the 
network providers would want to charge as well as the value of the average 
price of competitors in the market. A seven-cell OPNET TM simulation model 
developed to test the effect of dynamic pricing was described and simulation 
results reported. The results showed that competition driven ad hoc dynamic 
pricing can be a very effective tool in increasing the revenue generated for the 
network operator (see Figure 5-3). The ad hoc pricing scenario also increases 
the total load in the network (see Figure 5-8) while reducing the number of 
blocked calls (see Figure 5-4). However, the shape of the pricing function will 
significantly affect the effectiveness of the dynamic pricing policy. 
Additional factors, such as user mobility, were also shown to affect the 
effectiveness of dynamic pricing as a regulatory mechanism and these have to 
be considered before an accurate prediction of its efficiency can be made. 
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Chapter 6 
The simulation results reported in the previous chapter show that 
dynamic pricing could be an effective tool for controlling network load and call 
blocking. However, its effectiveness depends on the shape of the pricing 
function. This chapter proposes a control theory approach to dynamic price 
setting. The most sensitive variables in the system are identified as the 
revenue generated by the network operator and the percentage of blocked 
calls. As a result these are recognised as being suitable controlled variables 
and a control system model for the cellular network suggested. Due to the 
non-linearity of the system traditional control theory methods are not suitable 
for finding the "best" pricing function applicable for the network. Therefore, the 
mathematical framework of a revenue attainment approach is then developed 
to solve the problem. The aim is to achieve a predefined target revenue for the 
network provider, initially assuming linearity of the dynamic pricing function. 
The linearity requirement is then dropped and a comprehensive model for the 
determination of optimal dynamic price setting strategy for any type of demand 
assumption is presented. Simulation results showing the effectiveness of the 
revenue attainment model are presented and discussed. 
6.1 Control Theory Approach to Dynamic Price Setting. 
Simulation results reported in Chapter 5 show that the suggested 
competition driven price setting methodology can lead to changes in system 
I- 
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behaviour that are difficult to predict. For example, the linear pricing function 
will lead to an average price to users with inelastic demand (demand elasticity 
0 of 0.15 to 0.16 units asp increases (see Figure 5-11), rather than the 
expected 0.22 un itS43. In this case the actual price is closer to the market 
average price of 0.13 un itS44 . This pricing strategy also offers higher revenue 
for the network operators and at the same time reduces call dropping, without 
significantly affecting user welfare. 
The non-linear pricing function on the other hand, leads to an average 
price of 0.09 to 0.11 units (as 0 increases), which is lower than the average 
market price. The lower price leads to an increase in the number of successful 
calls, but at the cost of significantly reduced revenue for the network operator 
and increased blocking in the network, which is undesirable from both network 
operator's and user's point of view. 
As user demand becomes elastic, the weighted average price increases 
significantly for both functions (to 0.21 units and 0.24 units respectively). 
Although both are above the average market price of 0.13 units, they lead to 
an increase in both the number successful calls and revenue for the network 
provider, due to the very elastic demand. However, this is at the cost of a very 
significant (in the order of 600%, see Figure 5-4) increase in the percentage 
of blocked calls, which makes them unacceptable from a network operator's 
point of view. 
These problems arise because the prices were chosen in an ad hoc 
manner, without taking into account any of the parameters affecting system 
behaviour such as the intensity and elasticity of user demand, expected call 
4- , ' This price is derived using the pricing function in Figure 5-1 for M=1.0 
44 Calculated using the Cellnet table (Occasional Caller +) in Appendix B. 
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length or load in the network. A more rigorous approach, taking into account 
these parameters, is necessary to ensure that the prices set will lead to the 
desired system behaviour. 
Control theory provides a powerful tool for determining the control 
necessary to steer a system into its desired state. To define the cellular 
network as a control system we have to find the most suitable controlled 
variable or variables z and identify any significant disturbances w. 
The results presented in section 5.3 highlight how sensitive a network 
provider's revenue and the percentage of blocked calls are to the choice of 
pricing function. If, for example, the network operator implements the non- 
linear pricing function, it would lead to a significant drop in their revenue. 
Decreased revenue will directly affect the profit and investment of the network 
operator and in the long run will have a negative effect on the network 
operator's market share as pointed out in section 3.1.1. The percentage of 
blocked calls would, on the other hand, affect users' perception of the QoS 
provided by the network operator. Since the generated revenue and the 
percentage of blocked calls are particularly sensitive variables, this also 
means they could be good candidates to be controlled variables in the system. 
Another parameter that significantly affects the network behaviour once 
dynamic pricing is implemented is the magnitude of the load in the network as 
a function of the time of day, as this will have a bearing on the performance of 
the pricing function. For example, the effectiveness of the linear ad hoc 
function for revenue generation and control of call blocking decreases as the 
magnitude of the peak load in the network decreases. The system was tested 
with the linear ad hoc pricing function defined in Figure 5-1 and a reduced 
intensity of the traffic during peak hours by 50 (for medium load) and by 100 
(for small load) calls per hour (see Figure 6-1). 
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Figure 6-1 Comparison of different peak-hour traffic loads. 
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With a small network load the percentage of blocked calls, in fact, 
increased with the introduction of dynamic pricing (see Figure 6-2) for all 
values of the demand elasticity p. This is due to the over-stimulation of peak- 
hour demand, which the linear pricing function cannot control efficiently at very 
low magnitudes of the peak-hour load in the network. 
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Figure 6-2 Comparison of call blocking with different peak-hour traffic loads 
However, as the magnitude if the peak-hour load increases the 
effectiveness of the linear pricing function in controlling the system improves 
and the percentage of blocked calls decreases. 
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The effect on the revenue is also significant. With a small load and 
inelastic or unit elastic demand (p !ý2.0), the total generated revenue will 
decrease or remain the same as the revenue generated without dynamic 
pricing (see Figure 6-3). With a larger load, however, (medium or test load) the 
expected revenue will actually increase. 
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23 
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Figure 6-3 Comparison of generated revenue with different peak-hour traffic loads 
These results show the importance the intensity of the traffic load plays in 
determining the effectiveness dynamic pricing as a control function. Therefore, 
to derive a pricing model that will lead to the desired system behaviour, the 
magnitude of the load in the network as a function of the time of day has to be 
taken into account in the form of a system disturbance 
one possible representation of the cellular system as a feedback control 
system is shown in Figure 6-4. The system has one input (demand) and two 
outputs: revenue and network load, which act as controlled variables. This is a 
non-linear control system which cannot be solved using traditional control 
theory methods because the principle of superposition (see section 2.3) 
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cannot be applied (Phillips and Harbor [1041). Therefore, alternative 
mathematical methods have to be considered. 
Optimal load 
D(t) + 
Load + Revenue 10. - 10.10. 
+ 
AD (8, P (q T 
User Pnce +V 
behaviour P(q) 4 
Optimal revenue 
Figure 6-4 The cellular network as a control feedback system. 
6.2 Linear Revenue Attainment Price Setting Methodology. 
6.2.1 Revenue Attainment Mathematic aI Model Definition. 
The objective is to define and solve a mathematical model describing the 
system depicted in Figure 6-4 to establish a pricing function the network 
operator has to use. The pricing function has to ensure that certain target 
revenue 45 Rclesil. c(I is generated within a 
fixed time interval (White [1051), while 
the load in the network is optimal. 
In mathematical terms the revenue generation objective can be 
expressed as: 
tI 
Minimise f R(*111,1, ell I 
(t ýlt 
to 
R, Iesil. (,,, - 
Desired revenue; 
Network providers can determine the required revenue by, for example, using equation ( 4-28 ). 
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Rcu 
rren i 
(t )- Revenue generated at time t; 
t,, - Start of optimisation period; 
tj - End of optimisation period. 
6.2.1.1 Mathematical model assumptions 
1. This approach can lead to potential increase of the prices over the 
optimisation period (tl-to). Target revenue that has not been 
generated at the beginning of the pricing period, due to demand 
fluctuation, will be generated by increasing prices at the end of the 
day. This could be perceived as "unfair" by both the industry 
watchdog and the users who will expect cheaper prices at the end of 
the day. To avoid the problems of uncertainty, the network operator 
can make the increments in revenue constant. This would prevent 
potential cross subsidy of prices over time. In addition, the value of 
the desired revenue would be updated on hourly basis. 
2. For the purpose of this study it will be assumed that the network 
operator is attempting to match the revenue generated without 
dynamic pricing to the revenue generated with dynamic pricing. This 
choice will minimise any competitive disadvantage the network 
operators can incur at the introduction of dynamic pricing, as their 
consumers will be spending overall the same on calls as before 
dynamic pricing was introduced 46 . The target revenue generated 
using the OPNET TM simulation without dynamic pricing is plotted in 
Figure 6-5. 
4" This assumption has to be checked more rl III ic 'gorously before the practical application of dynam' 
pricing. 
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Figure 6-5 Hourly revenue attained without dynamic pricing. 
3. The pricing function will be assumed to be linear (equation ( 6-2 )). 
4. The price in each cell will depend on the instantaneous load in the cell 
and will be fully described by the gradient V of the dynamic pricing 
function. 
P(q) = VIq + Fýjý, (6-2) 
Instantaneous load in the cell; 
V/ - Price gradient; 
PýIlll - Minimum price charged, assumed to be 0.01 price units. 
5 It will be assumed that the proportion of the load contributed by each 
individual cell in the network is equal. Therefore, as the instantaneous 
load in the network is the sum the instantaneous loads in the 
individual cells, the total load in the network will be proportional to the 
total load in the individual cells. In this case, the two terms are 
interchangeable. In practice, this assumption will not be accurate for 
the entire network and the network operator will have to calculate the 
revenue optimisation prices on per cluster basis, for example, to 
reduce the expected price estimation error. 
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6 Due to the limited amount of data available regarding the temporal 
distribution of user demand without dynamic pricing, it will be 
assumed that the expected number of users in the network changes 
hourly. As a result of this assumption, the demand function will be 
independent of the state of the intermediate price update interval t 
within the hour and can be written as D(P, (Vfq + PMin )). 
6.2.1.2 Mathematical model development. 
Given a desired hourly revenue Of Rdesired and T 
subintervals, the problem can be defined as: 
Minimise f R,,, ren 1(t 
) dt 
to 
Number of price update subintervals; 
t- Intermediate price update interval; 
Rou'rent (t)- Total revenue generated at time t; 
to - Start of optimisation interval; 
t, - End of optimisation interval. 
price update 
(6-3) 
Taking the square of the error between the two terms in the equation 
ensures that both the positive and negative error is minimised. 
The revenue generated at each pricing subinterval T with the linear 
pricing function ( 6-2 ) is: 
Rcurrent 
(D(p, (Vfq + Prrýn ))) (Yfq + Pn-fin (6-4) 
T 
D(P, (Vq+Pmin)-Phias)- Expected compound demand for network services; 
p- Elasticity of demand; 
-c - Average call-holding time; 
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Instantaneous load in the network; 
Price gradient; 
Pn-ýn - Minimum price charged, assumed to be 0.01 price units.. 
In addition to the requirement for revenue generation, the network 
provider has to ensure that the capacity of the network is not exceeded by 
demand. This condition ensures that the derived prices encourage optimal 
resource usage without call blocking. In mathematical terms this is expressed 
as a constraint ensuring that the number of calls at any given time t is less or 
equal to the available network capacity C: 
D(t, 0, (Vfq + Pn-ýn q<C (6-5) TT 
C- Network capacity as number of channels. 
In fact, from network operator's point of view, equality is particularly 
desirable, as it will encourage more network usage, and potentially more 
revenue when the available resources are under-utilised. Therefore, to find the 
revenue attainment price PRequations ( 6-3 ) and ( 6-5 ) have to be solved 
simultaneously using the Lagrangian multiplier. This requires the optimisation 
of: 
I L 
Rdesired (D(yf, q))(V q 
TTq+ 
Pmin + A( c-T+ 
Ir 
(6-6) 
Taking the derivative with respect to the variables V, q and A, equating 
the resulting equations to 0, and removing A results in: 
-2r 
Rdesired (D (yf, q» (VN + Pnun 
TT 
+ 
(qvf + P.. ) 
+ D(Vi, qý 
1 dVf dVf 1 
=O 
(6-7) 
TTc dD(Vi, q) clq T 
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C- (6-8) 
Equation ( 6-7 ) has two independent solutions and can be split into two 
independent systems of equations, ( 6-9 ) and ( 6-10 ) respectively: 
Rdesired D(VI, q) (Vfq + P. ý, 
0 
T 
D(yf, q) 
Tq (6-9) 
c+0 
T 
+ 
(q Vf + Pn-ji n+ D(yf, qI 
dyl dyf I=0 
Tr dD(yf, q) dq T (6-10) 
q c-+0 
T 
Equation ( 6-9 ) represents a simplified version of the original problem 
and its solutions will involve Rdesired I the capacity of the network and all 
necessary variables. It solution will be discussed in the following section. 
Equation ( 6-10 ), on the other hand, does not explicitly contain Rd,, ired 
and, in addition, solutions to this equation give an unexpected result with the 
price gradient V<0. This can be verified by expressing the load q from the 
second equation in ( 6-10 ), calculating 
dq 
and substituting in the first 
dyl 
equation of the system ( 6-10 ) which gives: 
P. T 
D(yf, qý + qT 
(6-11) 
All variables in ( 6-11 ) are positive and, therefore, the price gradient V is 
negative. Thus the solution of equation ( 6-10 ) will be an optimal pricing 
function with a negative slope, i. e. the price of the calls will fall as the load in 
the network increases. This is certainly highly undesirable from a network 
operator's point of view because it will lead to even busier network in peak 
hours. Further research is necessary to establish the reasons for this result 
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and so system ( 6-10 ) will not be used to determine the optimal price gradient 
v in this thesis. 
6.2.2 Revenue Attainment Model Solution. 
The equations presented in ( 6-9 ) cannot be solved analytically because 
of their non-linear nature. However, they can be solved numerically by 
introducing a penalty term in the equation. Penalty functions are mathematical 
tools which impose an increased penalty for violating a constraint (Nash and 
Sofer [106] or Gill et al. [107]). The revenue attainment problem can be solved 
by choosing one of the equations in ( 6-9 ) as the function to be minimised, 
while the other equation is imposed as a constraint. To ensure that the 
constraint is met a penalty function, such as the quadratic loss penalty function 
I 
p(g(x)y, is introduced and the problem is solved for increasing values of the 2 
penalty parameterp. Applying this to ( 6-9 ) leads to the minimisation problem: 
Min 
Rdesired D(yf, q) (Vfq + Pn-ýn +Ip C- +q (6-12) 
TT2TT 
The choice of the main equation and the constraint is not binding and the 
minimisation function could have equally been defined by swapping the 
positions of the function and the constraint. Both Matlab and C programs for 
finding the optimal price gradient V are suggested in Appendix D. 
Using the Matlab program and the revenue data in Figure 6-5 it was 
established that the revenue attainment prices very rarely satisfied the equality 
of the capacity constraint, which also maximises network utilisation. This 
indicates that an exact solution to this optimisation problem using the attained 
revenue from the simulations is not always possible. Defining a price which will 
attain a given revenue leads to a price which will not offer maximum capacity 
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optimisation over all hours in the day and vice versa. This is due to the fact 
that the number of users affected by the dynamic prices is not constant but 
changes as a function of time of day. During off-peak hours the proportional 
increase in demand due to the fall in price will not lead to the same 
proportional increase in the number of calls made by users, and this will lead 
to a reduction in the generated revenue 47 . As the simulations were based on 
real life data, this suggests that a network provider would also be faced with 
this problem. 
In such a case, network providers would have to look for a compromise 
between revenue attainment and maximum network capacity utilisation and 
determine the actual price in the network based on their preference for 
revenue or capacity utilisation. One possible resolution is the use of a 
combination of the optimal revenue attainment price PR(q) and the optimal 
capacity utilisation price PC(q) for a given network load q. These prices can be 
linked by the addition of parameters representing the network operator's 
preference for either revenue attainment (E , say) or capacity utilisation 
say) and the results normalised. 
Poptfinal (q) -- 
EPR (q) + OPC (q) 
(6-13) 
E+0 
It was also observed that the price gradient Vf and the instantaneous 
load q are inversely linearly dependent and, therefore, in order to determine 
the gradient Vf, the load q has to be known. Using the demand for network 
services without dynamic pricing, a network operator could predict the 
expected load in the network 
(qfL-ced 
I say). The network operator would then be 
" in this thesis it was assurned that users have a unit 'inelastic demand and, therefore, small changes 'in 
the price lead to small chaiiges in demand. Whether this assumption is totally justified will require 
further research. 
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able calculate the optimal price Poptimal(qfixed) for this level of demand, using ( 
6-12 ). From this the gradient of the optimal pricing function can be derived 
using: 
Pptinial(q 
ixed 
P.. 
q 
fi (6-14) 
fixed 
P, 
ptimal 
(q 
lixed) - Optimal price at network load qft-Ted ' 
Substituting ( 6-13 ) in ( 6-14 ) the optimal gradient V of the pricing 
function for a particular expected network load qft. yed can be found. This 
process can be seen as a calibration of the pricing for a particular load in the 
network. 
Once the gradient of the pricing function is determined the complete 
pricing function for all states of the network can be derived: 
( 
EP)R(qfiLiced)+OPc(q, fixed) 
P(qcurrent 
E+o 
Wcurrent + P,,, 
qft, 
ved 
E- Network operator's preference for revenue attainment; 
Network operator's preference for capacity optimisation; 
q. rL-ved - Expected load for optimal price calibration; 
qcurrent - Current load in the network; 
PR(q1j, 
e(j) - 
Revenue attainment optimal price at load qf,,, d 
R,, (q, f,.,,, 
)- Capacity attainment optimal price at load qft-ved ; 
P- Minimum price charged, assumed to be 0.01 price units. min 
(6-15) 
Equation ( 6-15 ) derives the optimal price for an instantaneous network 
load qcurrent, given a network operator's preferences for revenue attainment c 
and maximum capacity utilisation 0. This pricing strategy was implemented in 
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the OPNET TM model developed in section 5.2, which was used to test its 
effectiveness. The simulation results are reported in the next section. 
6.2.3 Simulation Results with Linear Revenue Attainment Pricing. 
This section gives results from the OPNET TM simulation, which was run 
for low, medium and high network operator preference for revenue attainment 
-c (parameter c=u, 0.5 and 0.9 respectively). Since, by definition, the 
parameter for capacity utilisation O =I-E, the simulation will test 
corresponding high, medium and low operator preference for capacity 
utilisation (parameter 0=o. 9,0.5 and 0.1 respectively). The effectiveness of 
the revenue attainment pricing algorithm in controlling the system would be 
tested by observing the behaviour of the controlled variables: revenue, load 
and percentage of blocked calls 
In Figure 6-6 the total revenue generated in the network at different 
values of the demand elasticity 0 and network operator's revenue attainment 
preference c is shown. Overall the total desired revenue (in this case the 
revenue achieved without dynamic pricing i. e. demand price elasticity P=0.0) 
is never achieved, with the overall revenue on average 25% below the target 
revenue. Surprisingly, the best result is achieved in the case of low preference 
for revenue attainment (parameter c=0.1) and unit elastic demand (demand 
elasticity p=2.0). In fact, for unit elastic demand, the generated revenue 
actually decreases (by 3.6%) as the network operator's preference for revenue 
attainment increases (. c = 0.9). 
Although this decrease is not statistically significant, it suggests that the 
effect of the maximum capacity utilisation price on the overall dynamic price 
becomes more significant as the elasticity of demand 0 increases. This is 
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confirmed by the fact that for inelastic demand (p = i. 0) the total revenue 
increases, as expected, when the revenue attainment preference c increases 
(by 2.6% for E=0.5 and 1.5% for c=0.9). 
7.5 
7 
6.5 
5.5 
5 
4.5 
4 
beta = 0.0 
Figure 6-6 Total revenue as a function of the revenue attainment preference E 
The revenue generated as a function of the time of the day is compared 
to the desired revenue in Figure 6-7 for inelastic (price elasticity P=1.0 ) and 
Figure 6-8 for unit elastic (price elasticity 0=2.0 ) demand. The revenue 
attainment strategy does not generate the desired revenue even with the 
highest preference for revenue attainment -, with discrepancy between target 
and achieved revenue being most significant in both cases during peak hours. 
8 
c 
CD CD 
0 
08 12 16 20 
Time of day (hours) 
no dynamic 
epsilon = 0.1 
epsilon = 0.5 
epsilon = 0.9 
24 
Figure 6-7 Revenue as a function of the time of the day for 0=1.0 
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Figure 6-8 Revenue as a function of the time of the day for P=2.0 
UCIL 
During off-peak hours, however, the best match between target and 
actual revenue is attained, as expected, for c-0.9 for all values of demand 
elasticity 0 (Figure 6-9 and Figure 6-10). 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
Figure 6-9 Revenue attained during off-peak hours for 0=1.0 
The failure to generate the desired revenue is remarkably consistent and 
can probably be explained by three factors. On one hand, the calibration of the 
pricing function relies on the accurate estimation of the number of users 
attempting to use the network at any given time. The estimated expected load 
in the network (qfixed ) affects the pricing at two stages: the calibration of the 
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pricing function (equation ( 6-14 )) and the calculation of the optimal prices 
(equation ( 6-15 )). Therefore, the accumulated error can become significant. 
This hypothesis is confirmed by the results, which show that the error in the 
calculation of off-peak prices is smaller than the error in peak-hour prices. A 
potential solution to this problem that could be investigated in the future is the 
use of alternative measure for estimation of network load. 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 no dynamic 
epsilon = 0.1 
epsilon = 0.5 
epsilon = 0.9 
Figure 6-10 Revenue attained during off-peak hours for 0=2.0 
On the other hand the determination of revenue attainment and capacity 
utilisation prices independently of each other could contribute to the 
cumulative error with this pricing policy. The "best" price for a particular 
situation, for example, the price generating a target revenue, is derived without 
taking into account its effect on the capacity utilisation of the network. The 
effect of this independent choice would be most apparent when there is a 
significant discrepancy in the magnitude of the revenue attainment and 
capacity utilisation prices, as averaging the prices using equation ( 6-13 ) will 
lead to a large bias in the final price. 
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Finally, the simplifying assumption of price linearity could ---ing the 
affecting the effectiveness of the dynamic pricing algorithm. To test Mr. 
hypothesis the price linearity requirement would be dropped and an alternative 
approach to dynamic pricing discussed in the following section. 
Overall, the linear revenue attainment algorithm has not performed 
satisfactorily in ensuring that the target revenue of the network operator is 
generated. 
The second controlled variable in the system is the percentage of 
blocked cal IS48, plotted as a function of the network operator's preference for 
revenue attainment - in Figure 6-11. It can be seen that the percentage of 
blocked calls, in fact, increases as the network operator's preference for 
revenue cattainment e increases for both inelastic (p = i. 0) and unit elastic 
demand (P = 2.0). In this instance the system behaves as expected, because 
as network operator's preference for capacity utilisation decreases the control 
over network load would also decrease. 
U) 0.2 
m L) 
ýo 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
0 
Epsilon 
Figure 6-11 Percentage of blocked calls with revenue attainment prices 
" Perccritaue of blocked calls is defined as the ratio of the number blocked calls over the number of 
Successful calls in the network. 
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The revenue attainment pricing strategy is successful in reducing the 
percentage of blocked calls for inelastic demand (P = 1.0, c=0.1) by 7.5%. 
However, the price is not very good at controlling the blocking when demand is 
unit elastic (P = 2.0, E=0.1) allowing a 36% increase in the percentage of 
blocked calls. 
While the revenue attainment strategy is not successful in controlling the 
revenue generated in the network and would not be considered a good choice 
by the network operator, it is efficient at controlling and reducing call blocking 
(when used with revenue attainment preference c=o. I). This strategy is also 
successful in generating a larger proportion of calls in the network (8% 
increase for inelastic demand (P = i. 0) and 35% increase for unit elastic 
demand (P = 2.0)). It also leads to lower average prices (up to 34% reduction) 
in the network compared to the scenario without dynamic pricing. Graphs and 
detailed discussion of these results are given in section F. 4 of Appendix F. 
A particular drawback with this pricing policy is highlighted by Figure 
6-12, which shows the probability distribution of actual prices in the network 
rather than the weighted averaged price. 
0.1 
,?: ý 
0.08 
.0 0.06 
0.04 
0.02 
0 
0.3 
Price (units) 
* eps ilon = 0.1 
epsilon = 0.9 
Figure 6-12 Actual prices with revenue attainment model 
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As a result of the specific way in which prices in the network are 
calculated it is very difficult for the network provider to control the number of 
prices that users see. For example, with demand elasticity 0=1.0 and 
revenue attainment preference E=0.1, users in the network could see up to 48 
different prices, some of which are very unlikely, but nevertheless occur when 
the network is very busy, for instance. The total number of possible dynamic 
prices decreases to 30 for E=0.9 but the proliferation of prices would remain a 
significant problem for users. The large number of intermediate dynamic prices 
could cause problems for the network operator with internal accounting and 
billing. 
6.3 Optimal Revenue Attainment Dynamic Pricing Strategy. 
The dynamic pricing strategy suggested in section 6.2 assumed linearity 
for the dynamic price that a network operator should charge. This assumption 
imposes some limitations on the performance of the dynamic pricing function 
and ideally a network operator would be able to choose a "best" or "optimal" 
shape for the dynamic pricing function. In addition, the suggested revenue 
attainment algorithm leads to a large number of intermediate prices and would 
make billing and accounting very difficult (for example, see section 3.3.2.1 for 
a discussion of billing issues). Therefore, from both the network operator's and 
user's point of view, a simplified pricing function is desirable. 
6.3.1 Determination of Optimal Dynamic Pricing Function. 
Finding the optimal control function for a given system is equivalent to 
the problem of finding the optimal pricing function for the system shown in 
section 6.1, Figure 6-4 to steer the system into the desired state. Mathematical 
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methodology exists in the calculus of variations, which uses Euler's equation 
to find optimal functions that will satisfy certain conditions (Butkov [98]). Thus 
calculus of variations would be a very good candidate to apply to the control 
problem to enable us to find the shape of the optimal pricing function. 
However, Pinch [108] has indicated that there is a significant difference 
between the description of control systems, where systems are described in 
terms of differential equations and the calculus of variations, which uses 
functionals. Therefore, in order to use the techniques from the calculus of 
variations to find the optimal control for a system, the statement of the problem 
has to be modified. 
In calculus of variation terms the problem can be defined as: 
Minimise c- +1 dt (6-16) 
to 
( 
t, 
subject to f 
D(P(q)) 
P(qýdt = Rdesired (6-17) T 
to 
to - Start of optimisation time 
tj - End of optimisation time; 
c- Total network capacity; 
D(P(q)) - Compound demand for services; 
P(q) - Price for calls; 
Instantaneous network load (as number of calls); 
,r- Call holding time. 
This is an isoperimetric problem with fixed end points. Although in this 
case we chose to minimise the difference between compound system demand 
and available network capacity, subject to given revenue, the problem can be 
- 174- 
Chapter 6 Linear and Optimal Revenue Attainment Pricing Models UCL 
turned around. In that case, the aim would be to minimise the difference 
between the desired and current revenue, subject to a fixed capacity 
constraint. The dynamics of the cellular system at any intermediate 
optimisation time t can be expressed as: 
dq D(P(q)) q 
dt TT 
(6-18) 
Substituting D(P(q)) into ( 6-16 ) and ( 6-17 ) gives the problem in terms 
of the change in the load Yq-- and therefore in a calculus of variations form: dt 
tl 
Minimise f C-dq 
'dt 
(6-19) 
to dt 
subject to 
t, dq 
+q (qýdt =R 
f-- 
desired (6-20) 
to 
( 
dt 'r 
By letting t= xI, q=x., and 
dq 
=U and introducing a further state dt 
variableX3with X3 
(tO )=0 and X3 
(tl )=Rdesired 
with: 
X3= U+X2 (x, ý (6-21 ) 
Ir 
the problem is converted into an optimal control problem with fixed end points 
(Pinch [108] : pp 173). 
It should be noted that in this definition of the problem, the load in the 
network is the control variable, rather than the price of the calls. This is due to 
the fact that we do not want to impose any restrictions on the shape of the 
price function, in the form of an additional differential equation. However, the 
price is linked to the load in the network and as the optimal load is known in 
advance, this will enable us to derive a function for the optimal price. 
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By Pontyagins maximum principle [108], in order to find the optimal 
control u we need to examine the function: 
x H=_(C_U)'+yfý+Vf, U+yf, U+ 2 (X, ý (6-22) 
Z 
With the following constraints: 
dyf, aH 
dt -- axi =0 (6-23) 
= 
dY1 2 aH 
- UP(X, )+ U+ 
X2 , (X) (6-24) lý2 dt 
-Vf 3 aX2 
Vý3 
d yf3 
_-aH =0 dt aX3 (6-25) 
The control function minimising ( 6-19 ) will be the control function 
maximising H and therefore we require: 
aH 
=2C-2u+Vf2 +Vf3p(X, 0 (6-26) au 
This is a maximum as: 
a 2H 
= -2:! ý 0 (6-27) aU 2 
The function to be optimised (H ) is independent of V, and, so to find the 
optimal control only equations ( 6-24 )-( 6-26 ) need to be solved 
simultaneously. 
The solution to equation ( 6-25 ) is straightforward and gives: 
V3 -:::: ý 
ý-a constant. 
To find Vý2 we use ( 6-26 ) to get: 
(6-28) 
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d aH 
= -2u'+V2 =0 (6-29) dt au 
Substituting into ( 6-24 ) we get: 
2u'= ý UP(X2)+ U+ 
12 (X, ) (6-30) 
Solving ( 6-30 ) with respect to u giveS49: 
1p/x 
e22 (6-31 (P' + Pý 
Integration constant. 
To find the value of C, we assume that at time t=0 the system has a 
load Of q0 . In this case: 
=qo+ 
P, X, 
(P I +Pý 
(6-32) 
Therefore, the optimal control for this particular system as a function of 
time is: 
I 
-X-, p +e 
3tý(P+P') ((P + P'ýqo + P'X, (6-33) it =- - (P' + Pý 
Using equation ( 6-20 ) will enable us to find ý and thus the optimal load 
in the network as a function of time. The optimisation of the revenue occurs at 
independent small time intervals within each hour and, so for each 
optimisation subinterval to =0 and t, = tj, 
The constraint equation to be solved becomes: 
f 
(U 
+ "C2 rdt = Rj,, ired (6-34) 
0 
For simplification the dependence of the price P(X, ) on the load X, will not be writ 
41) 
1 ten explicitly. 
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(p+P, )g 
2 -I+e 
2 P+P, so+ 
Rdesired 
(P + P'Y (p+P, )g 
x, 2- I+e 2+ p(P + P, 
>iý 
ME 
(6-35) 
The value of ý cannot be derived analytically and therefore, the equation 
has to be solved numerically using the technique of exhaustive enumeration 
[107] by testing all possible numerical combinations of P and i>. To ensure 
that the solutions of equation ( 6-35 ) are feasible, it has to be solved 
simultaneously with equation ( 6-33 ), as the load in the network has to be kept 
as close to the optimal load as possible. 
Returning to the variables in the original problem gives: 
I 
- tý(P+P') 
qP+ e2 ((P + P'ýqo + 11"q) 
_ 
D(P(q)) 
(P' + Pý T 
, (p+p')IIý 
2 -I+e 
2P+ P'ýqo + 
p 
(P +Pq2 
-I+el 
(P+P')tjý 
+ P(p + P'ý, ý 
Rdesired 
(6-36) 
(6-37) 
Equations ( 6-36 ) and ( 6-37 ) provide a very general solution for finding 
optimal prices for a control system defined by equations ( 6-16 ) and ( 6-17 ). 
A specific solution to the system for any particular set of initial conditions can 
in turn be found by using information relating to the distinct system the network 
operator is using. 
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6.3.2 Network Specific Optimal Pricing Solution. 
We have a general optimal pricing model, that when applied to a specific 
network, will allow the network operator to find the optimal dynamic prices for 
any type of demand as a function of price and time of day fluctuations in the 
network. To find a pricing solution specific to the network used for simulations, 
the corresponding variables are given their numerical values. It was assumed 
that the average call holding time is 'r = 1.2 minutes, price updates occur every 
5 minutes and the price remains constant within the subintervals. As a result of 
this assumption, the price in the subinterval will be determined by the load in 
the network at time t =0, which by definition iS q, and ti =land T=1. 
By taking into account these assumptions a solution to the general 
revenue attainment problem defined in ( 6-16 ) and ( 6-17 ) will require the 
numerical solution of: 
I (P+P')ý 
P+1.2e2 (1.83P'+ P) 0.834qo 
D(p, P)= , 
P, p 
I (P+P')ý 1 (6-38) Pqo 
ý 
P(- 2.4 + Pý) + (- 4 .4+ Pý)P'+ 2.4e2 
(P + 1.83P') 
Rclesired --':: k 
(P + P, ft 
A Matlab program for finding the optimal prices for the exponential 
demand function discussed in section 4.1.2 is shown in Appendix D. 
An interesting property of the specific optimal solution to the revenue 
attainment problem is that it involves both the price of the calls P and the 
derivative of the price P'. However, the demand function developed in section 
4.1.2 does not involve the absolute change in the price P'. This means that in 
this case, the solutions we will find will not be optimal. To ensure full optimality 
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the model for demand will have to be enhanced to take into account the 
expected reaction of users to the change in price. In this thesis it will be 
assumed that the derivative of the price i, = 0 and the simplified model for 
finding the optimal prices becomes: 
K Pý ) 
D(P, P)= 0.834+e 2 qo 
Pý (6-39) 
2.4qo -I+ e2+0.47Pý 
Rdesired 
Using ( 6-39 ) with the exponential network demand discussed in section 
4.1.2 and the desired revenue without dynamic pricing plotted in Figure 6-5, 
the optimal dynamic prices given in Table 6-1 and plotted in Figure 6-13 are 
derived. It can be seen that as the elasticity of demand P increases, the 
optimal prices in the network decrease on average by 10%. Overall as the 
load in the network increases the optimal dynamic prices also increase. 
To reduce the number of potential prices and simplify the pricing tariffs it 
is suggested that the prices would only change for load increases of 10%. 
Network 
utilisation 
Optimal price 
(% busy channels) 1.0 2.0 
1.75 0.02 0.01 
2.1 0.02 0.01 
2.45 0.02 0.01 
2.8 0.02 0.01 
5.25 0.02 0.01 
7.7 0.04 0.03 
10.85 0.01 0.01 
23.8 0.03 0.02 
30.1 0.06 0.06 
40.95 0.03 0.03 
45.5 0.03 0.03 
52.15 0.03 0.03 
53.2 0.23 0.22 
56 0.02 0.02 
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75.6 0.15 0.27 
78.4 0.15 0.27 
80.85 0.31 0.28 
82.95 0.17 0.17 
83.65 0.33 0.29 
83.65 0.33 0.29 
85.4 0.04 0.04 
91.7 0.43 0.34 
109.9 0.5 0.38 
113.7 55, 0.55 1 0.4 
Table 6-1 Optimal dynamic prices plotted against network utilisation. 
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Figure 6-13 Optimal dynamic revenue attainment prices 
A- 
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The prices given in Table 6-1 were derived on the basis of the system 
behaviour in real time, and this has two consequences. On one hand, the 
optimal prices for some states of the network cannot be found such as at loads 
between [57%, 75%] as, due to demand variation, real time data is not 
available. In this case, the optimal price will have to be estimated using, for 
example, regression. On the other, for some states of the network more than 
one optimal price was found, for example, the load between 0% and 10%. 
These optimal prices can potentially be different, in which case the average of 
the two prices will be taken as the optimal price. 
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A-. ý MI. 
Averaging the prices, however, can lead to a significant problem. The 
optimal prices divide naturally into two separate groups for the same load in 
the network for all values of demand elasticity p, depending on the time at 
which this load occurred. This division is due to the different 'inherent' peak 
and off-peak prices in the network. The optimal prices for loads that occur 
during peak hours are significantly higher than the optimal prices for the same 
load during off-peak hours. This can be seen in Table 6-1 for loads in the 
interval [55%, 85%]with the optimal price fluctuation within the interval of 
[0.02,0.331 units (demand elasticity p=i. o). 
Averaging the optimal price in this case will lead to an overall 
reduction/increase in the optimal prices that will decrease the optimality of the 
pricing strategy. This problem can be overcome by allowing peak and off-peak 
tariffs in the network depending on the time of day a load occurs. Plotted in 
Figure 6-14 and Figure 6-15 are the optimal dynamic prices for demand 
elasticity PE=- [1.0,2.0], which will be tested with the simulation 
50 
a- 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
optimal off-peak 
optimal peak 
0 20 40 60 80 100 
Load (% busy channels) 
Figure 6-14 Optimal dynamic revenue attainment prices for 0=1.0 
ý` Missing prices were estimated using Microsoft Excel 97 SR -I built in polynomial and power 
functions (peak and off peak hours respectively). 
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Figure 6-15 Optimal dynamic revenue attainment prices for 0=2.0 
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6.4 Simulation Results for Optimal Revenue Attainment Pricing. 
The efficiency of the optimal dynamic pricing as a control to ensure the 
generation of a target revenue and reduction of call blocking was tested using 
the OPNET TM simulation developed in section 5.2. The results from the 
simulations were compared with the corresponding results from the linear 
revenue attainment model. The network operator preference for revenue and 
capacity attainment was set at E=0=0.5. This choice gives equal weight to 
revenue attainment and capacity utilisation, and is perhaps the most natural 
alternative for the network operator. 
6.4.1 Effect of Optimal Pricing Policy on Revenue Generation. 
Plotted in Figure 6-16 is the total revenue generated in the network with 
the optimal dynamic pricing strategy, compared to the revenue attainment 
strategy. It can be seen that the generated revenue with the optimal dynamic 
pricing is very close to the total desired revenue (in this case this is the 
revenue generated without dynamic pricing i. e. demand elasticity p=o. o). This 
is true for both inelastic (p = i. o) and unit elastic (P = 2.0) demand. The optimal 
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dynamic pricing performs significantly better than the linear revenue 
attainment pricing discussed in section 6.2. 
7 
6.5 
6 
5.5 
5 
12 4.5 
4 
0 ODtimal 
Figure 6-16 Total revenue generated with optimal and linear revenue attainment 
pricing 
Although it performs better that the linear revenue attainment pricing, the 
revenue generated with the optimal pricing is 4% below the target level (set as 
the revenue without dynamic pricing for p=o. o), regardless of the demand 
elasticity. Although this is not a significant reduction, in the long run it could 
have more significant effects. The discrepancy can be explained in part by the 
averaging of the prices to reduce the overall number of prices in the network. 
In addition, the model used for the derivation of the optimal prices is analogue 
by nature, while the optimal prices are discrete. Further research would be 
necessary to establish the degree of error introduced by the rounding of prices 
in the process of making them discrete. 
Comparing the revenue generated at different times of the day shows 
that the target revenue was generally attained when the load in the network 
was relatively small and demand was inelastic (p = i. o) (see Figure 6-17 and 
Figure 6-18). 
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Figure 6-17 Revenue generated as a function of time with optimal dynamic prices 
no dvnamic 
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Figure 6-18 Revenue generated as a function of time with optimal dynamic prices 
(small network loads) 
However, the target hourly revenue was not attained when either the 
network was very busy or demand elasticity p was increased. This problem 
was also encountered with the linear revenue attainment pricing policy. 
Nevertheless, the total revenue generated is not significantly different from the 
total desired revenue and, therefore, the optimal pricing policy is successful in 
controlling the cellular system to satisfy a given revenue requirement, through 
the setting of prices on a dynamic basis. 
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6.4.2 Effect of Optimal Pricing Policy on Call Blocking. 
The second controlled variable of interest is the percentage of blocked 
calls. The effect of the optimal pricing on the total number of blocked calls in 
the network can be seen in Figure 6-19. The optimal pricing function leads to a 
4% reduction in the percentage of blocked calls (for inelastic demand 
(P = 1.0)), compared to the percentage of blocked calls without dynamic 
pricing. As demand becomes unit elastic (P = 2.0), the percentage of blocked 
calls increases by 25%, compared to the blocking without dynamic pricing. 
This increase is due to the increased demand elasticity and was also observed 
with revenue attainment strategy. The failure of the optimal pricing function to 
control call blocking with unit elastic demand (demand elasticity p=2.0) could 
be due to other parameters in the system such as the frequency of the price 
update interval. 
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Figure 6-19 Percentage of blocked calls with optimal and revenue attainment pricing 
However, overall the optimal pricing function performs better than the 
linear revenue attainment strategy, regardless of demand elasticity, and 
therefore, the optimal pricing function is significantly better at controlling the 
percentage of blocked calls. 
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The effect of the optimal dynamic pricing on other parameters in the 
network can be seen in section F. 5 (Appendix F). The optimal dynamic pricing 
strategy stimulates demand during off-peak hours and controls demand during 
peak hours (Figure F-26), increases the overall number of successful calls 
(Figure F-28) and leads to a reduction in the average price in the network 
(Figure F-29). 
In summary, the optimal dynamic pricing strategy is significantly better 
than the linear revenue attainment pricing strategy at attaining the target 
revenue and limiting the percentage of blocked calls, while increasing the 
number of successful calls and decreasing the average price in the network. 
Therefore, the optimal dynamic pricing strategy is the control function 
recommended to network operators. 
6.5 Chapter Summary. 
This chapter proposed a control theory approach to dynamic price 
setting. The most sensitive variables in the system were identified as the 
revenue generated by the network operator and the percentage of blocked 
calls. As a result these are recognised as being suitable controlled variables 
and a control system model for the cellular network suggested. Due to the 
non-linearity of the system traditional control theory methods were not suitable 
for finding the "best" pricing function for the network. Therefore, alternative 
approaches were suggested. 
First a linear revenue attainment pricing model was developed taking into 
account the preference of the network operator for revenue attainment C or 
maximum capacity utilisation 0. Results from the simulation showed that the 
total revenue generated in the network did not match the network provider's 
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desired revenue, when defined as the revenue generated in the network 
without dynamic pricing (see Figure 6-6 or Figure 6-7). This was particularly 
evident during peak hours, which decreases the utility of revenue attainment 
pricing from network provider's point of view. This discrepancy was attributed 
partly to the error in estimation of the expected number of users in the network 
from which the prices are derived, and partly to the independent choice of 
optimal prices for revenue attainment and capacity utilisation. The linear 
pricing function, however, was efficient at controlling call blocking (Figure 
6-11), in particular for inelastic demand (P = i. o). A specific problem with the 
revenue attainment strategy is the fact that it leads to users seeing up to 40 
different dynamic prices, which is difficult both from the network operator and 
user's points of view. 
Then the assumption of linearity for the revenue attainment pricing 
function was dropped and an optimal shape for the dynamic pricing function 
derived by modification of the revenue attainment model, using calculus of 
variations and control theory. A comprehensive model for the determination of 
optimal dynamic price setting strategies for any type of demand assumptions 
was presented. Simulation results showed that the optimal dynamic pricing is 
very successful at generating the desired revenue for the network operator for 
different values of the demand elasticity p (Figure 6-16). In addition, it led to a 
decrease in the probability of call blocking and an overall increase in the total 
number of calls completed in the network (Figure 6-19). This shows that the 
optimal pricing strategy is successful at controlling the network into the desired 
state and this makes it a very attractive dynamic pricing policy. 
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Chapter 7 
The previous chapters presented three different approaches to dynamic 
pricing and evaluated their effectiveness from the point of view of both network 
operators and users. This chapter investigates the expected effect of the ad 
hoc, the linear revenue attainment and optimal revenue attainment pricing 
strategies on network operators' market share. The aim, from a network 
operator's point of view, is to identify the optimal pricing strategy that will 
maximise the size of the user database. 
7.1 Effect of Dynamic Pricing on Network Operator's Market Share 
The effect of the different dynamic pricing strategies on the network 
operator's market share can be estimated using the model suggested in 
chapter 3 equation ( 3-2 ). The suggested mathematical model compares the 
benefits of the users with two different pricing strategies and takes into 
account the value for money users receive from the service, the total number 
of calls completed in the network and the revenue generated from the network. 
It is assumed that the users will chose their service provider on the basis of 
the benefits received from the respective pricing strategies. 
User benefit derived from the dynamic pricing strategies discussed in this 
thesis will be compared to the user benefit with the traditional non-dynamic 
pricing strategy. The graphs below show the expected proportion of users in 
the market preferring a dynamic pricing strategy. The loyalty of the users (m ) 
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will be taken as equivalent for both service providers. This scenario could exist 
when a service provider offers both dynamic and traditional non-dynamic 
tariffs, in which case the model aims to predict the proportion of users who will 
take up the respective tariffs. 
7.1.1 Effect of Ad Hoc Dynamic Pricing on Network Operator's Market 
Share 
From Figure 7-1 we can see that if network operator were to offer 
competition driven ad hoc pricing then the linear pricing tariff could expect to 
capture 60% of the market, irrespective of the elasticity of user demand. 
--T C1 linear, beta = 1.0 7m 
linear, beta = 2.0 
El nonlinear, beta = 1.0 
0 nonlinear, beta = 2.0 
C 
CL 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Proportion of market share 
Figure 7-1 Expected proportion of market share with competition driven ad hoc pricing 
Although the linear ad hoc function offers higher prices, it also leads to a 
significantly lower probability of call blocking which increases the "value for 
money component " of user benefit. In addition, the network operators can 
invest a significant proportion of increased revenue into advertisement and 
special promotions, which would attract new userS51 
This prediction is based on the assumption that the proportion of people deterred by higher prices 
would be equal to the proportion of users attracted by the higher QoS, advertising and special 
promotions. This would have to be confirmed by further market research. 
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However, with a non-linear pricing function and inelastic demand 
(demand elasticity p=i. o) the network operator could expect to capture only 
48% of the market. This is due to the significantly reduced revenue and the 
effect this will have on the ability of the network operator to promote its 
services. The situation changes, though, as the elasticity of demand increases 
and demand becomes unit elastic (demand elasticity 0=2.0). Lower prices 
and significantly higher number of calls in the network outweigh the negative 
effects of call blocking and reduced revenue and attract a larger proportion of 
the market (78%). However, the retention of this market share will be a 
significant problem if the provided QoS is perceived as unsatisfactory by 
users. 
7.1.2 Effect of Linear Revenue Attainment Dynamic Pricing on Network 
Operator's Market Share 
The expected market share with the linear revenue attainment pricing 
strategy with different network operator preferences for revenue attainment E 
and capacity utilisation 0 is shown in Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3. 
El epsilon = 0.1, beta = 1.0 
o epsilon = 0.5, beta = 1.0 
m epsilon = 0.9, beta = 1.0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Proportion of market share 
Figure 7-2 Expected proportion of market share with revenue attainment pricing policy 
(0=1.0) 
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In this case, if demand is inelastic (demand elasticity p=i. o) the best 
strategy for the network is equal preference for revenue attainment and 
capacity utilisation (E =0=0.5 ). This policy is predicted to gain 63% of the 
market, followed closely by the revenue attainment pricing strategy giving 
preference to capacity utilisation (, c = 0.1) with 61 % of the market. 
However, if demand is unit elastic (demand elasticity 0=2.0), the best 
strategy for capturing maximum market share is the capacity utilisation 
strategy with small revenue attainment preference E=0.1. This strategy would 
ensure 80% of the market share, compared to an equal preference for 
revenue and capacity attainment potentially capturing 72% of the market. This 
can be explained by the relative increase in the price sensitivity of users as 
demand elasticity 0 increases, which will manifest itself in a higher proportion 
of users giving more weight to lower prices. 
0 epsilon = 0.1, 
beta = 2.0 
2 [1 epsilon = 0.5, . beta = 2.0 
0 epsilon = 0.9, 
Pm 
beta = 2.0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Proportion of market share 
Figure 7-3 Expected proportion of market share with revenue attainment pricing policy 
(P = 2.0) 
In both cases the pricing strategy giving highest preference to revenue 
attainment (, c = 0.9) performs worst capturing only 50% and 52% of the 
potential market when competing with a service provider offering non- 
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dynamically priced services. This may be explained by the fact that although 
the average prices offered with the revenue attainment pricing strategy are 
lower than the average non-dynamic prices, the amount of revenue generated 
is also lower and does not offer adequate leverage to the network operator for 
service promotion. 
7.1.3 Effect of Optimal Revenue Attainment Dynamic Pricing on 
Network Operator's Market Share 
The proportion of market share that a service provider can expect to 
capture with the optimal dynamic pricing strategy is plotted in Figure 7-4. It is 
around 60% with both inelastic (demand elasticity p=1.0) and unit elastic 
(demand elasticity 0=2.0) demand. This is less then the predicted market 
share with the non-linear ad hoc pricing function with unit elastic demand 
(P = 2.0) or the linear pricing function with low or medium preference for 
revenue attainment (, c = 0.1 or c=0.5, p=2.0). However, the QoS users 
receive from the network with the optimal pricing function is significantly better 
and as a result the probability of market retention with the optimal pricing 
function is higher. 
>4 
Proportion of market share 
Figure 7-4 Expected proportion of market share t! - with optimal pricing policy 
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The predicted market share with the optimal dynamic pricing function is 
very similar to the proportion of users expected with the linear ad hoc 
competition driven pricing strategy (demand elasticity 0=1.0 and 0=2.0) (see 
Figure 7-5). This could be explained by the proportion of users attracted by 
promotions and advertising generated by the additional revenue in the case of 
the ad hoc competition driven strategy. However, the reliance on this strategy 
is risky from a network operator's point of view because it depends on a 
random factor, in this case the success of an advertising campaign. 
0 ad hoc linear beta = 2.0 
ci ad hoc linear, beta= 1.0 
0 optimal, beta = 1.0 
Ei optimal, beta = 2.0 
Mann" 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Proportion of market share 
Figure 7-5 Market share comparison of ad hoc and optimal pricing policies 
The predicted market share with the optimal dynamic pricing function is 
also similar to the proportion of users expected with the linear revenue 
attainment pricing function with low or medium preference for revenue 
attainment (E = 0.1 or E=0.5 ) and inelastic demand (p = 1.0) (see Figure 7-6). 
In this case users would be attracted by relatively lower prices at the cost of 
higher call blocking. However, the optimal dynamic pricing strategy offers the 
best option by attracting a similar market share without relying on successful 
promotion or compromising the QoS of the service provided. 
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Figure 7-6 Market share comparison of revenue attainment and optimal pricing policies 
The optimal dynamic pricing strategy would lead to a higher proportion of 
expected market share compared to the non-linear ad hoc competition driven 
pricing policy with inelastic demand (i. e. demand elasticity 0=1.0) and the 
linear revenue attainment strategy with high preference for revenue attainment 
0.9, demand elasticity 0=1.0 and P=2.0). 
In summary, to capture maximum market share with a dynamic pricing 
policy the network operator should offer pricing strategies that lead to very low 
average prices. Those include the non-linear ad hoc competition driven pricing 
or the revenue attainment pricing with low preference for revenue attainment 
(E =I) and high preference for capacity utilisation (0 = 0.9). However, these 
strategies will reduce the total revenue generated by the network and will 
increase the probability for call blocking, thus reducing the QoS provided. 
Therefore, in the long run the network operator has to consider pricing 
strategies that improve the QoS and generate the necessary revenue such as 
the linear ad hoc competition driven dynamic pricing strategy or the optimal 
dynamic pricing strategy. This is illustrated by the experience of the UK 
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52 network operator One 2 One , who gained market share 
by offering very 
competitive prices, and then changed their pricing policy to ensure market 
share retention. This issue is discussed in detail is section 3.1.1. 
7.2 Chapter Summary. 
In this chapter the expected effect of the ad hoc, the linear revenue 
attainment and optimal revenue attainment pricing strategies on network 
operators' market share was predicted with the aim of identifying the optimal 
pricing for maximisation of the total user database. The results showed that 
dynamic pricing strategies could provide an increase in the number of 
subscribers for the network operator, compared to non-dynamically priced 
networks. The most marked increase in market share was with the dynamic 
pricing strategies offering lowest average prices. However, these strategies 
also lead to a significant increase in the probability of call blocking and 
retention of customers in a climate of low QoS would be unlikely. 
The most attractive pricing strategy from both operator's and user's point 
of view is the optimal revenue attainment function, which generates the 
desired revenue for the network operator, while at the same time controlling 
call blocking. It also leads to significantly lower average prices in the network 
compared to the non-dynamic pricing and the competition driven ad hoc linear 
pricing strategies, which promotes an increase in the number of calls 
generated. The optimal dynamic pricing strategy offers an overall market 
share of 60% relative to a non-dynamically priced network 53 and these results 
T-Mobile since April 2002. 
This result is based on the assumption that the users have no objections to accepting a dynamic 
pricing polic)'. 
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support the hypothesis that dynamic pricing could be used successfully as a 
tool that serves the interests of both users and the network operator. 
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Chapter 8 
8.1 Conclusions. 
A., 
-UCL 
The aim of this project was to test the efficiency of dynamic pricing as a 
mechanism for load management and control in cellular mobile networks. The 
study involved the utilisation of tools and methods from a variety of disciplines 
(economics, engineering and control theory) which increased the complexity of 
the task significantly. After identifying the main parameters that affect the 
capacity of cellular wireless systems (GSM, GPRS and UMTS) and current 
suggested strategies for optimising network utilisation, an alternative "soft 
edge ýl approach for achieving better capacity utilisation through dynamic 
pricing (variation of price as a function of load) was suggested. The 
engineering and economic implications of the introduction of dynamic pricing 
were identified and possible dynamic pricing algorithms based on the load in 
the system suggested for both circuit-switched and packed-switched networks. 
The most challenging issue with dynamic pricing was identified as the 
mapping of system load to monetary units and determining the overall shape 
of the pricing function. 
A mathematical model specifically developed for investigating the 
expected effect of dynamic pricing on the operator market share was 
presented. To model the expected effect of dynamic pricing on user behaviour 
a comprehensive mathematical model was developed taking into account the 
price elasticity of user demand as well as the existing pricing bias in the 
198 
ChaPter 8 Conclusions and Future Directions A. 
-UCL 
network. Substitution and time of day effects due to the fixed network were 
also modelled. In addition, a user mobility model showing the effect of price on 
user mobility was introduced by adapting a transportation model discussed by 
Wilson [78]. 
Three novel strategies for setting the dynamic prices as a function of 
system load were developed and tested using a seven-cell simulation model 
built in OPNET TM . These were competition driven ad hoc pricing, linear 
revenue attainment pricing and optimal revenue attainment pricing (in which 
the requirement for linearity was dropped). Simulation results using the 
competition driven ad hoc dynamic pricing confirmed that the shape of the 
pricing function can significantly affect the behaviour of the network. In 
addition, the results identified generated revenue and number of blocked calls 
as the most sensitive factors in the system. Therefore, revenue attainment and 
control of the probability of call blocking were the two controlled variables 
considered in the control system model used for the development of the linear 
and optimal revenue attainment dynamic pricing strategies. 
Results from the simulations showed that the revenue attainment pricing 
strategy was not a very efficient control function, as it failed to generate the 
target revenue, although it controlled call blocking. The optimal dynamic 
pricing strategy, on the other hand, generated the target revenue as well as 
controlling the percentage of blocked calls. In addition, the optimal dynamic 
pricing strategy led to a reduction in the average price in the network, 
promoting an increase in the number of calls, which makes it attractive from 
user's point of view. Therefore, this was the pricing strategy recommended to 
network operators. 
Finally, the effectiveness of the different dynamic pricing policies in 
increasing the network operator's market share was tested. The results 
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showed that the policies offering the lowest average prices would attract the 
largest proportion (up to 80%) of the market share. However, these strategies 
also led to very significant increases in the probability of call blocking and 
would, therefore, decrease the QoS that users receive. The optimal revenue 
attainment strategy would attract up to 60% of the market share with lower 
weighted average prices, while generating sufficient revenue. It has to be 
noted that the same proportion of the market would be captured with the linear 
ad hoc competition driven pricing, which generates significantly more revenue 
than the network without dynamic pricing by using higher prices. However, 
despite the higher prices it is likely that it could still attract users because the 
enhanced revenue means the network operator can invest more in promotions 
and advertisement. The results highlighted the difficulties with which the 
network operators are faced when choosing their pricing policy, as their 
market share is affected by a combination of factors whose influence can 
cancel each other out in the long run. 
Dynamic pricing is a powerful tool which, when used correctly, can offer 
significant advantages to both the network operator and users of the cellular 
network. However, as this thesis showed, its effects on network performance 
are complex and further research is deemed necessary before practical 
implementation is attempted. 
8.2 Future Directions. 
Throughout this thesis a number of factors that affect the effectiveness of 
any dynamic pricing policy were identified as potential candidates for future 
research. Suggested areas for research that would enhance the 
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understanding of the overall effect of dynamic pricing on all aspects of the 
cellular network management would be: 
1. Extending the optimal dynamic pricing model to enable determination of 
optimal pricing for a network with a mix of voice and data type of traffic, 
taking into account the different traffic profile of voice and data. 
2. Improving the mathematical model for user demand by taking into account 
the derivative of the price. 
3. Modelling the effect of price on the length of the calls. 
4. Further investigation into the optimal price update intervals, the practical 
implications of dynamic pricing on the signalling overhead in the network 
and the best method for conveying billing information to users. 
5. Determination of the actual relationship between mobility elasticity a and 
price quasi-elasticity 0 together with an accurate estimation of these 
parameters from real time data. 
6. Investigation of the optimal method for measuring the expected load in the 
network for accurate calculation of revenue attainment dynamic prices. 
7. Further study and development of a discrete optimal revenue attainment 
dynamic pricing model. 
8. Modelling the effect of the fixed line network on dynamic pricing. 
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System North America UK Japan 
Parameters (AMPS) (TACS) (NTT) 
Transmission 
Frequency (MHz) 
Base station 870-890 935-960 870-885 
Mobile station 825-845 890-915 925-940 
Spacing between 30 25 25 
channels (kHz) 
Number of 666/832 1000 600 
channels 
Coverage radius by 
one base station 2-25 2-20 5 (Urban) 
(Km) 20 (Suburban) 
Data transmission 10 8 0.3 
rate (kbs) 
Table A- I First Generation Cellular Networks 
System USA Europe USA 
Parameters (IS-54) (GSM) (IS-95) 
Access 
technology TDMA/FDMA TDMA/FDMA CDMA/FDMA 
Transmission 
Frequency (MHz) 
" Base station 869-894 935-960 869-894 
" Mobile station 824-849 890-915 824-849 
Spacing between 30 200 1250 
channels (kHz) 
Number of 
channels per Radio 3 8 - 
Frequency channel 
Data transmission 7.95 13 8 
rate (kbs) (variable) 
Table A-2 Second Generation Cellular Systems 
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Appendix B- UK Cellular Telecommunications Market. 
B-1. Market Supply Structure - Network Operators and Service 
Providers. 
-A- UCL 
In the UK market, the network operators are responsible for the planning 
and installation of the network, while the service providers are responsible for 
the distribution of the mobile handsets, the sale of subscriptions and the after- 
sale service. This structure encourages competition and the operators and 
service providers subsidise demand by selling mobile terminals at low prices 
and splitting the cost (see Figure B-1). Competition between operators and 
economies of scale in the market for hand held terminals are the key factors of 
the success of the British market. 
Users 
monthly bill 
Davment 
Service providers 
monthly bill 
payment less 
discount 
incentives 
for new 
subscribers 
Cellular operators 
Orange, Mercury One 2 One, 
Cellnet &Vodafone 
Terminals 
Figure B-I Structure of UK cellular phone distribution network 
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There are four licenses granted to UK network operators, two for each 
2 nd generation digital standard. DCS1800 is used by T-Mobile54 and Orange, 
and GSM is used by Cellnet and Vodafone. T-Mobile and Orange are 
relatively new entrants into the market, having launched their services in 
September 1993 and April 1994 respectively. Shown in Figure B-2 is the effect 
on price for peak and off-peak cellular calls at the launch of the additional 
competitors in the market [11 ]. 
Light User Schemes 
0.3 
0.3 
0.2 
.r 0.2 CL 0.1 
0. 
0. 
U) 
a) a) 
Cellnet 
Jaf one 
ý2 One 
Figure B-2 Prices of peak-hour calls from mobile phones -5-' 
The most significant reduction in the tariffs of the older network operators 
Cellnet and Vodafone occurred when new competitors T-Mobile and Orange 
entered the market. This resulted in a 57% decrease in the peak-time tariffs of 
Cellnet and a 25% decrease in Vodafone's tariffs. This clearly demonstrates 
that direct competition drives prices down. In fact, after the initial introductory 
period, both One to One and Orange increased their prices by 16% and 13% 
ý4 ý4 New name for One 2 One since April 2002. 
55 Direct comparison between tariffs is impossible due to the different amounts of free time included 
(bundled) in each tariff 
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respectively, so that presently the prices charged by all the operators are quite 
similar. 
Licences for 3 rd generation networks were distributed by auction and 
there will be five operators - British Telecom, Vodafone, Orange, One2One 
and Telesystem International Wireless Inc. (TWI) from Canada. The increase 
in the number of competitors in the market will lead to active competition 
between the service operators in the future as they attempt to capture and 
retain their market share. 
B-2 Relative Market Shares. 
The relative market shares of the four UK network operators can be seen 
in Figure B-3. The two DCS1800 operators gradually increased their share of 
mobile subscribers to 40%. Currently Vodafone is the market leader with 32% 
of the market, followed by Cellnet with 27%. From the late entrants T-Mobile 
currently holds 19% the market while Orange has captured 22% of the market 
[109]. 
100% 
80% 
60% 
40% 
20% 
0% 
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Year 
Figure B-3 Market shares of the four UK network operators. 
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B-3. Cellular Phone Tariffs as on 30'hMarch 1999. 
Tariff Pre-Pay Occasional 
Caller+ 
Regular 
Caller+ 
Frequent 
Caller+ 
Connection included f 29.79 f 29.79 f 35.25 
Monthly Line Rental mcluded f 14.8 9 f 21.28 f 34.04 
Inclusive Calls f 4.25 f 4.25 f 12.77 f 17.02 
Peak Call Charges 34.04p 34.04p 29.79p 20.00p 
Ofj'- Peak Charges 10.21p 10.21p 10.21p 10.21p 
Charges 10.21p 10.21p 10.21p 10.21p 
Table B-1 Cellnet tariffs 
UCL 
Tariff Minute 
Saver 5 
Minute 
Saver 20 
Minute 
Saver 60 
Minute 
Saver 100 
Connection 35.25 35.25 35.25 35.25 
Monthly Rental 16.99 19.99 26.99 37.49 
Charge Period 
8am-8pm 
Mon-Fri 
8am-8pm 
Mon-Sat 
8am-8pm 
Mon-Sat 
8am-8pm 
Mon-Sat 
Chargelmin 40p 35p 32p 21p 
Charge Period All other times All other times All other times All other times 
Chargelmin I Op I Op lop I Op 
Inclusive Air time 
_5 
minutes 20 minutes 60 mmutes 100 mmutes 
Table B-1 Vodafone tariffs. 
Plan Name Monthly 
Charge 
Talk Time included 
(per month) 
Call Charges Orange to 
Orange peak 
Peak Off - 
Peak 
call charges 
everyday 20 E15.00 
_20 
min off-peak dail 40p I Op 40.00 
talk 15 f 17.63 
_I 
5 minutes 29.3 8p 5p 14.69p 
talk 30 E17-50 30 minutes 30p 5p 30.00p 
talk 60 E29.38 120 minutes 23.50 5p 11.75p 
talk 200 E58.75 
_400 
minutes 21.15p 5p 10.58p 
talk 360 f88.12 720 minutes 18.80P 5p 9.40p 
talk 540 E 117.50 . 
_I 
080 minutes 8.23p 
Talk-Oare+60 f, 44.06 120 minutes 23.50p 11.75p 11.75p 
Table B-2 Orange tariffs. 
Time Plan Monthly Charge Free Time Peak Off- VoiceMail 
Calls Peak 
Calls 
Onc-2-Evening f22.50 Local only, Mon- 30p lop free 
Fri, 6pm-midnis4ht 
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One-2- Weekend F- 17.50 Local only, all 
weekend 
30p lop free 
One-2-45 f 17.50 45 mins Anytime 30p 5p free 
Precept 100 E25.00 100 mins Anytime 20p 5p free 
Precept 200 f40. OO 200 mins Anytime 15p 5p free 
Precept Daytime f59-00 Weekday daytime, 
local calls 
15p lop free 
Table B-1 One2One tariffs. 
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Appendix C- Survey Methodology and Findings. 
To investigate the attitudes and preferences of mobile telephone users a 
survey, in the form of a questionnaire, was conducted in the spring of 1998. 
Series of questions enquired about the consumers' current behaviour and the 
degree of their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the currently offered service. 
A different set of questions was asked to establish the preferences of the 
customers. Some questions tested the consumer's preference for it per-use" or 
"bulk" pricing. Other questions examined users' concept for Quality of Service 
in relation to clarity of voice and connectivity of the speech. Finally, the users 
were asked to speculate about the future possible uses of mobile phones. 
Probing in depth about the opinions and preferences of the mobile phone 
users would allow us to draw conclusions about their behaviour. 
C-1. Methodology. 
A questionnaire (see end of appendix) was published on the Internet in 
March 1998 and various Internet users were invited to complete it. To 
minimise the professional bias in the respondents, the URL address of the 
questionnaire was sent by e-mail to two specific user groups - students and 
staff at University College London and emPloyees at British Telecom Labs, 
Ipswich (private and business users). In total there were 93 responses to the 
survey, with 29 from a company email addresses. 
The results were analysed using Statistical Product and Service 
Solutions for Windows (SPSS) [110]. Two tests were applied to assess if a 
significant proportion of the test population have given the same answers. The 
first test, Chi-square, was used to test for significance when studying the 
population as a whole. The second test, One-way Anova, was applied when 
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the test population was divided into multiple categories and significant 
differences were sought between the categories. For example, to test if users 
would accept dynamic pricing, a Chi-square test would be applied to the 
results while to determine if there is a difference in the answers of business 
and private users a One-way Anova test would be used for analysis. 
Despite the limited number of people who responded to the survey, the 
results from this study can be used as an indication of mobile phone users 9 
opinions and attitudes of and can be used as a basis for assumptions and 
further studies. 
C-2. Results and Discussion. 
In designing the survey, it was ensured that three main areas of interest 
were covered by the questionnaire - the sensitivity of users to price and QoS, 
as well as their attitudes to dynamic pricing. Overlapping questions were 
asked to guard against question bias. 
C-2.1. User attitudes to pricing and QoS. 
To determine the relative importance of price for mobile users, a question 
enquired about the main factors determining the choice of mobile operator 
(see Figure C-1). The majority of respondents (34.4%) indicated that price of 
the calls was the deciding factor in their choice. The second most significant 
factor (at 25%) was coverage area. Although, about 5% of business user 
chose a subscriber because they could get a package at a special discounted 
price, the main incentive for their choice is still the price. There is no significant 
difference in the preferences expressed by the two groups (business and 
private), which can perhaps be explained by the fact that the majority of users 
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pay for their calls themselves rather than have the cost covered by a 
company. 
Factors influencing users' choice of service provider 
Price of the phone 
ot 
Recommendation 
Coverap 
Price of the calls 
Figure C-1 Main factors influencing the choice of service provider 
Therefore, users will choose the service provider with lowest call charges 
and adequate coverage area. Price is an important factor in determining user 
choices and if the introduction of dynamic pricing were to reduce the price of 
calls to and from mobile phones, it would give a competitive advantage to the 
respective operator. 
The second factor that could influence users' choice of service provider is 
QoS provided by the network. First, users' reactions to call dropping and call 
blocking were assessed. Surprisingly, call blocking seemed to present no 
significant problem for the users with 42% of users not finding it at all 
frustrating and only 17% getting very annoyed by it (see Figure C-2 ). 
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Level of perceived irritation due to blocked calls 
V 
Quite 
Not at all 
Figure C-2 Level of perceived irritation due to blocked calls 
However, when asked about their reason for purchasing the mobile 
telephone 74% indicated that contactability (the ability to make and receive 
calls) and emergency use have been their main consideration (see Figure 
C-3). This contradicts the finding that the call blocking is not a serious 
problem. A wider survey and a more targeted questioning may resolve this 
ambiguity. Therefore, the ability to make and receive calls is paramount to 
users perception of acceptable QoS and care has to be taken to ensure that 
access to the network is guaranteed most of the time. 
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8.05% 
I 
El Contactabi I ity 
03afety and emergency 
El Other 
MCheap calls 
NBusiness use 
7% 
Figure C-3 Reasons for purchasing the mobile phone 
In contrast to call blocking, a significant proportion of users (34.4%) find 
call dropping very irritating (see Figure C-4 ). 
Level of perceived irritation due to dropped calls 
Very much 
A at all 
- Not very much 
Figure C-4 Level of perceived irritation due to dropped call 
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A set of questions tried to ascertain the most common places and times 
during the day when call dropping and call blocking occurred. According to the 
respondents, most frequently, call blocking occurs on trains (35% of cases) 
and between six and nine in the evening. However, mobile phone usage does 
not peak at this time of the day. A possible explanation of this phenomenon 
could be that calls initiated at this time tend to be very short thus reducing the 
overall channel occupancy time but nevertheless causing congestion. 
The situation is very similar with call dropping, with the largest proportion 
(29%) of users indicating that on a train they experience most frequent 
interruptions. This can perhaps be accounted for by the fact that trains often 
travel at high speed, crossing cells frequently and requesting many handoffs, 
which causes the problem. Overall, there is a significant difference in the 
perception of QoS provided by the cellular networks for the two groups (Table 
C-1 shows the frequency distribution of the replies). 
Satisfaction with QoS 
User group 
Private users Business users Missing data 
QOS QOS QOS 
Count % Count % Count % 
Not very 
satisfied 9 18.8% 12 29.3% 
Fairly 
satisfied 24 50.0% 21 51.2% 
Very 
satisfied 15 31.3% 8 19.5% 4 100.0% 
Table C-1 Overall satisfaction with the QoS 
29.3% of the business users from BT are not satisfied with the service, 
compared to only 18.8% of the private users from UCL. This perhaps can be 
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explained by the higher expectations business users have for mobile phone 
services. 
When asked if they are prepared to pay more for a better QoS a 
significant proportion of the users said no (see Table C-2). We can interpret 
this in two ways: either users are happy with their current service or they do 
not think that QoS is as important as price. However, there is a significant 
difference in satisfaction with QoS between Orange and One to One users, 
which indicates that people are aware of the QoS provided by the network. 
Therefore, although users are not prepared to pay more for better QoS, they 
are sensitive to different qualities of service a network provides. 
Readiness to pay more for better service 
User group 
Private users Business users Missing data 
Pay for better service Pay for better service Pay for better service 
Count % Count % Count % 
Yes 6 12.5% 6 14.6% 2 50.0% 
No 32 66.7% 24 58.5% 1 25.0% 
Don't 
10 20 8% 11 26.8% 1 25.0% know I I . I I I I 
Table C-2 Customers readiness to pay more for better service 
In summary, the results from the survey suggest that the price of the calls 
I 
is the most important factor in determining users' choice of service provider. 
Users are aware of the QoS provided by the network and are very irritated by 
call dropping; therefore the service operators can increase user satisfaction by 
implementing preventative measures such as channel allocation algorithms 
prioritising channel availability for handover, for example. 
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C-2.2. User attitudes to dynamic pricing. 
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The second factor tested by the survey is the expected change in user 
behaviour at the introduction dynamic pricing. Intuitively, one would expect 
users to reduce their usage of the network when prices are high and increase 
it when prices are lower. To check the viability of this hypothesis, users' 
preferences for tariff types and behaviour were questioned. Firstly, users 
preferences for "bulk 99 and "pay as you use" tariffs were determined. A 
significant proportion of the test population indicated that they would prefer the 
it pay as you use" tariffs (see Table C-3). 
Preference for per-use rate tariffs 
User group 
Private users Business users Missing data 
Prefer flat rate tariffs Prefer flat rate tariffs Prefer flat rate tariffs 
Count % Count % Count % 
Yes 14 29.2% 11 26.8% 2 50.0% 
No 33 68.8% 19 46.3% 2 50.0% 
Don't 
1 2 1% 11 26.8% know I I . I II I I 
Table C-3 User preference for "per-use " tariffs 
This is in contrast to finding by Cosgrove and Linhart [781 for the USA 
market. This difference can possibly be explained with the different prevailing 
cultures in USA and Europe. Traditionally, in USA the telephone companies 
have used fixed tariffs for local calls, whereas in UK the "pay as you use" 
tariffs have been more popular. As a result the customers have adjusted their 
preferences accordingly and users in USA prefer the fixed rate tariffs. This is 
confirmed by the finding that from the 93 respondents. The proportion of users 
who pay for their calls have a significant preference for "per use 99 payment, 
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whereas the proportion of users who do not pay for their calls, have expressed 
no particular preference (see Table C-4). 
Preference for per-use rate tariffs by users paying for their 
calls 
Paying for calls 
Yes No 
Prefer flat rate tariffs Prefer flat rate tariffs 
Count % Count % 
Yes 25 30.9% 2 16.7% 
No 50 61.7% 4 33.3% 
Don't 
know 6 7.4% II 
6 
I 
50.0% 
I 
Table C-4 Preference for per use tariffs by users who pay for their calls 
The results from the survey also indicate that a significant proportion of 
users would find it helpful to be reminded the price of the calls before they 
make a call as it would help them plan their usage better (see Table C-5) 
Perceived usefulness of seeing price before making call 
User group 
Private users Business users Missing data 
Price will help plan Price will help plan Price will help plan 
better better better 
Count % Count % Count % 
Yes 19 39.6% 22 53.7% 4 100.0% 
No 13 27.1% 8 19.5% 
Depending 
15 31.3% 10 24.4% 
on the call 
Don't know 1 2.1% 1 2.4% 
Table C-5 Perceived usefulness of seeing price before making a call 
In fact, a significant number of respondents have implied that they will 
use their phone more if prices were variable but lower than current nominal 
prices (see Table C-6). These findings are particularly important for justifying 
the implementation of dynamic pricing 
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User group 
Private users Business users Missing data 
Use more if price is Use more if price is Use more if price is 
lower lower lower 
Count % Count % Count % 
Yes 30 62.5% 25 61.0% 3 75.0% 
No 11 22.9% 9 22.0% 1 25.0% 
Don't 
know I 7 I 14.6% I 7 17.1% I I 
-i 
Table C-6 Usage if prices are variable but lower 
Most important, however, is the confirmation of the repression 
phenomena observed by Cosgrove and Linhart [78]. A significant proportion of 
users have indicated that they are conscious of reducing the duration and 
frequency of their calls during peak hours. Surprisingly, this is true even for 
people who do not pay for their calls (see Table C-7). This finding indicates 
that potentially dynamic pricing could lead to shift in usage from busy hours 
with high prices to non-busy hours with lower prices. 
Change in use depending on time of day 
User group 
Private users Business users Missing data 
Keep calls shorter Keep calls shorter Keep calls shorter 
during peak hours during p ak hours during peak hours 
Count % Count % Count % 
Yes 32 66.7% 17 41.5% 4 100.0% 
No 3 6.3% 9 22.0% 
Depending 
13 27.1% 15 36.6% 
on the call I I I I II I 
Table C-7 Usage reduction during peak hours 
To summarise, the results from the survey indicate that price plays a 
major role in user's decision making process and that users would favour a 
pricing policy that would reduce overall call charges. Users have also stated 
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that they reduce their usage of the phone during the more expensive peak 
hours, verifying the hypothesis that higher prices would discourage usage. 
Although, neither the business nor the private users are prepared to pay more 
for higher QoS, both groups have indicated that they are particularly irritated 
by call dropping, which suggests that load management techniques can be 
employed to increase user satisfaction with the performance of the cellular 
network. 
C-3. Survey Questions. 
1. For how long have you been using a mobile phone? 
Less than 1 month 
1-6months 
6months-1 year 
1-2years 
More than 2years 
2. Why did you purchase the phone? 
3. Which is your service provider 
Cellnet 
One2One 
Vodafone 
Orange 
Do you have a digital or analogue system 
Digital 
Analogue 
Don't Know 
5. What influenced your choice of service provider 
Price of the phone 
Price of the calls 
Coverage area 
Recommendation 
Other (please specify) 
6. Compared to your expectations do you think that your mobile phone service is: 
Reliable: Doesn't cut off 
Allows access at all times 
Other (please specify) 
The quality of voice is Clear 
Continuous 
Noisy 
Noisy but intelligible 
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Other (please specify) 
UCL 
7. How often do you see on your display the message "Limited Service Available" which only 
allows you to make emergency calls 
More than twice per day 
1-2 times per day 
2-3 times per week 
About once per week 
Less than once per week 
8. How annoying do you find this where T= 'Not at all', '5'= 'Most Annoying 
9. When and where does this usually happen 
Before 9am 
Between 9am 12pm 
Between 12pm 3pm 
Between 3pm 6pm 
Between 6pm 9pm 
After 9pm 
On the motorways 
On the train 
In the suburbs 
In the centre of town 
Other places 
10. How often do your calls get cut off in the middle of a conversation 
More than twice per day 
1-2 times per day 
2-3 times per week 
About once per week 
Less than once per week 
11. How annoying do you find this where T= 'Not at all', '5'= 'Most Annoying 
12. When and where does this usually happen 
Before 9am 
Between 9am 12pm 
Between 12pm 3pm 
Between 3pm 6pm 
Between 6pm 9pm 
After 9pm 
On the motorways 
On the train 
In the suburbs 
In the centre of town 
Other places 
13. Do you pay for your calls? 
Yes 
No 
14. How much do you pay for your calls on the mobile 
Peak: 
Off-peak: 
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15. When making a call during peak hours do you keep your calls shorter to reduce the total 
cost? 
Yes 
No 
Depends on the call 
16. If the prices of the calls are displayed before you start your call would it help you to plan 
and decide the call duration? 
Yes 
No 
Depends on the call 
Don't know 
17. Would you like the option of paying more for a call if this meant receiving better service 
Yes 
No 
Depends on the call 
For what in particular would you pay? 
18. If the prices were variable (changing by time and location), but less than the current rate, 
would you use your mobile more often? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
19. Would you prefer a pre-fixed payment for all your calls (local and national) at the beginning 
of the month as opposed to'per call' charge? 
Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Please add any additional comments 
20. Do you have or foresee in the future a need for laptop wireless services (using your mobile 
phone like a computer 
Yes 
No 
-220- 
Appendix D Matlab and C Routines 
Appendix D 
-A- UCL 
D-1. Matlab Routine for Finding the Balancing FactorS Ai and Bi. 
% ELENASOLVER FOR FINDING THE BALANCING FACTORS - this is the master function called ELENASOLVER. m, which calls the slave function ELENAFUNCT. m. 
%v is the vector whose elements are x1, x2, yl and y2 
% It will be the solution to the minimisation problem 
% Start with an arbitrary choice of values, all ones 
% Edit this line if other starting values are desired 
x1 = 70; x2 = 50; yl = 0.02; y2 = 0.01; 
vo = [xl x2 yl y2]; 
% set up some parameters for the solver 
% It retuns a solution when the error returned by Elenafunct. m 
% is below Tolfun = 0.0001 and the values in v are steady from 
% one iteration to another to within ToIX = 0.0001 
% (good choices are problem dependent). 
% (Type help optimset to discover more about parameters) 
options = opti mset('Max Fun Eva Is', 8000, 'Max Iter', 8000 
'TolFun', 1 e4jolX, 1 e-4); 
% Send the initial guess into the solver. The equations are 
% in the Matlab program called elenafunct. m 
v= fminsearch(elenafu nct', vo, options); 
abs(v) % This line prints the result 
ELENAFUNCT. rn is the 'slave' optimisation function called by the 
'master'program called ELENASOLVER. m 
function [error] = elenafunct(v); 
% ELENAFUNCT is the 'slave' optimisation function called by the 
%'master' program called ELENASOLVER. m 
"v is the vector of variables that are being optimised. 
" Force a real non-negative solution: 
v= abs(v); % Negative values not permitted. It works like 
" this: even if the optimiser master routine searches negative values 
" we only ever use the positive value. This trick is needed 
" because the MATLAB optimiser is unconstrained, but we want 
" to exclude negative values. 
" Unpack vector v 
x1 = v(1); x2 = v(2); yl = v(3); y2 = v(4); 
% calculate residuals 
el = x1 - 1/(0.6*yl +0.1 *y2); 
e2 = x2 - 1/(0.8*yl +0.2*y2); 
e3 = yl - 1/(0.9*xl+0.2*x2); 
e4 = y2 - 1/(1.2*xl +0.4*x2); 
Sum of squares. 
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error = elA2+e2 
A 2+e3A2+e4 A 2; 
" To see the detailed working, delete the % sign on 
" to get a run time print out of all the trials. 
" error = el 112+e2^2+e3 A 2+e4A2 
% The variable "error" is now returned to the MATLAB 
% fsolvemin programme which will try some other x1l, x2, yl, y2 
D-2. Matlab Routine for Finding Competition Driven Dynamic 
Prices. 
%The program follows the notation developed in the thesis. 
pmin 0.01; 
pmax 0.5; 
rn 1.2*sqrt(l+(pmax-pmin )A 2); 
z sqrt(MA 2- (0.5-0.01 )A 2); 
test = inline('1.2432-(sinh(x))/(x)'); 
x fzero(test, 2); 
c 1/(2*x); 
h (atanh((pmax-pmin)/m)*2*c-l)/2; 
lambdal = c*cosh(h/c)-pmin; 
%lambda2 = (c*cosh((l+h)/c)-pmax); 
%pricel = c*cosh((q. +h)/c)-lambdal; 
price2 = c*cosh((q/100+h)/c)-lambdal; 
D-3. Matlab Routine for Finding Revenue Attainment Dynamic 
Prices. 
UCL 
%This routine searches and find the optimal Vf that will allow the attainment of a given 
%revenue. "test. m" is the slave function called to minimise the difference between the actual 
%and desired revenue. 
global Rcur, b, a, q, pint, C, tau; 
bigcount 1; 
Ropt_arr [22,11,7,5,4,6, 
125,85,82,76,68,38]; 
a- arr = [31,15,8,5,6,7,22,86 
160,149,130,117,68]; 
X0 = 0.05; 
b=1.0; 
ax = [0.1: 0.1: 1]; 
C= 80; 
tau = 1.2; 
people = (31 *7); 
for bigcount= 1: 1: 25, 
15,50,397,519,520,516,517,509,575,615,612,540, 
152,237,239,231,224,216,262,314,325,239,244, 
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if (( bigcount > 9) & (bigcount<=19)) 
pint = 0.25; 
else 
pint = 0.05; 
end 
Ropt = Ropt-arr(bigcount); 
a= (7*a_arr(bigcount)); 
counter = 1; 
Rcum = 0; 
n=0; 
ave = 0; 
Rcum = 0; 
fort= 1: 1, 
Rcur = (Ropt-Rcum)/(13-t); 
[xl, xvall = fm i nsea rch ('test', xo); 
psy(t, counter)= xl; 
Rcum = Rcum + (a*exp(-b*((x 1 *q+O. 0 l)-pi nt))*(xl *q+O. 01 )*tau); 
deltap(t, counter)=(xl *q+0.01 )-pint; 
q= (a*exp(-b*((xl*q+0.01)-pint)))/C; 
pr(t, counter)=(xl *q+0.01); 
Att(t, counter) = Rcur; 
Curn(t, counter)= Rcum; 
end 
counter = counter+l; 
n= n+l; 
bigcount= bigcount+l; 
end 
dlmwrite('testl', test_rev, '\t'); 
dlmwrite('test2', test_a, '\t'); 
dlmwrite('test3', test_psy, '\t'); 
dlmwrite('test4', test_att 
- 
rev, '\t'); 
dlmwrite('test5', test-pr, '\t'); 
% "test. m" 
function [error] = test(x); 
global Rcur, a, q, pint, C, tau, mew; 
m= X('); if««m*q)<0)1(-a*exp(-b*«m*q+0.0 1 )-pi nt»+C)<0)&(mew>O» 
el=rand(1)*8000; 
else 
UCL 
el = (Rcur-(a*exp(-b*((m*q+0.01)-pint))*(m*q+0.01)*tau))- mew*log(m*q)- mew*log(- 
a exp(-b*((m*q+0.01)-pint))+C); 
end 
error = el. 112; 
D-4. C Routine for Finding Revenue Attainment Dynamic Prices. 
#include<math. h> 
#include<stdio. h> 
#define MAXIT 5000 
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#define FACTOR 1.1 
#define NTRY 500 
UCL 
float rtsafe(int a, double rev, double alfa, double beta, double pý-b, double c-len, double 
n, float *result) 
/* Using a combination of Newton Raphson and bisection, find the root */ 
/* of a function bracketed between x1 and x2. The root, returned as the 
/* function value rtsafe, will be refined until its accuracy is known within 
/* +/- xacc. funcd is a user-supplied routine that returns both the function 
/* value and the first derivative of the function. 
void funcd(int a, double rev, double alfa, double beta, double pr-b, double c-len, 
double n, float x, float *fun float *der); 
int zbrac(int a, double rev, double alfa, double beta, double pý-b, double c-len, double 
n, float *x1, float *x2); 
int j; 
float df, dx, dxold, f, fh, fl; 
float temp, xh, A, rts, t1, t2; 
float x1l, x2; 
x2 = 1/(alfa+beta); 
xl = x2-0.02; 
zbrac(a, rev, alfa, beta, pý_b, c-len, n, &xl, &x2); 
funcd(a, rev, alfa beta, pr_b, c-len, n, xl, M, &df); 
funcd(a, rev, alfa beta, pr_b, c-len, n, x2, &fh, &df); 
/* //printf("min = %f, max = %f \n", fl, fh); */ 
if ((fl>0.0 && fh>0.0) 11 (fl< 0.0 && fh< 0.0)) 
printf("Root must be bracketed in rtsafe"); 
if (fl 0.0) return x1; 
if (fh 0.0) return x2; 
if (fl< 0.0){ 
A x1; 
xh x2; 
else f 
xh x1; 
A x2; 
I 
rts = 0.5*(x 1 +x2); 
/* //printf("RTS1 %An", rts); 
dxold = fabs(x2-xl); 
dx = dxold; 
funcd(a, rev, alfa, beta, prý_b, c_len, n, rts, W, &df); 
for 0=1; j<=MAXIT; j++)f 
if ((((rts-xh)*df-f)*((rts-xl)*df-f) > 0.0) 11 (fabs(2.0*f)>fabs(dxold*df))){ 
dxold = dx; 
dx = 0.5*(xh-xl); 
rts = xl+dx; 
if (XI == rts 
luSult = rts; 
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return rts; 
I 
I 
else 
dxold = dx; 
dx = f/df; 
temp = rts; 
rts -= dx; 
/* Hprintf("RTS3 %f\n", rts); 
if (temp == rts) 
, esult = rts; 
return rts; 
if (fabs(dx) < 0.0001) {*result = rts; return rts; j 
funcd(a, rev, alfa, beta, pr_b, c-len, n, rts, W, &df); 
if (f<0.0) 
fI= rts; 
else 
xh = rts; 
printf("Maximum number of iterrations exceeded in rtfsafe \n"); 
return 0.0; 
UCL 
void funcd(int a, double rev, double alfa, double beta, double prý_b, double c_len, double 
n, float x, float *fun float *der) 
double sorted; 
double people; 
if (x < 0.05) 
sorted = 1.0/(10*(x-pý_b)); 
*fun = rev - (a*exp((-beta)*(x-prý_b)) + pow(sorted, beta))*x*c_len; 
*der = (beta*a*exp((-beta)*(x-pý_b))+ 10* beta* pow(so rted, beta+ 1 ))*x*c_len - 
(a*ex p((- beta)* (x- prý_b)) + pow(sorted, beta))*c-len; 
/*//printf("Function low is %An", *fun); 
//printf(" People low are %f\n", people); */ 
I 
else 
*fun = rev - a*exp((-beta)*(x - pr_b))*x*c_len; 
/* //people = 7*a*a*n*exp((-alfa-beta)*(x - prý_b)); */ 
*der = beta* a*ex p((- beta)* (x - prý_b))*x*cJen - a*ex p((- beta)* (x - pr-b))*c_len; 
/* //printf("Function high is %f\n", *fun); 
//pri ntf(" People high are %f\n", people); 
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int zbrac(int a, double rev, double alfa, double beta, double pr_b, double c-len, double 
n, float *x1, float *x2) 
int j; 
float fl, f2, der; 
void funcd(int a, double rev, double alfa, double beta, double prý_b, double c-len, 
double n, float x, float *fun float *der); 
funcd(a, rev, alfa, beta, pr_b, c- len, n, *xl, Wl &der); 
funcd(a, rev, alfa, beta, pr_b, c_len, n, *x2, W2 &der); 
for 0=1; j<=NTRY; j++) 
if (fl*f2 < 0.0) return 1; 
if (fabs(fl) < fabs(f2)) 
funcd(a, rev, alfa, beta, pr_b, c-len, n, *xl+=FACTOR*(*xl-*x2), Wl &der); 
else 
funcd(a, rev, alfa, beta, prý_b, c_len, n, *x2+= FACTO R*(*x2-*x 1 ), W &der); 
I 
printf("Did not converge\n"); 
return 0; 
D-5. Matiab Routine for Finding Optimal Dynamic Prices. 
%This routine calls function "opt. m" which finds the optimal prices in the network by 
calling %"opt_2. m" which finds the revenue attainment price, and then chooses the optimal of 
those %in terms of optimal load in the network. The solutions are found using the numerical 
%method of exhaustive enumeration. 
global number 
for number = 1: 1: 24, 
[price(number), der(number), error(number), quan(number)] = feval('opt', number); 
end 
wklwrite('opt_pricel_10_0', price); 
wklwrite('opt_derl_O', der); 
wklwrite('opt_quanl_O', quan); 
%"opt. m" with N denoting the derivative of the optimal dynamic price. 
function [optimal_price, derivative, first-one, q] = opt(bigcount); 
global Rcur, b, a, q, pint, N, p, qO; 
%bigcount = 1; 
i=1; 
Ropt_arr = [20,14,7, 
198,122,117,105,95,54]; 
a arr = [31,15,8,5,6, 
160,149,130,117,68]; 
b 1; 
q 0.2; 
qO 0.0; 
i= 
5,4,7,19,65,524,768,790,791,774,751,828,902,912,786, 
7,22,86,152,237,239,231,224,216,262,314,325,239,244, 
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j 
k 
fi rst one = 2*80A 2; 
other= 1; 
%for bigcount= 1: 1: 1, 
if (bigcount == 1) 
qO = 0; 
else 
qO = 7*a_arr(bigcount-l)/12; 
end 
if (( bigcount > 8) & (bigcount<19)) 
pint = 0.25; 
xo = 0.40; 
else 
pint = 0.05; 
xo = 0.40; 
end 
%The second equation is: 
cor = 0; 
spec = 1; 
for N= 0.01: 0.01: 1/b, 
%or 
- 
pr(k) = N; 
%orý_pr(special)= N; 
%h1= -(0.0 1 *cor); 
hl = 0; 
%h2 = «l/b-(0.01*cor»-0.01); 
h2 = 0; 
j=j; 
for p= hl: 0.01: h2, 
%der 
- 
price(k, j)= p; 
%der 
- 
price(spec) = p; 
%or_pr(spec)= N; 
i=1; 
%for q=0.1: 0.1: 0.1, 
a= (7*a_arr(bigcount»; 
q- a/20; 
Rcum = 0; 
Rcur = Ropt_arr(bigcount); 
[xl, xval] = fminsearch('opt-2', xo); 
%pr= xl; 
u(k, j)=«4799.9+1.44*N*xl)/(2-1.728*p*xl»*(1-2*exp(-O. 6*p*xl»+2*exp(- 
0.6*p*xl)*qO; 
UCL 
if (((u(k, j)>O)&(u(k, j)<80))) 
diff 
- 
u(other)= u(k, j); 
der_price(other) p; 
or 
- 
pr(other)= N; 
R(other) ((l/(2-1.7*p*xl))"2)*(1.44*exp(-0.6*p*xl)*N*(2*(-2 
+exp(O. 6*p*xl))*q*(-2+1.7*p*xl)+(4000+1.2*N*xl)*(-5.77+exp(O. 6*p*xl)*(4.88-1.7*p*xl)))); 
if( N >= 0.05) 
dem(other) = a*exp(-b*(N-pint))/12; 
else 
if (b==l) 
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numb = 10.0; 
%numb 
else 
numb = 10.0; 
%numb 
end 
dern(other) = a*exp(-b*(N-pint))+(numb*N )A(-b)/l 2; 
%other_demand = dern(other) 
end 
difference = (80 - dem(other))A2 +(diff_u(other) dem(other) )A 2; if(difference < first_one) 
first_one = difference; 
optimal_price(i) = N; 
derivative(i) = p; 
%optima I_price(i)= N 
%derivative(i) p 
%first-one 
i= i+l; 
end 
other = other+l; 
end 
%u(k, j) 
%load(k, j) = q; 
%price(k, j)= xl; 
i= i+l; 
%end 
i= j+1; 
spec= spec+l; 
end 
cor = cor+l; 
k= k+l; 
end 
%bigcount= bigcount+l; 
%end 
plot3(or_pr, der_price, diff-u, '*: ') 
x1abel('Price') 
ylabel('Derivative') 
zlabel('Demand') 
-A- UCL 
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Appendix E- Detailed Solution of the Ad Hoc Competition 
Driven Pricing Model. 
The optimisation problem is 
Qmax 
Minimise f (P,, 
-ý. + 
P(q)ýq, E-1 
Qmin 
subject to 
2 E-2 
FI+ -P(qTdq 
=M 
2 
and the boundary conditions: 
P((? 
rnin 
p E-3 
n-dn 
P(Qmax )ý Pmax ( E-4 ) 
Minimum price; 
Pmax 
-Maximum price; 
Load in the network; 
P(q) - Intermediate prices in the network; 
Competition market price; 
Qnun 
- Minimum load to start dynamic pricing; 
Qmax - Maximum load in the network. 
Taking Q,,, =o and using calculus of variations, the curve minimising the 
area bound by itself can be found using Lagrange's multiplier (see Butkov [98] 
for proof for sufficiency and necessity conditions). Thus we have to solve: 
Q max 
H(P, P', q)= 
f P. 
n+p(q)+AýJ+P(qý q 
E-5 
0 
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As ( 5-5 ) does not explicitly dependent on qa special formula for finding 
the functional can be used (see Irving and Mullineux [99]) and the Euler 
equation which will be solved becomes: 
2 
P. + P(q)+ AVI + P(q 
;,, 2 P(q) 
;2- 
const =K E-6 ýl 
+ 
-P(q 
Rearranging equation ( E-6 ) gives: 
(K 
- 
Pmin 
- P(q))ýl + P(qý2 E-7 
and expressing in terms of P(q) 
f 
we get 
2 p(C (K - 
Pmin 1))2 
P (q) ( E-8 
K- 'Pmin - P(q 
Let K- P. 
n-P(q)=Acosu and substituting 
into ( E-8 ) and changing 
variables gives: 
CIP A sin u du 
clq Ä cos u du 
dp 
=A sin u=A 
sin u dq 
du A Cos u du 
and this gives 
dq 
=A Cos u 
du 
-A sin u 
( E-9 ) 
(E-1 0) 
1) 
(E-1 2) 
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Using right hand angle triangle equalities and changing the variable back 
to q gives: 
C, ý2 - 
-(h- 
qy=K-P,, ý - P(q) (E-14) 
The general solution to this optimisation problem is: 
P(q)= K- Pmin _ 
V, ý2 
-(h-q 
)2 (E-1 5) 
To solve the problem for boundary conditions (( E-3 )) and (4) and 
determine an exact solution the following system of equations has to be 
solved: 
P(O) -= pK- Pnin - vf/12-h2 min 
P(Qm,, )= Pma, =K- Pmm _ 
Vý, 2 
- (h - Qma, 
Qmax 
f 
ll+P(q; 2dq=M 
0 
sin u 
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(E-1 3) 
(E-1 6) 
The integral is evaluated by differentiating (E-15) which gives: 
P(q)' = 
h-q 
(E-1 7) 
and setting h-q=. ýcosO 
2 
-(h-q)2 
ma 
fxA dq 
A dqdO fý 
sin 0A 0 
1/12- 
(h -qy 0 
QMXX Qmax 
=Cos-, 
(h-Q. )-Cos-, (, f AdO = /10ý 
00 
(E-18) 
The constants A and h can be found by solving the following system of 
equations numerically. 
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Pn-ax 
- 
Pnun = ý4; 
ý2 
-h 
2 
Cos-, 
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Appendix F- Additional Graphs from the Simulations. 
F1 Simulation Model Verification. 
F. 1.1 Effect of Mobility Elasticity a on Call Blocking. 
-A- UCIL 
To validate the effect of user mobility on the performance of the network, 
the simulation was be run by changing the mobile elasticity (parameter a in 
the mathematical model) and keeping all other variable in the model constant. 
To facilitate correct operation of the mobility model, the prices charged in 
different cells were different and taken randomly from the interval [0.05,0.35] 
units but kept constant throughout the simulation. The simulations were run for 
a 24-hour period using the variables presented in Table 5-1. 
As users move through the network their spatial distribution will affect call 
blocking in the system. User behaviour is determined by mobility elasticity (x. 
When a< 0 the users will be acting irrationally and move to more expensive 
cells and when a>0 move to cheaper cells. Therefore, it can be expected 
that the number of blocked calls will initially decrease as (x increases and 
eventually increase again as the proportion of users shifting to cheaper cells 
increases and cell capacity begins to saturate. 
Shown in Figure F-1 is the total number of blocked calls in the system as 
mobility elasticity a increases. The total number of blocked calls in the 
network initially decreases as a increase, but then begins to increase again 
after an inflection point at a=2. The inflection point at a=2 rather than a=0 
is due to the exponential relationship in the user distribution model. The 
proportion of users moving to a particular cell depends on the mobility 
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elasticity a and the price in the cell P,. For a<0, the shift will be towards the 
cell with the maxtP ,I 
in the system. 
If a>0 the shift will be towards the minýP, I in the system. The 
magnitude of the mobility exponential function for a< 0 is aP, > 1, while if 
a>0, the magnitude of the function is 0< aP, <I and, therefore, the mobility 
with a<0 will generate a greater proportion of blocked calls than the mobility 
with a>0. 
900 
U) 
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820 
4- 780 0 
E 740 
Z Z 
700 
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Figure F-I Effect of mobility elasticity a on call blocking 
F. 1.2 Effect of demand elasticity P on Call Blocking. 
The price elasticity of user demand is effected by the parameter p in the 
mathematical model developed in chapter 4. It represents the sensitivity of 
users to price changes. If the sensitivity of users to price increases (keeping 
the price constant) the total number of calls generated in the network at any 
given price will decrease. As a result the total number of blocked calls should 
also decrease and Figure F-2 shows that the simulation behaves as expected. 
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Figure F-2 Effect of demand elasticity 0 on the number of blocked calls 
F. 1.3 Effect of Call Length. 
A, 
UIICI 
As the length of the calls increases, keeping all other parameters in the 
system constant, the total number of blocked calls should also increase. This 
follows from the Erlang formulae (see Table 2-1) and is confirmed in Figure 
F-3. 
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Figure F-3 Effect of call length on the number of blocked calls 
These results indicate that the simulation system behaviour is consistent 
with the expected analytical behaviour in the case of non-dynamic prices. 
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Therefore, it can be assumed that the results from the system with the 
dynamic pricing operating would also be accurate. 
F2 Additional Simulation Results with Competition Driven Pricing 
without User Mobility. 
Plotted in Figure F-4 is the distribution of the percentage of blocked calls 
as a function of the time of the day. As demand becomes unit elastic the 
majority of call blocking occurs during off-peak hours, rather than the peak- 
hours. This is due to the effect of the substitution effect with the fixed network, 
which leads to a very significant increase in the number of users attempting to 
access the network during off-peak hours. 
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Figure F-4 Distribution of percentage of blocked calls as a function of time 
Figure F-5 shows the fluctuations of user demand as they occur at 5- 
minute intervals without smoothing of the data. The graphs show the rapid 
increase and decrease in demand during off-peak hours as the price fluctuates 
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and explains the very sharp increase in the number of blocked calls as the 
elasticity of demand p increases. 
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Figure F-5 Fluctuation of user elastic demand 3.0) and a non-linear pricing 
function 
F. 3 Simulation Results with Competition Driven Pricing and User 
Mobility. 
This scenario will introduce mobility of users in reaction to the changing 
price, with users moving to cheaper cells and avoiding more expensive ones. 
This will be done by altering the mobility elasticity parameter defined as a in 
the mathematical model. This parameter represents the willingness of users to 
move to cheaper cells before initiating a call and will be tested for aG [0,2 ] 56. 
As a increases, the willingness of users to move the cheaper cell also 
increases and, therefore, the relative proportion of users moving to the 
cheaper cells would grow. 
This choice is arbitrary. The value of this parameter can be estimated by network operators by using 
historic data and conducting further market research (Evans [82]). 
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F. 3.1 Network operator's perspective. 
With the introduction of user mobility the simulation predicts a decrease 
in the total revenue generated with both linear and non-linear pricing function 
as the elasticity of mobility a increases (see Figure F-6 and Figure F-7). 
8 
(0) 
7.7 
7.4 
7.1 
6.8 
6.5 
Figure F-6 Revenue with user mobility and linear pricing function 
This decrease is due to the shift of users to cheaper cells in the network, 
which results in reduction in the generated revenue. Again the linear and non- 
linear pricing functions lead to different behaviour in the system. With the 
linear pricing function the decrease in revenue only becomes significant for 
a=2.0, at 6% and 5% reduction respectively for P=1.0 and 0=2.0 (see 
Figure F-6). Network operators would, therefore, only need to take price 
induced user mobility into account with the linear pricing function, if they 
estimate the mobility elasticity of users to be greater than 2, i. e. a ý! 2.0. 
With the non-linear pricing function, on the other hand, the reduction 
becomes significant at 5.5% for a=1.0 and inelastic demand (p = 1.0) and at 
5.7% reduction for a=0.5 and unit elastic demand (p = 2.0) (see Figure F-7). 
Therefore, with the non-linear pricing function the network operator has to take 
into account user mobility as soon as dynamic pricing is introduced. 
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Figure F-7 Revenue with user mobility and non-linear price function 
A 
. Ucl 
The effect of price induced user mobility on the percentage of blocked 
calls with linear and non-linear dynamic pricing functions can be seen in 
Figure F-8 and Figure F-9 respectively. 
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Figure F-8 Percentage of blocked calls with mobility and linear pricing function 
With the linear pricing function (Figure F-8) call blocking decreases by 
13% when mobility is first introduced and demand is inelastic (a <- i. o and 
p= but then increases steadily until there is 45% more blocking with unit 
elastic demand (P = 2.0). This increase is due to the increase in the proportion 
of people moving to cheaper cells and saturating the available capacity, before 
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the price increases and drives them away. However, in the case of the linear 
pricing function, the benefits of dynamic pricing are only outweighed by the 
increased blocking due to user mobility for mobility elasticity a>1.5. This 
suggests that, the linear ad hoc dynamic pricing could offer a reduction in 
expected call blocking. 
The effect of the non-linear dynamic pricing function on the percentage of 
blocked calls (Figure F-9) is more significant, with the overall percentage of 
blocked calls increasing for both inelastic and unit elastic demand, due to 
cheaper cell saturation. The increase is very significant for inelastic demand 
(P = 1.0) reaching up to 49% for a=2.0. However, with unit elastic demand 
(0=2.0) the increase is not significant for a! ý]. O at 0.1% increase. As the 
mobility elasticity a increases this difference becomes more significant 
reaching 35% increase for a=2.0. 
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Figure F-9 Percentage of blocked calls with mobility and non-linear pricing function 
Therefore, although call blocking in the network can increases as the 
proportion of users moving to cheaper cells increases, this effect is only 
significant for mobility elasticity a>1.5 with the linear pricing function. With the 
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non-linear pricing function the effect becomes significant for mobility elasticity 
a> 0.5 and so, network operators would have to be more cautious when 
applying this form of dynamic pricing. 
The effect of price induced user mobility elasticity a on the variance of 
the load in the network is shown in Figure F-1 0 and Figure F-1 1 for inelastic 
demand (P = 1.0) with the linear and non-linear pricing function respectively. 
The introduction of mobility (a> 0-0) leads to a decrease in the intensity of 
peak calls for both pricing functions, with the decrease with non-linear pricing 
function being more significant (Figure F-1 1). 
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Figure F-I 0 Traffic load with user mobility, 0=1.0 and a linear pricing function 
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Figure F-I I Traffic load with user mobility, 1.0 and a non-linear pricing function In 
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The effect of price induced user mobility elasticity a on the variance of 
the load in the network for unit elastic demand (P = 2.0), is plotted in Figure 
F-12 and Figure F-13. 
The introduction of user mobility again leads to a more even distribution 
of the network load as a function of time. As a increases the effect on the off- 
peak network load is insignificant. There is, however, a sizeable reduction (up 
to 0.5 Erlang for the non-linear function, Figure F-13) in the expected load in 
the network during peak hours. This is reduction due to the overall increase in 
the average price in the network, as the proportion of users shifting to less 
busy cells increases and leads to proportionally higher average price (see 
Figure F-1 7). 
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Figure F- 12 Traffic load with user mobility, 0=2.0 and a linear pricing function 
Therefore the effect, of intrioducing user mobility is to smooth the 
temporal distribution of the network load, in particular for mobility elasticity 
i. 0 and a non-linear pricing function. 
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Figure F-13 Traffic load with user mobility, 0=1.0 and a non-linear pricing function 
These results show that the introduction of user mobility as a function of 
the price in the network could lead to a reduction in the amount of revenue 
generated for the network operator (for mobility elasticity a>0.5 ) and a 
potential increase to the percentage of blocked calls (for a>1.5). Therefore, in 
order to precisely predict the effect of dynamic pricing on network performance 
a network operator would need to take account of user mobility. 
F. 3.2 User perspective. 
The introduction of user mobility also has an effect on the welfare of 
users by affecting the number of successful calls and the weighted average 
price in the network. 
In Figure F-14 and Figure F-15 the number of serviced calls for different 
values of a are compared. 
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Figure F- 14 Total number of successful calls with mobility and a linear price function 
Generally, the introduction of mobility leads to fewer calls being made 
with both linear and non-linear pricing functions. This is due to the reduction of 
calls in peak hours, as a increases, which is not compensated by an increase 
in calls during off peak hours. The only exception is the increase in the number 
of successful calls by 0.1 % with a linear pricing function, a=0.5 and inelastic 
demand (p = 1.0). 
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Figure F-I 5 Total number of successful calls with mobility and a non-linear price 
function 
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The reduction in the total number of calls becomes more significant as 
the mobility elasticity a and demand elasticity P increase. The linear pricing 
function performs better with only 1.8% and 2.1 % less calls for P=1.0,0 = 2.0 
and a=2.0 respectively. With the non-linear function the corresponding values 
are 4.4% and 5.5%. 
The weighted average price in the network also changes with the 
introduction of user mobility for both the linear and non-linear price functions. 
With the linear pricing function the average price in the network 
decreases by 1.3% as user mobility is introduced for inelastic demand 
(p = (see Figure F-16). The decrease diminished as a increases leading 
to - 0.1% percent decrease in the price for a= 2.0, which is insignificant, 
compared to the situation without user mobility. 
For unit elastic demand (P = 2.0), the price remains constant as the 
mobility elasticity a increases with a maximum 0.6% increase at mobility 
elasticity a=2.0 (which is insignificant). 
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Figure F-I 6 Weighted average price with mobility and a linear pricing function 
The situation is more dynamic with the non-linear pricing function. In this 
case, the price steadily increases as a increases with the inelastic demand 
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(P =I . 0) reaching up to 8.9% more, 
for mobility elasticity a= 2.0. For unit 
elastic demand (p = 2.0), however, the introduction of user mobility leads to an 
initial drop in the average price in the network by 3% (mobility elasticity 
a! ý 1.0 ). 
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Figure F- 17 Weighted average price with mobility and a non-linear pricing function 
As the mobility elasticity increases to a= 2.0, the average price in the 
network also increases by up to 5.7% above the average price without user 
mobility. This price increase is due to the relative increase in the proportion of 
users who choose to move to cheaper cells, increasing the overall price in the 
cells and thus the average price in the network. 
Shown in Figure F-18 and Figure F-19 is the probability distribution of the 
prices users will see with inelastic and unit elastic demand and the linear 
pricing function. The effect of the increase the mobility elasticity of users (a) is 
very insignificant and in both cases leads to an increase in the probability of 
users seeing the minimum and the maximum price in the network. 
-246- 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 
Appendix F 
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
CL 
0 0.1 
.2 
a- 0.05 
0 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Price (units) 
-k UCL 
Figu re F- 18 Price probability distribution with user mobility 1.0 and a linear pricing 
function 
0.3 
0.25 
.00.2 m 
0.15 
CL 
w 0.1 
U 
0.05 
0 
alpha 
alpha 
19 
10 
Is 00aaI 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Price (units) 
Figure F- 19 Price probability distribution with user mobility 2.0 and a linear pricing 
function 
Plotted in Figure F-20 and Figure F-21 is the effect of the user mobility 
elasticity a on the probability distribution of expected prices with the non- 
linear pricing function. As was the case with the linear price function, the 
effect of the increase the mobility elasticity of users (a) is very insignificant 
and in both cases leads to an increase in the probability of users seeing the 
minimum and the maximum price in the network, rather than the intermediate 
prices. 
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alpha = 2.0 
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Figure F-20 Price probability distribution with user mobility 1.0 and a non-linear 
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Figure F-21 Price probability distribution with user mobility 2.0 and a non-linear 
pricing function 
These results suggest that taking into account user mobility due to 
different prices in the network, combined with dynamic pricing, could 
potentially lead to a reduction in the number of successful calls in the network. 
It can also lead to an increase in the expected average price in the network for 
a>i. o if non-linear pricing function is used. 
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F. 4 Additional Simulation Results with Revenue Attainment Pricing. 
The introduction of revenue attainment pricing leads to an increase in the 
successful calls in the network with low revenue attainment preference 
(. c = I) with an increase by 8% for inelastic demand p=1.0 and 35% for unit 
elastic demand 0=2.0 as shown by Figure F-22. The increase diminishes as 
the preference of the network operator for revenue attainment - increases 
(increase by 5% for inelastic demand p=1.0 and 15% for unit elastic demand 
0=2.0. Overall, the total number of successful calls is higher than the number 
of successful calls in the system without dynamic pricing. 
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Figure F-22 Total number of successful calls with revenue attainment prices 
The effect of the preference for revenue attainment -c on the load in the 
network is plotted in Figure F-23 and Figure F-24. The graphs show that as 
the preference for revenue attainment E increases (and, therefore, the 
preference for maximum capacity utilisation 0 decreases) the overall load in 
the network also decreases. Significantly, however, the load in the network 
with dynamic pricing is higher than the load without dynamic pricing, 
regardless of demand elasticity. 
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Figure F-24 Load with revenue attainment prices and P=2.0 
This shows that dynamic pricing leads to better utilisation of the available 
capacity by reducing pieces when network capacity is under-utilised and 
stimulating demand 
The weighted average prices in the network are shown in Figure F-25. 
Overall the average price in the network is significantly lower (up to 35%) than 
without dynamic pricing (0.13 units )57. 
17 Calculated using the Cellnet table (Occasional Caller +) in Appendix B. 
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As the preference for revenue attainment increases, the average price in 
the network also increases. However, in order to ensure maximum capacity 
utilisation, it would be necessary to keep the average prices lower than the 
prices necessary to ensure that the required revenue is attained. 
F5 Additional Simulation Results with Optimal Dynamic Pricing. 
The effect of the optimal dynamic pricing on the load in the network for 
different demand elasticity 0 is plotted in Figure F-26. 
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Figure F-26 Load in the network as a function of time with optimal dynamic pricing for 
different demand elasticity 
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As with the other pricing functions as p increases, its effect on the 
distribution of the load becomes more significant, with an increase in the 
number of off-peak calls and a decrease in the number of peak-hour calls. 
In Figure F-27 the effect on network load of the optimal pricing is 
compared to the revenue attainment pricing for unit elastic demand (P = 2.0). 
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Figure F-27 Load in the network as a function of time, 2.0 and optimal and ad hoc 
competition driven pricing. 
The change caused by the revenue attainment pricing function is more 
significant than the effect of the optimal pricing function, in particular during 
peak hours. The optimal dynamic pricing strategy causes an increase in off- 
peak hours and a reduction in load during peak hour, which controls the 
percentage of blocked calls. The revenue attainment pricing strategy leads to 
an increase in both peak and off-peak traffic, thus leading to an increase in call 
blocking. Therefore, from a network provider's point of view the performance 
of the optimal dynamic pricing strategy could be considered more satisfactory. 
Running the simulation also indicated that with the introduction of optimal 
dynamic prices the total number of serviced calls would increase by 3% and 
18% for P=1.0 and P=2.0 respectively (see Figure F-28). This can be 
attributed to the reduction in the average price in the network (by 12% for 
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p=i. o and 15% for P=2.0) with the optimal dynamic pricing strategy (Figure 
F-29) 
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Figure F-28 Number of successful calls with optimal and revenue attainment pricing 
This increase in the number of successful calls is smaller than the 
increase in calls generated by the alternative revenue attainment pricing 
strategy (by 3% and 5% for inelastic and unit elastic demand respectively). 
This is due to the even lower (by 35%) average price with the revenue 
attainment pricing (Figure F-29), which over-stimulates demand thus 
increasing both the number of successful and the percentage of blocked calls 
in the network. 
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Figure F-29 Weighted average network price with optimal and revenue attainment 
pricing 
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